2025 has seen the focus of Indian democracy shift away from national-level campaigning towards State Assembly elections in Delhi and Bihar, and other local and national issues outside the realm of day-to-day politics. This explainer explores these issues, analysing what impression they give of India’s democratic health at the present time. From the six examples discussed here, it is clear that Indian democracy faces structural challenges relating to its federal system, electoral system, voter registration process and more which demand attention across the political spectrum.
The Lok Sabha’s Delimitation Dilemma
Large federal democracies face a common and often intractable challenge: as the population and economy grows at different rates in different parts of the country, how is equal representation in legislatures ensured? Most such democracies undertake periodic re-apportionment exercises (termed ‘delimitation’ in India), adjusting the number of legislative seats available to each state following a national census. India is no stranger to this challenge, but for structural reasons is suffering more than most as the Lok Sabha – its lower house – becomes increasingly unrepresentative.
Under the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution of India, Lok Sabha seat shares for each state were frozen to their share of the population in 1971. This was extended by the 84th Amendment to the Constitution in 2001, making current allocations over 50 years out of date. The design history of the Lok Sabha suggests that it was supposed to be constituted based on population share, and not equal representation for each. The current imbalances also create a welfare problem, with the less economically prosperous but more populous northern states under-represented in comparison to the more prosperous but less populous southern states. Fixing decades of inaction requires a step-change in the system.
As research by the ICfS has suggested, the existing structural problems are exacerbated by the Lok Sabha’s First-Past-the-Post electoral system: several state-level critics of the forthcoming delimitation exercise would lose out on Lok Sabha representation following any changes, creating an unintended incentive to resist what ought to be a routine exercise. Whilst electoral reform is unlikely in the near future, a preferential voting system would remove this barrier and give more space to smaller parties.
India has not had a census since 2011, as the scheduled 2021 census was delayed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Government of India has announced that the next census will take place on 1 March 2027, with an earlier date of 1 October 2026 for the areas of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. Re-apportionment of seats can only take place once official census results have been published. Given that previous delimitation exercises have taken around two years to complete, there are risks that the process will be rushed so that it can be completed before the 2029 General Election. Devadasan has also highlighted concerns around the independence of the Delimitation Commission, one member of which is India’s Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). The Union Cabinet has had a 2:1 majority on the panel to appoint the CEC since 2023, with the result that the CEC is structurally more likely to tow the Government line.
Several solutions to India’s delimitation dilemma have been put forward over the course of this year. Expanding the Lok Sabha is one option: India’s new Parliament Building can seat up to 880 Lok Sabha members, and Devadasan has pointed out that smaller constituencies reduce barriers to less well-resourced candidates, given the cost of campaigning. Rajya Sabha reform may strengthen India’s federal system. The Delimitation Commission must also operate within a transparent framework, with clear restrictions on the geographical size and number of eligible voters in each new constituency to minimise gerrymandering based on religion, caste or economic status.
Who rules in India’s states?
On 8 April 2025, India’s Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment, ruling that State Governors cannot absolutely veto or fail to approve Bills passed by State Legislatures. The Court outlined that the Governor of Tamil Nadu, RN Ravi, acted unconstitutionally and illegally by withholding or granting assent to 10 state Bills. The judgment ended a lengthy 5-year battle between the State of Tamil Nadu through the DMK-led legislature and its Governor.
Under Article 200 of the Constitution of India, upon receiving a bill, the Governor may choose to either grant assent, withhold assent or pass the bill for the President’s consideration (under Article 201). The Court, guided by the precedent of Union of India v Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (1979), observed that withholding assent from a Bill is only valid if the Governor returns the legislation to the legislature, and a re-passed Bill must be granted assent after being returned. April’s ruling mandates a specific timeframe within which Governors must respond to Bills, depending on whether the Governor sought advice and if the Bill was reconsidered by the legislature. The Bench further clarified that under Article 201, if the Governor chooses to pass a Bill to the President of India, they also cannot withhold assent without specified time limits. The case in Tamil Nadu proved especially contentious as it sought to amend the limits of gubernatorial powers, transferring authority over institutional oversight and executive appointments processes of state universities to the state legislative assembly. Similar cases have also arisen in Kerala and Punjab in 2023.
Within India’s federal system, Governors essentially act as the constitutional head of state at state level holding a range of legislative powers, including the ability to summon and prorogue the legislature. In practice, the exercise of legislative authority by States is highly significant in policymaking processes because States are responsible for issues such as public order, public health, land use, trade and for collecting taxes.
The Supreme Court’s ruling is highly significant to India’s democratic health as it reaffirmed the parliamentary nature of India’s federal system, in this instance, Governor Ravi overreached his authority by acting against the spirit of the Constitution and the advice of his Cabinet ministers, undermining the principles of representative democracy. Furthermore, the judgment upholds the integrity of the federal system by limiting the Union-appointed Governor’s powers to obstruct the will of the DMK-led government. The Court ensures the primacy of state-level representatives over the Governor’s party affiliations.
By curbing Gubernatorial overreach and upholding legislative sovereignty, the Court’s ruling signals a vital reassertion of the role of state legislatures as the true custodians of India’s parliamentary federal framework, reaffirming the importance of strong representative democracy at all levels of India’s system of government.
Tackling Online Misinformation
Operation Sindoor (which was covered in detail in two ICS reports) was a hot bed for misinformation. Indian news channels such as Times Now Navbharat, claimed that Indian troops had entered Pakistan and occupied the city of Karachi. Meanwhile, social media became a source for a large range of cases of misinformation and hate speech. This was not an isolated incident but instead reflective of long-term structural issues.
Part of this is how Indians get their news. A poll last year by Reuters found that 20-30% more Indians were getting news from social media rather than print or TV media. Social media in particular lacks the journalistic checks expected in TV media, which itself has not been immune to misinformation. Around half of people polled stated they used WhatsApp and YouTube for the news, creating the environment in which misinformation can spread quickly.
Meanwhile the state is ineffective in regulating this. Under Indian law social media platforms are defined as ‘network providers’. This presents these platforms in neutral terms, meaning that it is users who are held liable for posting misinformation. This is something that needs to be changed, particularly as major platforms expand their generative AI offering. There have been some attempts to strengthen against this. Social media campaigning has been monitored since 2019 by a Voluntary Code of Ethics. Whilst groups such as Facebook, Google and X (Twitter) have cooperated, it is still too slow to tackle the fast-pace nature of misinformation. It has been unable to tackle issues such as the use of deepfakes in campaigns and the amount of spending by third parties on social media. on social media.
Another tool India has in tackling misinformation is the Fact Check Unit (FCU). However, there are concerns that attempts to strengthen the FCU will come to the detriment of democracy. This year, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology drafted amendments to the IT (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Meida Ethics Code) Rules so that 10% of an AI-generated image’s display area or 10% of its audio runtime must be labelled as ‘synthetically generated information’. Whilst this would help to inform people, there have been concerns that this would hinder free speech as this will not distinguish between misinformation and legitimate uses such as satire. Moreover, previous amendments, which would have allowed the Fact Check Unit to direct the removal of content it identified as ‘fake or false or misleading’ under the IT Rules fell through. These amendments were ruled unconstitutional by the Bombay High Court in 2024.
These structural issues came to the fore during Operation Sindoor, when there was a lack of distinction between attempts to tackle pro-Pakistani disinformation and silencing legitimate news outlets. Not only was access to Pakistani media platforms such as Dawn restricted in India, but the Wire was taken down for 24 hours, leading to concerns that the Government was using the opportunity to hinder free speech and restrict criticism.
The spread of misinformation is a major issue that is not going away. How it is tackled will be a major test of India’s democratic health.
Should Politicians Serve from Jail? Examining India’s Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill
On 20 August 2025, India’s Home Minister Amit Shah proposed the Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill. It is currently in a joint parliamentary committee of the Houses (which require a 2/3 majority to pass).
The Bill requires removal of the Prime Minister, a Chief Minister of State or any other Minister in the central or state government if:
1) they are accused of an offence that is punishable by five or more years’ imprisonment; and
2) they are arrested and detained for 30 or more days
The aim of the Bill is therefore to restore faith and trust in democratic representatives. In a statement, the Home Minister claimed that it was ‘an insult to democracy’ that the Prime Minister, Minister and Chief Minister could serve from jail. This is a serious issue in India. Of the current Lok Sabha alone, 20% of members have declared criminal cases and 14% serious crimes.
However, whilst this is an issue that needs to be addressed, there should be concern about the Bill because of how it can be used by governments to stifle opposition.
The bill exceeds the Government’s constitutional remit. It undermines the principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ (Article 21(6) of the Constitution). The law goes against the Lily Thomas decision (2013). As Justice K. Chandru argues the importance of this ruling is that “even if the Parliament wants to make a law on disqualification of the elected member of the House of either the Parliament or the State legislature (which includes even the ministers, chief ministers and the Prime Minister), such a law cannot travel beyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution.” In this way the Bill appears to undermine the fundamental right of people to due process, instead punishing them for simply being charged with a crime.
This is of concern because the Bill, in conjunction with India’s enforcement agencies, can be used to target those opposed to the government. Although the Bill is framed neutrally, 95% of the cases brought against politicians by the Enforcement Directorate (ED), which investigates financial crimes, have featured politicians from minority parties. The relevant figure under Congress rule before 2014 was 54%. However, the ED also has a very low conviction rate. For instance, there is only a 0.5% conviction rate for politicians charged under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (the ED’s main tool). With this context, the Bill could make the ED more effective in silencing political opposition.
An example of how this could be used is seen in the arrest of former Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal in 2024 due to allegedly receiving kickbacks from his alcohol sales policy. Whilst the case may be credible, it is notable that he (and his AAP party) are vocal critics of the ruling BJP. Kejriwal was arrested weeks before the 2024 Lok Sabha elections and was in jail for 5 months. Had the 130th Amendment Bill been in force, he would automatically have been removed as Chief Minister, with significance not only for campaigning during those elections but also for the Delhi Legislative Assembly elections that took place in early 2025.
Therefore, there is some doubt whether the Bill will fulfil its aim of reinstating faith in democracy. Instead, it will most likely further undermine it by creating new opportunities for corruption charges to silence political opposition.
Revising India’s Electoral Rolls: A Problem of Structural Challenges
The latter half of 2025 has been marked by allegations of voter fraud and the manipulation of the electoral rolls in India by Rahul Gandhi, the current Leader of the Opposition. The allegations relate to the Haryana state elections in 2024 and the Bihar state elections in 2025, prior to which the Election Commission of India conducted a large-scale revision of the electoral roll. Though it remains unclear whether the Bihar exercise was unconstitutional, the case points to structural challenges relating to India’s election management system.
Only citizens of India can vote in elections at all levels. Voters can only be registered in their place of ordinary residence and must fill out a form if they wish to transfer their registration to a new residence. The electoral register is managed at constituency level both by local agents of the Election Commission and by party-affiliated officials called Booth Level Agents (BLAs). Small-scale revisions of the register occur before every election. The Election Commission can carry out a large-scale revision (‘Special Intensive Revision’) – such as that which took place in Bihar from June 2025 onwards – when it chooses but must give reasons for doing so. In this case, the reasons given included rapid urbanisation, frequent migration and the inclusion in the roll of illegal immigrants who are ineligible to vote.
The electoral registration and management process in India includes a mixture of paper and online forms. Voter lists are checked manually when voters go to the polling booth to cast their vote. Bihar is one of India’s poorest states, with significant economic migration to other areas of India. A system that is paper-based and managed at constituency or local level has clear structural challenges in these circumstances.
The last Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of Bihar’s electoral roll was in 2003. In the recent SIR, every elector on the roll had to provide documentation to verify their eligibility. For those registered prior to 2003, their presence on the 2003 roll was sufficient proof. Those registered after 2003 had to produce one of eleven documents. Until the Supreme Court of India’s intervention in July 2025, this did not include the Aadhaar card, India’s government-issued ID. As Aadhaar cards do not prove citizenship, the Court’s direction assumes that all previous electoral registrations and issued Aadhaar cards were validly issued. The Court’s final decision on whether the SIR was constitutional was not given prior to the Bihar elections in November 2025, won by the National Democratic Alliance (the BJP’s pre-poll coalition).
Following the SIR in Bihar, the Election Commission announced that similar exercises would take place in twelve other States and Union Territories: Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Goa, Puducherry, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, and Lakshadweep. These exercises begun in October 2025, and final electoral rolls will be published in February 2026. Kerala, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu will all hold elections for their State Legislative Assemblies in 2026. The Supreme Court’s verdict in the Bihar elections case may well, given this, shape the conduct of India’s upcoming elections. Until this time, India’s policymakers and electoral officials must consider how electoral registers across the country can be systematised and digitised, with native digital platforms and data sharing across constituencies and booths to tackle the contemporary realities of Indian elections.
The six examples surveyed in this piece highlight a range of different structural challenges with contemporary Indian democracy. Resolving each one requires a carefully crafted programme of policy design that not only addresses current challenges but builds democratic resilience by promoting long-term solutions. The first steps towards these solutions must begin in 2026.
