Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk
How does a global ruling power react to a rising power? Harvard Professor Graham Allison argues that the ruling power’s fear can provoke conflict with the rising power, in what he terms the ‘Thucydides Trap’. For him, the US and China are locked in such a struggle. As India continues to aspire to global superpower status in the future, how will the US respond in the medium term, based on its ongoing tensions with China? Examining how the two candidates in the US presidential election approach the US-China relationship suggests that how India pursues greater influence will be critical to future US-India relations, with comments on its democratic credentials less significant in the current geopolitical climate.
The Harris approach
For the Democrats, there are two broad reasons why the US distrusts China. The first is more realist: China seeks supremacy in the Indo-Pacific for its own ends. It is catching up to the US in economic terms and has rapidly expanded in military terms. What John Hulsman calls the ‘Roosevelt Rule’ – that the primary geopolitical interest of the US is that no hegemon emerges on the Eurasian landmass, owing to the risks to the Western hemisphere – seems to be in play here, setting a notably realist base for Democrat policy. The second reason is more values-based: China is anti-democratic and seeks to reshape the international order to suit its own interests and way of governing, as the 2022 National Security Strategy notes. Ian Bremmer suggests that President Biden and Vice-President Harris approach this from different perspectives: for Biden, the key concern is the contest between democracies and autocracies, whereas for Harris, it is adherence to international norms and the upholding of a rules-based order. For the Democrats, the US must still cooperate with other nations to counter China, whatever their democratic credentials, and with China itself, to resolve shared global challenges. The idealism of the 20th century appears to have given away to a more pragmatic mindset: the Democratic administration does “not, however, believe that governments and societies everywhere must be remade in America’s image for us to be secure.”
The Trump approach
The evidence of the 2016-2020 Trump presidency and the claims of Project 2025 leave no doubt that Donald Trump views China as a major threat to US national interests. The US Strategic Approach to China from 2020 emphasises the risks of Beijing’s predatory economic practices, intellectual property theft and exploitation of other nations through the agreements made under the One Belt, One Road initiative. For Trump, the interests of the US ought to come first in any bilateral agreements, resulting in a transactional approach that some regard as bringing a cost-benefit analysis into every interaction. This had made Trump’s foreign policy approach an unpredictable one, with US-China relations deteriorating during his presidency and the risks of an escalating trade war if he is re-elected and tariffs are raised on both sides. Yet Trump has also praised Xi Jinping in a rally in Michigan, and whilst president, agreed a deal to export semiconductors and chipmaking equipment to China which was later amended, perhaps due to national security considerations. What is certain is that Trump’s foreign policy approach to China will seek to prioritise at every turn what he views as the interests of the US.
A shared pragmatism
There is a shared degree of pragmatism in both the Republican and Democrat approaches to China that is likely to be transferred to US policy on a rising India. Both parties view the need to preserve the national interests of the US as essential: this is central to Trump’s approach, and notable in the willingness of the Democrats to work with countries that are not democracies to counter shared threats. This means criticism about India’s democratic credentials from within the US will not wholly determine the nature of the US-India relationship under the Democrats.
The trade relations between the US, India and China add important context here. In the 2023-24 year, India had a trade surplus of c.$37 billion with the US, and a trade deficit of $85 billion with China. The US has a trade deficit of $185 billion with China between January and August 2024. Whilst it is unlikely that either India or the US will decouple from China entirely in the next five years, a Trump presidency in particular may seek to deepen the US-India trading relationship to reduce the US’s dependence on China. A recent joint paper from the Takshashila Institute and the Hudson Institute highlights the potential for economic cooperation between the US and India on emerging technology, especially keeping in mind the threat China poses to both countries’ national security interests.
The manner of India’s rise
The manner of India’s rise will be of interest to both Republicans and Democrats in this context, given the nuances of their foreign policy approaches to China. Were Trump to adopt something like the Roosevelt Rule – as Hulsman argues the Republicans ought to do – then the US-India relationship may sour going forward if the US sees India as the ‘next China’, asserting its military might and engaging in predatory economic behaviour. This is unlikely in practice: as Tim Marshall has identified, China’s military expansion owes itself to geographical barriers in the territorial waters of the South China Sea that simply do not apply to India. Moreover, the idea of India as a vishwa guru (‘world teacher’) seems to prioritise sharing cultural values, resources and technology to benefit both India and the world, rather than the hegemony represented by contemporary China. As William Dalrymple charts in his recent book The Golden Road, this was precisely the role of the Indian subcontinent in the first millennium CE, as it interacted with Southeast Asia, China and the Roman world.
The Democrats under Vice-President Harris will be more concerned about how a rising India situates itself within the rules-based international order created in the aftermath of World War II. India has sought a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for some years, a position recently endorsed by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken at the UN Summit for the Future. If Vice-President Harris is elected as President, India would be wise to work within the existing international order to even out some of the entrenched hierarchies.
There are two main areas of interest here. The first is the Ukraine-Russia war. The Democrats are committed to the conflict ending in Ukraine’s favour, because of Russia’s violation of international norms. If India keeps buying Russian oil, as suggested by India’s Minister for Petroleum and Natural Gas, the Democrats may start to see India as belonging on the wrong side of this particular divide. The second is how India’s engagement with Russia and China through the BRICS collective dovetails with its continuing relations with the US in other domains. Whilst some may regard the BRICS as an attempt to forge a new global order outside existing international structures – and thus an object of suspicion for the US – the more nuanced reality is that US engagement with India continues in various sectors. Indian firms are manufacturing aircraft and helicopter parts for Lockheed Martin and Boeing, whilst India has a joint agreement with the US, Japan and South Korea on investment to improve India’s digital infrastructure, to drive economic growth in the Indo-Pacific. Through continuing cooperation across sectors, grounded in shared respect for a rules-based order, a rising India can be seen as a trusted partner for the US going forward.
Where next?
The outcome of next week’s US elections will have significant international implications. As India continues to rise over the next five years, the manner of its growing global influence will be an important factor in shaping how its relationship with the US evolves. A Trump presidency will likely focus more on trade and shared defence interests to counteract China, albeit with a degree of unpredictability, whereas a Harris presidency will look to see whether India plays by the ‘rules of the game’ in both international fora and various bilateral agreements. As India navigates a course between two great poles, cooperation based on shared rules and interests will serve it much better than any desire to become the next global hegemon.
