2025

Engagement without recognition: How democracies abandoned Afghan women

Author: Ornicha Daorueng Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, no country in the world has formally recognised them as the legitimate government. One of the strongest barriers to recognition has been the Taliban’s failure to meet certain informal conditions: forming an inclusive government and respecting human rights, particularly the rights of women and girls. Diplomatic pressure intensified after the Taliban banned women from education and employment. The US Secretary of State warned that “there are going to be costs if this is not reversed.” The United Kingdom likewise declared that it “unequivocally condemns this ban and all others that restrict Afghan women’s and girls’ rights and fundamental freedoms.” India voiced concern over the Taliban’s university ban, urging the formation of an inclusive government in Kabul that guarantees equal rights for women and girls across Afghan society. At the 79th United Nations General Assembly, eighty-three countries issued a joint statement condemning the Taliban’s “institutionalised and systematic discrimination” against women and girls, and urged the regime to immediately reverse all edicts targeting them. On paper, the international community stands united in condemning the Taliban’s gender apartheid. In practice, however, the response has been weak and even contradictory. Many governments have opted for quiet “pragmatic engagement,” seeking common ground in the name of humanitarian access and regional stability. But is this truly the right path forward? The September 2025 earthquake revealed how Afghan women remain invisible even in tragedy, a stark reminder of what “engagement” has failed to change. Moreover, how can democracies founded on liberty, equality and human dignity remain passive in the face of Afghan women’s struggle? Engagement without conviction: how internationals justify engaging with the Taliban Beyond diplomatic isolation and conditional aid, no government has taken concrete steps to pressure the Taliban on women’s rights. Instead, a policy of “engagement without recognition” has emerged. The UK and US have not recognised the Taliban, but both maintain contact through third countries. The UK operates a “UK Mission to Afghanistan” inside its embassy in Doha, Qatar, and pursue a policy of “limited and pragmatic” engagement when it serves national interests. The US follows the same model, with officials meeting Taliban representatives in Doha whenever Washington deems it to be in its interest. India, too, has re-established a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan by sending a technical team to reopen its Kabul embassy. Most recently, in October 2025, Afghanistan’s Taliban Foreign Minister met with India’s External Affairs Minister, marking the highest-level visit by a Taliban official since the group took control in 2021.  During the trip, India announced plans to reopen its embassy in Kabul and to restore trade, investment, and humanitarian cooperation with Afghanistan. Even in the Muslim world, countries such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and several Central Asian states, while publicly criticising the Taliban regime, have nevertheless maintained ties, from reopening embassies in Kabul to hosting the Taliban’s political office. Governments justify this engagement on humanitarian, security, and geopolitical grounds, including aid delivery and economic stabilisation to narcotics control, counter-terrorism, and security assurances amid regional tensions. Officials insist that boycotting the Taliban would only deepen polarisation, whereas dialogue might create common ground and shape Afghanistan’s future. However, whatever the motive, whether humanitarian or strategic, the effect remains the same. Every meeting, mission, and handshake signals to the Taliban that the world still seeks their cooperation for access, stability, and control. As a result, Taliban representatives speak to the United Nations with confidence that they “do not wish to create obstacles” to its work, while declaring that their treatment of women is an internal matter that the international community should “respect.” Beyond rhetoric: acting on the courage of democratic values Every democracy, every member of the United Nations, especially those that signed the joint statement condemning the Taliban regime, claims to be built on liberty, equality, and human dignity. Yet the diplomatic practice of “engagement without recognition”, combined with a lack of real pressure or action, has reduced those values to rhetoric. Governments justify this approach by arguing that isolating the Taliban would only hurt ordinary Afghans, but in practice it allows diplomats to speak of women’s rights while sitting across from those who erase them. This is not pragmatic realism; it is a loss of democratic conviction.   There are actions that align principle with effectiveness. First, impose sanctions for gender apartheid. The existing sanctions regime, last substantively updated in 2011 with a focus on counter-terrorism, has never addressed gender-based persecution. The United Nations could reassert its credibility by enforcing and expanding targeted sanctions on Taliban leaders responsible for the systematic oppression of women and girls. Second, condition humanitarian aid on women’s rights. Under current humanitarian exemptions, billions of dollars in aid, including $4.4 billion in 2022, $4.6 billion in 2023, and more than $3.4 billion from the United States since its withdrawal, have kept Afghanistan afloat, covering food, health, and shelter. But the Taliban’s response to such generosity was to punish women further: in December 2022 they barred Afghan women from working for NGOs, and four months later, for the UN itself. The UN and donors should use existing humanitarian exemptions to make aid conditional on tangible progress in restoring women’s education, employment, and participation in public life. They should also channel funding to Afghan women-led organisations that quietly run underground schools, clinics, and community programmes, providing them with political protection and sustained support as rightful partners in rebuilding their country. Finally, governments could fast-track asylum and resettlement for Afghan women, not men, prioritising those most at risk: journalists, educators, activists, and judges. This is both to ensure their safety and to affirm the democratic values their struggle represents. These are only a few examples of how moral conviction can be translated into meaningful action, proof that defending values need not come at the expense of effectiveness. ** In dealing with extremists, polite engagement will never bring change. It is not their language, nor the conduct of a regime that has brutalised its own

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This Is Not Islam: The Taliban’s Rule over Women Shames Humanity

Author: Ornicha Daorueng A magnitude 6 earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan on the night of 31 August, killing at least 2,200 people, injuring more than 3,600, and destroying over 5,000 homes. More than half a million people have been affected, with hundreds of families displaced to temporary camps, while medical teams continue to treat the injured amid ongoing aftershocks. Amid this humanitarian catastrophe, one striking reality stands out: the absence of women. In nearly all the images and footage emerging from the earthquake zone, women are nowhere to be seen, not in rescue operations, not in relief camps, not even among the wounded in hospitals. This absence is tragic, though not surprising. Under Taliban rule, both before and after its return to power in 2021, Afghan women have been systematically erased from public life, banned from education, barred from employment, and excluded from almost every sphere of social participation. This gender apartheid is so absolute that even a natural disaster could not shake its walls. The fact that women remain invisible amid mass death and destruction is more than a tragedy to mourn or a “cultural difference” to excuse. It is a moral alarm to the world, a call to act. For non-Muslims, it is a demand to stop excusing injustice in the name of culture; for Muslims, it is an urgent duty to reclaim Islam’s true image from those who have distorted it. The Taliban’s regime: a “gender apartheid” The Taliban is an Islamist militant movement that emerged in the early 1990s with the aim of turning Afghanistan into an Islamic state. They captured Kabul in 1996 and ruled the country until 2001, before returning to power in 2021 following the US withdrawal. The Taliban are Islamist fundamentalists who enforce a rigid interpretation of Islamic law and are notorious for widespread human rights abuses. Under their version of Sharia, women and girls are banned from attending school, working, leaving the house without a male guardian, showing their skin in public, receiving medical care from male doctors, engaging in politics, or even speaking publicly. In other words, women have been erased from public life and confined within the home, with no control over their own lives. These are not isolated incidents of discrimination but a systemic denial of the most basic rights, simply because they are women. UN human rights officials have reported that these policies “seek to completely erase women’s presence in public.” Ashraf Ghani, the former Afghan president who fled the country as the Taliban seized power in August 2021, described it as “a vivid sign of gender apartheid in the 21st century.” Muslim world rejects the Taliban’s interpretation The Taliban claim their bans reflect Islamic law and teachings. Yet Afghanistan remains the only Muslim country in the world where girls are barred from secondary school and university. Across the Muslim world, leaders and scholars have rejected this as un-Islamic. From Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, to Indonesia and many other governments and religious authorities have publicly condemned the Taliban’s ban, especially on women’s education.  Turkey: “The ban is neither Islamic nor humane… Islam encourages education and science.” United Arab Emirates: “Bans on girls’ and women’s education violate fundamental human rights, contradict the teachings of Islam, and must be swiftly reversed.” Qatar: “It is very disappointing to see steps backwards… In Qatar’s Islamic system, women outnumber men in government, the workforce, and higher education.” Indonesia: “Education is a fundamental right for all men and women. Indonesia urges the Taliban to ensure uninterrupted access to education for women.” Al-Azhar’s Grand Imam (Cairo): “Banning Afghan women from university contradicts Sharia and Islam’s call for both men and women to seek knowledge.” In an interview with the ICfS, Paul Salahuddin Armstrong, Managing Director (Amir) of the Association of British Muslims, reflected: “the Prophet himself empowered women and encouraged women’s education. Within Islam, the woman is the first teacher of her children and her family.” He added, “the Taliban are Islamists who use the excuse of Islam to impose policies and actions aimed at controlling society.” Taken together, these statements show a clear consensus across the Muslim world: the Taliban’s treatment of women is fundamentally wrong. Their edicts are not a defence of Islam, but a pursuit of political control disguised in religious language. Neither the holy texts nor Islam’s mainstream traditions endorse this kind of oppression imposed on women in Afghanistan today. Reclaiming human rights and Islam from the Taliban’s ideology Religion is not monolithic. Islam, like Christianity, Hinduism, or Buddhism, is not a fixed block of belief but a living tradition, shaped by multiple schools of thought, interpretations, and cultural expressions. As Paul Salahuddin Armstrong remarked, “As Islam spread around the world, it absorbed different cultures.” Many practices now labelled “Islamic” may, in fact, stem from local customs that merged with the faith as it expanded across regions. In pluralistic democracies, people are free to worship and live according to their faith. Yet liberty, equality, and human dignity form a universal baseline that no religion or culture can override. If we believe in liberty, equality, and human dignity as universal rights, then we must uphold them consistently, not only within our own borders but wherever they are denied. That means having the moral clarity to critique the Taliban’s ideology without fear of being labelled as “Islamophobic.” Defending universal rights is not an attack on faith; it is an affirmation of our shared humanity, and a way of shaping faith into a force for compassion, not oppression. Ultimately, the most powerful rejection of the Taliban’s ideology will not come from outsiders but from Muslims themselves. Muslims around the world must speak out for their own faith and against those who exploit and distort it. The strongest voices, and the best starting point, may come from Muslims living in democracies such as the US, the UK and India. They are among those who most deeply understand and live by the values of freedom, equality and dignity, in sharp contrast to the

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A Functional Analysis of UK House of Lords Reform

Author: Pravar petkar and Amy wonnacott The House of Lords is one of the largest and longest-standing parliamentary chambers in the world. For some, an unelected chamber at the heart of the British governing apparatus is a relic of a bygone era, incompatible with the demands of a modern democracy. For others, it represents a vital check on the party-political House of Commons, drawing on its members’ deep experience in public and professional life in revising legislation. Many nevertheless agree that the House of Lords is in need of some reform. But where should that reform begin?   This research paper argues that any effort to reform the House of Lords must start by articulating the chamber’s purpose – without this, reform efforts risk undermining what makes the House of Lords successful today. Read the full report here: A Functional Analysis of UK House of Lords Reform

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From Beijing to Delhi: Britain’s New Bet

Author: Sachin Nandha, DIrector-General Last week, Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer made his first state visit to India, arriving with a 125-strong delegation of business, academic, and cultural leaders. The official reason was to advance the recently signed UK–India Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The deeper reality, however, was a decisive tilt in Britain’s foreign economic orientation away from the embattled Sino-centric axis of previous years and toward a future in which Delhi may matter more than Beijing. In July 2025, the United Kingdom and India signed their long-anticipated free trade agreement after three years of negotiation. The deal promises to eliminate tariffs on more than 90 percent of UK exports to India, including cosmetics, clothing, and Scotch whisky, and to offer zero duty on 99 percent of Indian exports to the UK. India will also reduce duties on cars, currently above 100 percent, to 10 percent under a quota, while providing enhanced access to procurement and services sectors (Reuters, 23 July 2025). The two countries also agreed to reset a Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) to manage implementation and launched new cooperative initiatives in innovation, connectivity, and artificial intelligence (Government of the United Kingdom, 9 October 2025). What Britain hopes to gain is clear. Access to India’s fast-growing market projected to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2028, is the sort of expansion that post-Brexit Britain urgently needs (Reuters, 7 October 2025). The agreement is projected to generate around 6,900 new UK jobs across sectors such as engineering, creative industries, and technology. The deal also strengthens Britain’s credibility in South Asia’s strategic landscape, a valuable asset at a time when global power rivalries are sharpening. India’s gains are equally significant. Indian exporters of textiles, agricultural goods, and pharmaceuticals will now enjoy much greater access to UK markets, often duty free (Reuters, 7 October 2025). Delhi also secured commitments for nine UK universities to open campuses in India and for increased collaboration in technology and artificial intelligence (NDTV, “India–UK Trade Pact to Boost MSMEs, Create Jobs,” 2025). In addition, a new mobility scheme will allow 3,000 Indians and 3,000 Britons to live and work in each other’s countries for up to two years. Politically, the deal enhances India’s stature as a preferred partner of a major Western democracy. However, the partnership is not without its difficulties. India failed to secure an exemption from Britain’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, meaning that high-emission exports may face additional cost burdens (Reuters, 23 July 2025). A bilateral investment treaty remains unresolved, and key issues such as rules of origin, liberalisation of financial services, and certain visa provisions are still under negotiation or only partially settled. Furthermore, British firms face stiff competition from Chinese, Korean, and ASEAN rivals that benefit from greater state support and more favourable regulatory regimes. This situation invites comparison with Britain’s recent China strategy. Over the past decade, the UK’s relationship with China has evolved from enthusiastic engagement to cautious distance. In early 2025, the United Kingdom prepared to resume trade talks with China for the first time in seven years, reviving the Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETCO) that had been dormant since 2018 (Government of the United Kingdom, 2025). In January 2025, during the UK–China Economic and Financial Dialogue, Beijing agreed to re-list UK pork processors, ease access for legal services, grant better export certification for wool, andopen doors for Scotch whisky labelling (Government of the United Kingdom, “2025 UK–China Economic and Financial Dialogue Fact Sheet”). Despite these gestures, the numbers tell a less flattering story. According to the UK Department for Business and Trade, UK goods exports to China fell by 25.7 percent in the year to the first quarter of 2025, while imports from China rose by more than 5 percent, resulting in a trade deficit of £42 billion (UK Government, “China Trade and Investment Factsheet,” 19 September 2025). Britain’s approach to China has become a balancing act between commercial opportunity and security risk, as noted by analysts at Chatham House (“What the UK Must Get Right in its China Strategy,” July 2025). It is therefore no coincidence that Britain now courts India with enthusiasm. India’s democratic governance and relatively lower geopolitical risk make it a safer bet than Beijing’s opaque state capitalism. Where China represents an enormous but fraught dependency, India represents a promising partnership built on aspiration and mutual political legitimacy. Britain is effectively pivoting from a relationship based on dependence toward one based on alignment. Still, the success of this realignment depends on consistent implementation. Britain must ensure that Indian exporters do not simply displace other partners, and that small and medium-sized British enterprises not only large corporations benefit from the trade deal. India, for its part, must resist the temptation to reintroduce protectionist measures that could stall liberalisation. In summary, the Starmer mission to Mumbai symbolised ambition more than certainty. The new trade pact could yet become the crown jewel of Britain’s post-Brexit trade policy—or another well-intentioned treaty that fades under the weight of bureaucracy. For now, London and Delhi walk forward hand in hand, in a world where China still looms large, but no longer dictates the direction of travel. References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Reuters (23 July 2025). Britain and India sign landmark free trade pact during Modi visit. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britain-india-sign-landmark-free-trade-pact-during-modi-visit-2025-07-23 Reuters (7 October 2025). UK PM Starmer visits India to build business ties after clinching trade deal. Government of the United Kingdom (9 October 2025). India–UK Joint Statement. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/india-uk-joint-statement-9-october-2025 NDTV (2025). India–UK Trade Pact to Boost MSMEs, Create Jobs. Wikipedia. India–United Kingdom Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Government of the United Kingdom (2025). UK–China Economic and Financial Dialogue Fact Sheet. UK Government (19 September 2025). China Trade and Investment Factsheet. Chatham House (July 2025). What the UK Must Get Right in its China Strategy.

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Cultured Meat: An Economic and Environmental Imperative for Investors

Author: Sachin Nandha, DIrector-General The global food system is on the brink of its most profound transformation in over a century. For decades, the economics of animal agriculture have been taken for granted, with vast tracts of land devoted to livestock and feed production. Yet a new competitor is emerging that could upend this model: cultured meat. This technology, which produces real meat by growing animal cells in controlled environments, is moving rapidly from the laboratory to industrial scale. For investors, policymakers and food producers, the implications are immense. The Economic Case The economic rationale for cultured meat is strengthening each year. Between 2015 and 2023, investment in cultivated meat and seafood companies surpassed 3.1 billion US dollars, spread across more than 150 start-ups worldwide (United States Department of Agriculture, 2023). The global market for cultured meat, valued at just over 1 billion US dollars in 2024, is projected to grow to 10.8g billion US dollars by 2033, representing a compound annual growth rate of 16.5 per cent (Straits Research, 2024). Costs, long cited as the principal barrier, are falling due to breakthroughs in bioreactor design, cell line optimisation and the dramatic decline in the cost of growth media. Once regulatory approvals are secured in large consumer markets such as the United Kingdom and the European Union, production at scale will erode the cost advantage of conventional beef and dairy. At that point, cultured meat will cease to be a niche luxury and will become a mass-market competitor. The economics of animal agriculture are also inherently inefficient. Producing one kilogram of beef requires up to 25 kilograms of feed and 15,000 litres of water (Poore and Nemecek, 2018). By bypassing the animal and producing meat directly from cells, cultured systems eliminate much of this waste. Investors should note that in industries where efficiency gains of even 10 per cent drive long-term profitability, cultured meat offers an order of magnitude shift. The Environmental Case The environmental argument is equally compelling. Conventional livestock farming is responsible for approximately 14.5 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, largely through methane and nitrous oxide (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2013). Cultured beef, when produced with renewable energy, has the potential to reduce emissions by as much as 92 per cent compared to traditional beef (FoodChain ID, 2024). Land use is perhaps the most striking area of impact. In the United Kingdom, 17 million hectares are classified as utilised agricultural area, representing around 70 per cent of the country’s landmass. Of this, 9.7 million hectares are permanent grassland used overwhelmingly for grazing livestock (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2024). A further 2 million hectares of arable land are devoted to growing feed for animals, roughly the size of Wales (World Wide Fund for Nature, 2022). If cultured meat were to displace even half of the current beef and dairy sector, millions of hectares could be released for rewilding, carbon sequestration and biodiversity restoration. Globally, researchers estimate that replacing animal agriculture with plant-based or cultured systems could reduce land use by up to 75 per cent (Our World in Data, 2019). The implications for climate policy, food security and ecological recovery are profound. The Investor Opportunity For investors, the opportunity is immediate. The technology is moving out of the start-up phase and into industrial deployment. Regulatory frameworks are advancing: the Food Standards Agency in the United Kingdom is preparing approval pathways for cultured products, while Singapore and the United States have already authorised commercial sales. Once approvals in the UK and European Union are finalised, consumer adoption will accelerate. Cultured meat offers a multi-layered return profile. In the short term, early entrants will capture premium margins by marketing climate-friendly, ethically produced meat. In the medium term, cost parity with conventional meat will drive volume growth. In the long term, ancillary value will accrue from the release of land for carbon credits, nature-based solutions and ecosystem services. The investment logic is therefore clear. This is not merely a food story. It is a convergence of three megatrends: climate action, technological innovation and consumer demand for transparency and ethics. Institutional investors who position early will secure intellectual property, supply chain leadership and reputational advantage. Those who delay will face a compressed window, as incumbents in the meat industry pivot and as sovereign wealth funds and family offices increasingly allocate to food transition strategies. A Polite Confrontation For beef and dairy farmers, these trends represent an existential challenge. Current business models depend on land-intensive, emissions-heavy practices that will become increasingly untenable under both market and policy pressure. This is not an argument against farmers, but a recognition that the model must evolve. The choice will be stark: to pivot towards regenerative land management, ecosystem stewardship and specialty value chains, or to face decline. History shows that industries resistant to change eventually lose relevance. The cultured meat revolution is not a matter of if, but when. For investors and leaders, the real question is whether they will seize the opportunity to shape this future or be left reacting to it. The scale of land, capital and emissions at stake demands urgency. Cultured meat is no longer a thought experiment. It is an economic and environmental imperative. References Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2024). Farming Evidence Pack: Key Statistics. GOV.UK. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2013). Tackling Climate Change through Livestock. FAO, Rome. FoodChain ID (2024). Lab-grown Meat as an Alternative for Traditional Meat Production. FoodChain ID, April 2024. Our World in Data (2019). Land Use by the World’s Diets. Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/land-use-diets. Poore, J. and Nemecek, T. (2018). ‘Reducing food’s environmental impacts through producers and consumers’, Science, 360(6392), pp. 987–992. Straits Research (2024). Cultured Meat Market Size, Share and Growth Analysis 2024–2033. United States Department of Agriculture (2023). Economic Research Report 342: Emerging Alternative Proteins. USDA Economic Research Service. World Wide Fund for Nature (2022). The Future of Feed: Understanding UK Land Use. WWF UK.

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Investigating Perceptions of Anti-Hindu Hate and discrimination in the UK

Author: Ornicha Daorueng, Head of future of Faith Desk Anti-Hindu hate and discrimination in the UK is an increasing concern that has received limited attention. Despite being the third-largest religious group in the country, Hindus face hostility that remains poorly defined, inconsistently recorded, and largely absent from policy conversations. Although incidents such as the 2022 Leicester unrest were widely recognised and gained national attention, there remains no systemic engagement with anti-Hindu hate and discrimination at either governmental or institutional levels. This report, by the ICfS in partnership with Vichaar Manthan, a public engagement platform within the Hindu community, is grounded in recognition of that gap, drawing on survey responses from Hindu individuals and educational institutions in the UK. It seeks not only to examine the lived realities of anti-Hindu hate and discrimination, but also to understand how such hostility emerges, and why it has remained largely unrecognised. The report aims to bring greater visibility and an evidence-based understanding to the issue, and to offer practical recommendations that support more informed public debate, inclusive policy design, and long-term structural reform. Read the full report here: Investigating Perceptions of Anti-Hindu Hate and Discrimination in the UK

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How China’s Cartographic Aggression Undermines the Rules-Based Order in the Indo-Pacific

Author: Shruti kapil, researcher – Security and mutual dependence desk. “Maps are the product of power, and they produce power,” as stated by Geographer J Brian Harley. In 2023, the release of a new “standard map” by China’s Ministry of Natural Resources drew strong reactions from at least six or seven countries due to its expansive territorial claims. The map particularly angered China’s neighbours, as it included not only Taiwan but also portions of the maritime zones of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia, as well as disputed land belonging to India and even territory belonging to Russia, so-called China’s ally.   This is not the first time China has used cartography to project power and assert control in this region. Beijing has been doing so over the years through repeated visual dash lines, massive island-naming campaigns, repeated toponymy of borderland/ethnic regions, artificial-island reclamation, and renaming. These are not random incidents, but systemic, iterative changes used as part of a broader strategy to create facts and justify subsequent administrative or coercive steps.  This is psychological warfare, as maps serve as critical instruments in shaping global public opinion on territorial disputes. They function as ideological tools for educating populations, shaping perceptions, and fostering a collective national consciousness. By changing the map, one can change how the world is viewed. Repeated map publications condition domestic and foreign audiences to perceive Chinese claims as legitimate, an effect explained by the illusory truth effect in Psychology.    Figure 1 : The standard map released by China in 2023, claiming maritime zones and territories belonging to several countries as its own.   Legal, Economic and Security Implications  China’s cartographic aggression is a strategic weapon with legal, security, and economic implications, challenging the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Legally, it undermines international law by disregarding the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the binding 2016 Hague Tribunal ruling that invalidated the nine-dash line. On the security front, China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea and its assertion of control over disputed territories create potential flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific region. Economically, the region is extremely significant as it accounts for 65 percent of the world’s population, 63 percent of the world’s GDP, and 46 percent of the world’s merchandise trade and 50 percent of the world’s maritime trade. Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea position it to control or choke supply chains, potentially impacting all key players in the Indo-Pacific region.  Figure 2: Official reactions to China’s 2023 standard map by multiple countries directly affected by its claims.    Blind spot in the Western Strategy  While China’s standard map received sharp reactions from countries directly affected by it, the response from the West was limited, unclear, and insufficient, highlighting a blind spot in Western strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. The territories claimed by this map in the Himalayas and the South China Sea are part of China’s expansionism, which has implications for all key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific.   The U.S. gave the clearest legal rejection of the map’s maritime claims. Most European governments (UK, France, Germany, EU institutions) framed their responses around coercive conduct, safety and UNCLOS, rather than issuing a single-sentence legal denial of the 2023 map itself. None of the countries, including the US condemned China’s territorial claims in the Himalayas. Often, territorial disputes in the Himalayas are viewed separately from the issues in the South China Sea, a perspective that is rapidly changing.   Figure 3: Territories in Himalayas (Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh) illegitimately claimed by China in the 2023 map. Source: Reuters  If India, emerging as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific, is embroiled in border disputes and militarisation due to China’s territorial claims, it will remain occupied in the Himalayas while instability continues in the South China Sea. In essence, flashpoints in the Himalayas (Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh in Fig. 3), particularly the India-China border tensions, constrain India’s Indo-Pacific strategy, forcing it to prioritise border security. This hinders India’s ability to project its influence in the Indo-Pacific and introduces uncertainty and complexity into broader regional dynamics.   Preserving a Free, Open, and Rules-Based Indo-Pacific  A multifaceted approach that raises the legal, reputational, economic, and technical costs of unilateral changes to maps is necessary, as cartographic aggression thrives on cheap repetition, amplification and adoption by neutral third-party. There is an urgent need to introduce a form of regulation that governs the usage of maps and the consequences for not adhering to such regulation at the international level.  Firstly, countries such as the US, UK, and the EU, which advocate for a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific, should openly condemn China’s unilateral actions and reject the map entirely. This is crucial because claims in the South China Sea and the Himalayas significantly impact the Indo-Pacific strategy, and a clear rejection, free from ambiguity, is necessary to prevent unilateral map changes from becoming a future norm. Current silence especially in the Himalayas allows China to solidify its claims without consequence.  Secondly, condemnation alone is insufficient to counter China’s grey-zone tactics in the Indo-Pacific region, as China’s interests outweigh the costs. Prioritising legal and reputational pressure on the international stage, through ICJ advisory opinions or UNGA resolutions concerning unilateral name changes and territorial claims by China, would set a precedent not only for China but for any country making such claims in the future.  Thirdly, key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific should advocate for a “Responsible Mapping Code of Conduct” to ensure tech platforms, publishers, and logistics firms do not become inadvertent vehicles for Beijing’s territorial claims. Also, introducing mandatory “disputed” markers and disclaimers on contested areas, thereby limiting their worldwide dissemination.  Conclusion  China’s cartographic aggression extends beyond mere lines on a map it represents the psychological shaping of the geopolitical battlefield. The result is a weakened rules-based order, and a dangerous precedent for unilateral territorial expansion. For the UK, US, and other Indo-Pacific partners, the question is no longer whether to respond, but how, because

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The Civilisational-State: An Alternative View on India’s Foreign Policy

Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of strengthening democracy desk For many, India is an enigma. It simultaneously styles itself the ‘Mother of Democracy’ whilst maintaining a close relationship with authoritarian Russia. Government Ministers proclaim that India’s Hindu cultural heritage lays the foundations for a secular democracy, yet India’s Prime Minister publicly inaugurated the Ram Mandir in Ayodhya, near the birthplace of the deity Rama, on the site of a disused mosque – appearing to favour one community over the other. India has the cultural credentials to foster pluralism, yet there are growing concerns over polarisation between Hindus and Muslims. Navigating this complexity and India’s apparent contradictions cannot be reduced to a battle between autocratic nationalism and liberal democracy, or secular pluralism pitted against the influence of religion. It requires engagement with a wider range of ideas, starting with the concept of the ‘civilisational-state’. This reveals an India that is increasingly deploying its ancient past to sustain a contemporary identity that is beginning to shape its future engagement with the world.  The idea of the civilisational-state has garnered greater attention as the international order has become increasingly multipolar, and as liberal democracy has appeared increasingly under challenge. Most often applied to Russia, China and India, it signals a challenge to the decades-long dominance of the model of the Western European liberal nation-state. In its place, each aspiring civilisational-state seeks to root its domestic and foreign policies not in universal liberal principles such as individual rights, freedom and the rule of law, but in a construction of a historical ‘civilisational’ culture. Thus, the CCP roots China in Confucianism, Putin’s war rhetoric is rooted in an idea of Russkiy mir (‘Russian world’) that is both nationalistic and rooted in Orthodox Christianity, whilst India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar claims India is “one of the few civilizational states that has survived the ravages of history.” Even the US State Department has, in May 2025, invoked a shared civilisational heritage with Europe rooted in the natural law traditions of medieval Christianity. Each represents a distinct identitarian moral landscape derived from that movement’s construction of the past.  Though the governance practices of the civilisational-state vary from country to country, four key elements can be identified. First, it purports to represent a group defined not by territory, but by ethnicity, culture or religion – including members of the group located outside that state. Second, this group is often defined through cultural nationalist movements whose claims are then invoked by governments and the state apparatus. Third, civilisational-states challenge the dominant liberal and multilateral institutions, and the values and principles on which they are grounded. Finally, they assert that their political, social and economic thought is grounded in distinct ‘indigenous’ paradigms rather than the intellectual heritage of the West. Scholars such as the late Christopher Coker have suggested that India cannot be a civilisational-state because its cultural diversity prevents the cultural essentialism implicit in civilisational-state thinking. Yet an examination of India’s contemporary foreign policy and constitutional practice suggests otherwise.  India’s claims to be a civilisational-state begin with the global presence of its diaspora – and in particular, those within the diaspora who identify as ‘Hindu’. The most obvious example of a policy that favours its diaspora is its Citizenship Amendment Act 2019. This provides an accelerated pathway to citizenship for certain religious minorities – Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians – from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh who entered India without a visa on or before 31 December 2014. It aims to protect those facing religious persecution, yet has been criticised for communalising the basis of Indian citizenship; notably, this route is unavailable to Muslims, including the Rohingya and Ahmadiyyas persecuted in these countries. The Hindu diaspora – which for some includes Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains – is front and centre of the groups that benefit from this policy.   This emphasis on the diaspora is carried over into India’s bilateral engagement elsewhere in the word. Around half of the population of Mauritius is Hindu. On state visits, both the Prime Minister of India and India’s External Affairs Minister have regarded the diaspora as the primary driver of the India-Mauritius relationship based on shared culture, heritage and kinship, as many Mauritian Hindus are descended from indentured labourers. A further emphasis on access to Hindu pilgrimage sites in India and the importance of the deity Rama in Mauritius point to a geopolitical relationship driven by cultural factors. On this view, India’s support for Mauritius’ claim to sovereignty over the Chagos Islands may be more than just a hedging strategy against Chinese influence.  The cultural nationalist movements that feed the civilisational-state construct a ‘deep past’ that provides historical underpinning for an articulation of identity. References to an ancient Indic ‘deep past’ have been increasingly deployed over the last decade to frame India’s relationships with China and many of its Southeast Asian neighbours. On visits to China, India’s Prime Minister has invoked the journey of the seventh-century CE Buddhist monk Xuanzang from China to Nalanda University in ancient India to study Buddhism and carry manuscripts back to China. This establishes a ‘civilisational connect’ between two supposed civilisational-states alongside a contemporary economic relationship. Relations with Thailand have emphasised a centuries-old shared Hindu and Buddhist heritage and cultural tourism. India has promised to undertake restoration and conservation work at temples in Cambodia and Vietnam. Together with its focus on its diaspora, India’s foreign policy increasingly bears an identitarian cultural imprint.  India has also used the principles associated with its ‘deep past’ to argue for a vision of international order that challenges the current balance of power. India has been pushing for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for decades, under several governments – from Narasimha Rao in 1994 and Manmohan Singh in 2011 to Shashi Tharoor in 2013. The UK, France and the USA – under both Donald Trump and Joe Biden – have supported that claim. Behind this commitment to an international order where India plays a greater role, according to its

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Rooted Renewal: Hedgewar and the Indian Tradition of Progressive Conservatism

Author: Sachin Nandha, Director-General at the International Centre for Sustainability   Keshav Baliram Hedgewar does not fit easily into the conventional categories of modern political analysis. He is the founder of one of the most successful grassroot organisations in the world – the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which loosely translates to the National Volunteer Organisation, but a better and more meaningful rendition would be Volunteers for Serving the Nation. To some, he is the ascetic founder of a movement that reshaped India’s socio-political landscape by way of building community cohesion. To others, he remains a figure cloaked in suspicion. He is cast either as a cultural purist or a majoritarian ideologue. Yet both portrayals flatten a much more complex intellectual and historical figure.  Director-General, Sachin Nandha, recently published a paper which offers an alternative frame: Hedgewar as a Progressive Conservative. In doing so, it argues that his project was neither reactionary nor revolutionary, but deeply constructive. Hedgewar was not primarily interested in political power or in contesting the state (rajya). His vision was for the rāṣṭra, or the nation understood as a living cultural and moral organism, not merely a geopolitical construct. The rāṣṭra as understood by Hedgewar was civilisational – a moral-cultural unity, composed of memory, rituals and the organic unity of people. This would be akin to what Robert Putnam may have described as a civic community sustained by bonding social capital – a dense network of shared traditions, mutual obligations and daily interactions that generate trust, cooperation, and a sense of collective identity.  At the heart of this project lay a profoundly conservative instinct: to preserve and renew the moral and civilisational foundations of Indian society. Hedgewar believed that India’s decline under colonialism was not just the loss of sovereignty but the erosion of its civic fabric. This was marked by caste fragmentation, ritualism without meaning, and the collapse of social trust. His response was not to demand rights but to rebuild duties. He did not seek to capture state institutions, but to form individual character. He created shakhas: daily training grounds for cultivating self-restraint, physical vitality, and civic brotherhood. They were, in essence, laboratories of cultural repair.  In this sense, Hedgewar stands in a philosophical lineage with figures such as Edmund Burke, who argued that true political reform must be guided by prudence and continuity, not abstract perfection. He shares affinity too with Theodore Roosevelt, whose Progressivism retained a strong moral nationalism and emphasis on civic virtue, and with Jonathan Sumption, the former UK Supreme Court Justice, who has warned that the decline of shared duty and restraint in liberal democracies leads not to liberation but to fragility.  Read the full paper here

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India’s Climate Finance Taxonomy: A Blueprint for Mobilising Green Investment

Author: Matthew Watkins, research and Operations Intern. India lies at a crucial crossroads on its pathway to becoming a low-carbon economy. Over recent years, India has cemented itself as a leading climate player; in August 2022, it expanded its Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) targets on GDP emission intensity under the Paris Agreement goals and according to the International Finance Corporation, remains the only G20 nation aligned with 2°C global warming targets. With this substantive progress, however, India resultantly lies at the heart of a financing gap, where over USD 2.5 trillion will be required to meet their updated commitments.   To realise the country’s 2070 Net Zero goal and broader Viksit Bharat 2047 (developed India) initiative, India must now “enhance the availability of capital for climate adaptation and mitigation”, leveraging channels of public and private capital both domestically and from international actors alike. A robust climate finance ecosystem must simultaneously act as an enabler, leveraging clarity and transparency in championing climate goals.  In this context, India’s draft Climate Finance Taxonomy framework represents a significant step forward. Published by the Department of Economic Affairs in May 2025, the framework seeks to facilitate greater resource flow to climate-friendly technologies and activities by formulating a methodology for identifying/classifying those that contribute to India’s climate commitments. In articulating what constitutes “climate-aligned”, it offers a rare chance for India to harness classifications to unlock finance at scale, especially if policymakers make design choices that link definitions to instruments, governance and performance measurement.  What the draft proposes  As figure 1 details, the draft frames climate-aligned activity across three distinct categories: mitigation, adaption and supporting transition for hard-to-abate sectors where eligibility is constrained. The framework follows eight principles to ensure credibility and impact. It aims to unlock capital, support innovation, and align investment with India’s Net Zero pathway, creating clear opportunities with preliminary sectoral coverage across clean energy, transport, building, and agriculture.  Under the implementation blueprint, India will reinforce the framework through a “hybrid approach”, first applying qualitative criteria to broadly identify climate-aligned activities. Over time, the taxonomy will adopt quantitative thresholds for example, specific emissions savings targets to make alignment measurable and auditable. The taxonomy classifies activities into two main categories in aiming to direct public and private investment toward credible, measurable, and impactful climate solutions across India’s economy:  Climate-supportive activities: Includes projects that reduce emissions, deploy adaptation solutions, or contribute to climate goals through research and innovation:  Tier 1 – activities directly avoiding emissions like renewable energy.  Tier 2 – those that lower emissions intensity with clear pathways for improvement.     Climate transition activities: Projects in sectors where low-emission alternatives are not yet viable. The taxonomy provides a pathway for these sectors to decarbonise over time without disrupting their economic function.   Crucially implementation is staggered, following the precedent of EU and ASEAN taxonomies. An initial phase focussed on qualitative criteria will be followed by the incorporation of numerical benchmarks for greater precision, with the framework acting as a living and dynamic document that adapts over time.  Similarly, the framework incorporates specific provisions to ensure resource flows to agriculture and MSMEs aren’t adversely impacted, utilising simplified and proportionate criteria to address their resource constraints; this likewise recognises the diverse capacities within industrial organisations across sectors in India, allowing inclusivity and proportionality. This design dually preserves domestic flexibility but makes tightening predictable, thus enabling time-bound, target-driven transitional allowances for hard-to-abate sectors while protecting the taxonomy’s credibility.   Why a taxonomy is vital to mobilising capital  Current climate financing shortfalls in India – exacerbated by constrained domestic bank capacity, fragmented ESG practices, and widespread investor scepticism about green-washing – render the taxonomy as vital to credibly scaling capital. If effectively integrated alongside existing climate-related policy frameworks, a clear taxonomy could lower barriers and form bankable signals in three practical ways. First, it reduces transaction and due-diligence costs; investors and underwriters can use a shared classification to speed appraisal and standardise documentation across green bonds, project finance and blended-finance structures. Second, it leverages public capital to crowd in private investors; sovereign/sub-sovereign green bonds, concessional financing and first-loss/partial guarantees can all be tied to taxonomy alignment, reducing project risk and borrowing costs, whilst unlocking domestic finance and lending. Third, it builds investor confidence by reducing greenwashing risks; routine disclosure, public registries of labelled instruments, performance metrics tied to impact measurement and management reporting, and climate budget tagging. This allows capital providers to track outcomes through the financial system, ensuring fiscal pipelines are aligned to taxonomy-eligible projects.  Dynamic interoperability will be a crucial enabler. Mutual-recognition clauses with EU, ASEAN and Gulf taxonomies and clear interoperability rules will reduce repeated verification and legal friction, enhancing accessibility for Indian projects to cross-border and institutional investment from foreign asset managers, sovereign wealth funds and multilateral development banks. With this, however, global precedents highlight true potential: the EU taxonomy helped mobilise large green-bond flows, while ASEAN, Singapore and the UAE have used taxonomy-consistent instruments to attract cross-border capital. In short: design choices – linkage to instruments, measurable metrics, governance and interoperability—will determine whether the taxonomy simply describes “good” projects or actually unlocks the billions India needs for a just, bankable transition.   Limitations and Recommendations   The draft is an important step, but two structural weaknesses already stand out. First, it remains a high-level framework, missing enhanced detail on sectoral annexures and activity-level definitions. It also explicitly states that “coal-based power will continue to play a role in ensuring energy security, particularly for meeting base-load demand”; such allowances could be a concern, especially if fossil-linked sectors (steel, cement, power) continue lobbying for generous transitional definitions from this anchor point. Together these create an ambiguous signal that risks confusing investors and exacerbating pre-existing implementation challenges. However, these limitations are manageable if the next stage of public consultation is used effectively.   India must now also seek to maximise impact by prioritising adaptation finance, recognising that adaptation remains chronically under-funded despite recent momentum. The taxonomy should therefore explicitly ring-fence adaptation-eligible instruments to scale up bankable resilience projects. It should also be anchored within an

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