Research Articles

Author: Chloe Schuber, Operations and Research Assistant Since the Indian Supreme Court decriminalised consensual same-sex relations in 2018, legal reform has remained largely declaratory. While constitutional protections regarding dignity and privacy were clarified, same-sex partnerships remain excluded from formal legal institutions. Marriage, adoption, inheritance, housing, and welfare remain conditional on a narrow definition of family: the heterosexual, conjugal, nuclear unit, a model that shapes not only legal recognition, but also access to state benefits, taxation, property, and guardianship. Same-sex partnerships are still excluded from institutions like marriage, adoption, inheritance, housing, and welfare.   For policymakers, this is not just a question of rights. When entire communities have their social entitlement restricted, it undermines broader development goals, such as economic security and housing access to public health and caregiving infrastructure. A more inclusive policy framework is not only just, but it’s practical. The task of expanding rights for queer and non-heteronormative communities in India is not merely about legal inclusion, rather it requires questioning the colonial and normative categories through which legal recognition itself is granted.  Structural Legacy: Imported Legal Frameworks  The limitations of the current system can be traced to its institutional lineage. Colonial administrators codified Hindu, Muslim, and Christian family norms through the lens of Victorian morality. These legal interventions not only criminalised non-procreative sexual relations but reconstituted Indian familial systems around a singular ideal: monogamous, heterosexual marriage recognised through ritual and state sanction. Colonial legislation such as Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 explicitly targeted forms of intimacy and kinship deemed deviant, redefining relational legitimacy through imported moral norms.  Prior to colonisation, relational forms in the subcontinent were more varied. While not uniformly liberal or egalitarian, indigenous legal and ritual traditions recognised a spectrum of household configurations. The codification of personal law under colonial governance actively displaced these practices in favour of uniformity and control. As Indian family law evolved under colonial rule, it encoded a conjugal, heterosexual norm as the only legally recognisable structure, shaping everything from inheritance to guardianship rights.  Indic Knowledge, Relationships, and Same-Sex Intimacy  Indic knowledge systems offer an alternative foundation for policy design. One that is rooted not in imported legal categories, but in indigenous traditions of ethical and relational reasoning. Concepts such as sambandha (mutual bond or connection), when understood in specific social and affective contexts, illuminate how communities approached caregiving, guardianship, inheritance, and household structure. Rather than privileging institutional form, these frameworks foregrounded the substance of relationships, which were shaped by context, mutual care, and obligation.  These relational ideas were reflected in both philosophical texts and lived social practices. For instance, gandharva vivaha—a union based on mutual consent without ritual sanction, was acknowledged in texts such as the Manusmriti as one of several valid forms of marriage. While traditionally framed within a heteronormative context, it opens space to think beyond rigid ritual boundaries when formal recognition is absent. Similarly, regional customs such as matrilineal inheritance in Kerala or collective cohabitation in parts of the Northeast—attest to longstanding recognition of diverse domestic and relational forms. While these traditions were not uniformly egalitarian, they offer indigenous precedents for honouring affective ties and care networks beyond narrow legal definitions. A philosophical lens, especially from schools such as Nyaya and Mimamsa, may further help reinterpret these texts and practices as context-sensitive rather than rigidly prescriptive.  This historical depth also extends to the cultural legibility of same-sex intimacy. Public debate often frames such relationships as foreign imports, but Sanskrit texts like the Kamasutra describe a wide range of same-sex acts as legitimate expressions of pleasure and companionship, without attaching stigma or criminal sanction. Temple iconography—especially at Khajuraho and Konark features depictions of same-sex intimacy within sacred spaces, embedded within broader visual narratives of divine and human love. These representations were not marginal or hidden; they were public, canonically endorsed, and culturally integrated. Furthermore, historical records from temple and monastic communities reveal institutional roles for non-conjugal domestic units, especially among ascetic, ritual, and caregiving networks.  Together, these Indic traditions challenge the assumption that legal recognition must follow colonial categories of marriage or kinship. They offer a rich normative archive for policymakers seeking more inclusive frameworks grounded in India’s own intellectual and cultural heritage.  What policy instruments does this enable?  Drawing on Indic cultural knowledge enables the design of concrete policy tools implementable within current government structures.   Civil Affidavit Partnerships: A Stepping Stone to Marriage Equality Inspired by the concept of gandharva vivah, civil affidavit partnerships would allow two adults to formalise their relationship through a simple notarised declaration. Though such affidavits are currently used informally in India to evidence live-in relationships or shared tenancy, they are not yet a legally recognised partnership category granting rights. As such, this proposal would transcend existing practice to establish a formal civic category that entitles partners to rights like joint tenancy, medical decision-making authority, pension inheritance, and shared welfare access.  While this provides an immediate, low-barrier mechanism for recognition, it is not a substitute for full marriage rights. Denying queer individuals access to marriage reinforces a hierarchy that treats heterosexual unions as inherently more legitimate. Instead, civil affidavit partnerships are a pragmatic transitional tool toward equal access to civil marriage. Jurisdictions such as the UK and New Zealand initially introduced civil partnerships before extending full marriage rights to same-sex couples, illustrating how incremental legal recognition can serve as both a practical and symbolic path to broader equality.  Cohabitation Registries: Recognising Shared Life Without Marriage Indic knowledge traditions affirm sambandh. This is a relational bond grounded in mutual care as a legitimate basis for household formation. A national cohabitation registry could recognise long-term, stable co-residential relationships. These could be romantic or platonic and provide partners with access to key benefits such as health care, housing rights, and emergency decision-making authority.  Some Indian states already maintain limited forms of such registries under the guise of documenting “live-in relationships.” For instance, the 2024 Uniform Civil Code (UCC) Bill in Uttarakhand implemented a live-in relationship registry—though

Author: Ornicha Daorueng, research intern The result of the 2025 papal conclave, which elected Robert Prevost as Pope Leo XIV, the first American and the second pope from the Americas, raises important questions about the future of the Catholic Church. Does his election signal a decisive shift in the Church’s centre of gravity toward the Global South, and a further retreat from Rome’s historic role as the Church’s origin and traditional centre of leadership?    In fact, this shift has been underway for decades. John Paul II, elected in 1978, broke a 455-year tradition as the first non-Italian pope coming from Poland. He was followed by Benedict XVI from Germany, and then Francis, the first Latin American pope, born in Argentina. From Italy to broader Europe, and now the Americas, the leadership of the Church has steadily moved away from its traditional centre, confirming what many have long observed: that the “centre of gravity” in Catholicism is shifting southward.  This transformation is underscored by global Catholic demographics. As of 2023, over 72% of Catholics live in Latin America, Africa, or Asia, while around 20% reside in Europe. Population projections from Our World in Data confirm this trend: between 2025 and 2050, Europe’s total population is expected to decline by 5.5%, while Africa’s is projected to grow by 60%. Latin America, Asia, and North America are also expected to see more modest growth, ranging from 7% to 11%.  This demographic and institutional realignment has fuelled growing calls for Church leadership, including future popes, to come from the Global South. Some fear this could deepen the sense of alienation in Europe, where the Church is already facing a crisis of faith, or raise concerns about the direction the Church might take because of this shift. But the real challenge facing Catholicism today goes beyond demographics. It is whether its leadership can bridge a global Church divided by regional theologies and priorities, while also responding to interfaith tensions and public sentiment between “timeless” tradition and “timely” reform. What ultimately matters to the Church is not where its leaders come from, but whether they can bring unity and purpose to an increasingly fragmented global faith.   Regional theologies and priorities   Catholicism may be unified in doctrine, but it is far from monolithic. Across the world, different regions have developed distinct theological emphases, cultural expressions of faith, and pastoral priorities shaped by local contexts.   For example, African Catholicism often reflects a conservative moral outlook, with an emphasis on family and community values. African bishops have strongly defended traditional Church teachings on sexuality, while challenging Western efforts to liberalise positions on issues such as same-sex unions and communion for the divorced. These stances mirror broader African societal norms, often at odds with Western individualism and liberal values. Latin American Catholicism has long championed liberation theology, a movement that interprets the Gospel through the lens of social justice, economic inequality, and resistance to political oppression. Shaped by regional struggles with poverty and dictatorship, the Church emphasises defending human dignity and standing with the marginalised.   Asian Catholicism values interreligious dialogue and inculturation, as reflected in the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences’ “triple dialogue” with cultures, other religions, and the poor. Asian Catholic theology often draws on cultural traditions and communal values like Confucianism and Taoism to express Christian truths. In India, the Church stresses interreligious dialogue amid deep cultural and religious diversity. Asian Catholics’ resilient faith fits pluralist contexts but can spark concern among traditionalists over doctrinal authenticity. European Catholicism, the historic heartland of Christian theology and culture, now navigates a post-Christian landscape marked by declining religious practice and rising secularism. With fewer young people attending Mass and identifying as religious, the Church is increasingly engaged in highly secularised issues, including debates on gender, bioethics, and cultural identity, seeking to stay relevant while articulating faith in an increasingly secular society.   While holding diverse internal expectations for guidance and accompaniment, the Church also confronts external challenges, particularly tensions with Islam, a global phenomenon intensified by the rapid expansion of both faiths and the rise of Islamism. This is starkly evident in parts of Africa. For instance, although Nigeria’s constitution guarantees religious freedom, conversion from Islam to Christianity is illegal in the country’s 12 Sharia-governed states. This tension is further underscored by the abduction of a Nigerian Catholic priest by Boko Haram, a militant Islamist group that targets Christian communities. These realities highlight the Church’s priorities, and the Pope’s, in protecting its communities and lead interfaith engagement.   Together, these dynamics underscore the challenge of sustaining a unified global Catholic identity while fostering interfaith coexistence. Church leaders must balance, nurture, and reconcile the diverse hopes and needs of Catholics worldwide.    Timely and timeless: the Pope’s spiritual leadership in a divided church     Expectations of the Pope have grown more complex as society has transformed. Today, both Catholics and non-Catholics increasingly expect the Pope to speak out on pressing timely issues and to do so in an inclusive, liberal tone. Topics such as war, refugee crises, climate change, gender, and economic inequality have become central to the public’s moral expectations of the Church. At the same time, the Pope carries the responsibility of preserving the Church’s 2,000-year-old teachings, guiding the timeless values of Catholic tradition: holiness, truth, and charity. This dual role creates a profound tension. The same response to an issue, such as homosexuality, may be hailed by some as compassionate progress, and by others as a regression and a source of confusion about doctrine. These conflicting expectations are not evenly spread; they are reflected in regional and generational divides, as seen in the differing theological priorities across continents. Moreover, digital media has complicated intra-Church dialogue and interreligious relations. Instead of promoting critical thinking and consensus-building, online platforms often amplify misinformation, hate speech, and toxicity, fostering divisive echo chambers and digital tribalism.   The greatest challenge for any 21st-century pope is to represent a truly global Church by balancing the timely with the timeless. This effort became especially visible under Pope Francis, who signalled

Author: sachin nandha, trustee and director As India charts its path toward $2.5 trillion in infrastructure investment by 2030, the challenge is no longer why to invest, but how to do so at scale and with confidence. This white paper offers a strategic roadmap to unlock private capital by addressing systemic constraints, ranging from regulatory opacity to uneven returns across sectors and states. Featuring case studies, investor insights, and innovative tools like the Three Centuries Model and the Infrastructure ESG+ India Index, the paper reframes India not as a frontier risk but as a frontier of structured opportunity.  Read the full white paper here: From Capital Gap to Capital Magnet De-Risking Infrastructure Investment in India

Author: Chloe Schuber, Operations and Research Assistant Young people (18-25) have long been the backbone of progressive politics. However, the 2024 elections in the United States and the United Kingdom highlighted a growing paradox: while young voters overwhelmingly support progressive policies, they are increasingly disillusioned with the traditional left-leaning progressive parties that have historically championed these causes. This frustration was evident in two ways: generally, there was a decline in youth turnout in both countries; and more specifically, the number of young people voting for the Democrats and Labour Party fell.   In the US, youth voter participation fell to 42%, down from over 50% in 2020, and for the first time since 2008, Democrats failed to secure at least 60% of the youth vote — a 6% drop, with some shifting to Republicans. In the UK, turnout among young voters plummeted from 47% in 2019 to 37% in 2024, the lowest in at least a decade. Among all age groups, young voters exhibited the most dramatic shifts: Labour’s youth support dropped by 21% to 41%, Conservative backing collapsed by 14% to just 5%, and third-party support surged by 37%, reaching a total of 48% of the youth vote. This trend is more than just an electoral shift: it is a warning sign. When youth abandon not just parties but democratic electoral participation itself, there is a breakdown in representation. Systematic change is essential to restore faith in democracy and ensure its legitimacy for young people.    Structural Barriers to Youth Political Engagement   Institutional Distrust and Voting Restrictions  Today, there are structural and systemic barriers that discourage youth participation in elections. In the US, restrictive voting laws — such as strict ID requirements and reduced polling locations on college campuses — disproportionately impact young voters. In the UK, the introduction of voter ID laws has made it harder for younger and lower-income voters to participate. Additionally, both countries’ electoral systems – which tend to use the ‘winner takes all’ First-Past-the-Post — incentivise parties to focus on older, more reliable voter blocs rather than investing in long-term youth engagement. Young people can often feel overlooked and unwelcome in their country’s political system, which gradually leads to disengagement and a declining faith in the system’s effectiveness.  Institutional distrust also plays a critical role here. Many young voters perceive mainstream parties as beholden to corporate interests, with campaign finance structures — especially in the US — reinforcing a political class that prioritizes wealthy donors over grassroots movements. This cynicism is reflected in increased political activism outside traditional electoral channels, with young people favouring direct action, mutual aid networks, and digital activism over formal party politics.   The Digital Divide: Political Parties’ Failure to Adapt   While young voters are very politically active online, mainstream parties have failed to effectively engage with them in digital spaces. Platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and X have become critical arenas for political discourse in the US and UK, yet the Democratic and Labour parties struggle in maintaining meaningful engagement on this platforms. Instead, younger voters turn to independent content creators, grassroots activists, and alternative media for political information, further weakening their connection to traditional parties.   The rise of digital activism presents both a challenge and an opportunity. While social media has facilitated greater political awareness and the upholding governmental institutions accountable, it has also contributed to growing polarization and distrust in traditional political institutions. To reconnect with young voters, parties must integrate (better) digital outreach into their broader campaign strategies — not merely as a tool for voter mobilisation but as a space for genuine political dialogue.    Contextualizing: The Growing Policy Disconnect  Economic Concerns Driving Youth Alienation  These structural issues are exacerbated by policy misalignment. Economic concerns remain a top priority for young voters in both countries. Young people experience complex economic distress, from living with their parents due to high rent prices, to unemployment due to limited job opportunities and other struggles relating to the cost-of-living crisis. In the 2024 elections, 64% of young voters in the US and 41% in the UK cited inflation and the cost of living as their top concerns. Despite this, mainstream left parties seem to have fallen short of presenting viable solutions that resonate with younger generations. These political responses feel increasingly detached and signal that young people’s material realities are not being prioritised.   In the UK, Labour’s reluctance to introduce rent controls or pursue wealth redistribution has led to disillusionment amongst young people because of the electoral promises made earlier this year, especially as London rents surged by 9.2% in 2024. The party’s reversal on abolishing tuition fees has further eroded trust. 76% of youth believe the political system bears the primary responsibility for this issue, among others, while 50% think the economic system, or at least the way it is currently structured—favouring markets and private interests over public welfare— should also share the burden and look inwards for change.  In the US, student debt reached $1.77 trillion in 2024. While President Biden enacted partial loan forgiveness (eliminating around 10%), many young voters found it inadequate. Meanwhile, the median US home price exceeded $400,000, and wage growth failed to keep up with inflation. As a result, many young voters are disengaging from the Democratic Party or seeking alternatives. The collapse of traditional youth support for Democrats and Labour suggests that, unless these parties offer bold solutions to pressing economic issues, they risk further electoral decline among younger generations.  Climate Change and Environmental Disillusionment  Both the Democrats and Labour have struggled to align with young voters’ urgency on climate issues. The Biden administration’s approval of the Willow Project in Alaska was widely condemned by young environmentalists, reinforcing perceptions that the Democratic Party prioritizes corporate interests over climate action. Democrat-supporting youth have the highest rate of disapproval on Biden’s climate policies (34%) amongst Democrats. In the UK, Labour’s refusal to commit to ending North Sea oil and gas exploration alienated young voters who overwhelmingly support aggressive decarbonization policies. 36% of youth say they would consider voting

Author: Niharika Girsa, research intern Every time you ask an AI chatbot a question, you might be using more water than you did for your morning coffee or tea. AI, born from human intelligence, represents the next great leap in human innovation since the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution. Unlike those earlier advancements, which focused on reforming tools and processes, AI mimics the way the human brain works, it learns from experience, evolves with new data, and improves through training.  Studies from University of Colorado and University of Texas at Arlington has estimated that each ChatGPT session-comprising roughly 20-50 prompts consume the equivalent of a 500 ml bottle of water, used primarily to cool the data centres. Globally training large models like GPT-3 has been shown to consume over 700,000 liters per cycle. While exact national figures are unavailable, if we extrapolate based on India’s growing digital user base it is plausible to say that the country’s AI driven infrastructure could pose significant water demands. On average, a 1-megawatt data centre consumes around 26 million liters of water annually. And with India’s current capacity at approximately 1,255 MW, the cumulative annual water consumption across existing facilities alone could exceed 32.6 billion liters per year.   In a nation where over 600 million people are already facing high to extreme water stress, this is more than just a hidden cost, rather it is a Wake-Up call. The water footprint of our digital lives is becoming increasingly visible, and that’s a good thing. As AI becomes embedded in everything we do, it presents us with a powerful opportunity: to not only harness its potential, but to design it responsibly. Now is the moment to ask not just what AI can do for us, but how we can ensure it gives back more than it takes.   HOW IT WORKS?   Every chatbot response or AI-generated picture conceals a physical space, a data centre, buzzing with computers fuelling these technologies. Often hidden within large warehouses, these facilities operate continuously 24 hours a day, using significant quantities of power to remain cool and run smoothly. AI learns, stores, and gets smarter every day in these climate-controlled centres.  Although generative AI operates virtually and holds great potential, it has consequential real-world impacts. Servers are doing hundreds of calculations to produce the best feasible response and process every prompt sent to a generative artificial intelligence model. Located in data centres, these servers generate significant heat during processing. Often, water cooling devices are used to avoid overheating. Much like the human body utilises sweat to control temperature, these systems move the heat to cooling towers, where it is expelled from the data centre.   Figure 1: Data centre water footprint: on-site water consumption for data centre cooling, and off-site water consumption for electricity generation.   A study by the University of California Riverside and the University of Texas Arlington has uncovered the water consumption linked with AI models, termed the “secret water footprint.” Dr. Venkatesh Uddameri, a leading water resources expert from Texas, points out that a single data centre can consume between 11 and 19 million litres of water each day, roughly matching the daily water needs of a town of 30,000 to 50,000 residents.   The researchers also calculated that training GPT-3 in Microsoft’s US data centres can directly consume 700,000 liters of freshwater, which is equivalent to what it takes to produce 370 BMW cars or 320 Tesla electric vehicles. And if this training were to take place in the company’s Asian data centres, the water consumption would have tripled. This is because, unlike temperate regions where data centres can often rely on “free” cooling by using outside air to reject heat, many parts of Asia experience consistently hot and/or dry climates. When the outside air temperature exceeds 85 degrees Fahrenheit or the air is too dry, data centres must rely on water-based cooling methods. Water is needed both for evaporative cooling and for maintaining proper humidity levels. As a result, the climate conditions in Asian regions substantially increase water demand, leading to significantly higher consumption during AI training operations.  While the environmental footprint of AI is a global concern, its impact is particularly striking when we look at individual countries. As data centre expansion accelerates in countries like the United Kingdom, and India grapples with acute water scarcity amid rapid digital growth, the hidden “water cost” of the AI revolution has become an urgent issue.   The United Kingdom is positioning itself as a future global leader in artificial intelligence, pouring investment into new data centres to drive advances across sectors from healthcare to financial services. However, this digital expansion carries a hidden environmental cost: a growing strain on the country’s water resources.  Recent reporting by The Guardian highlights that new AI growth hubs are being proposed in areas such as Culham, Oxfordshire, which are close to the site of a major planned reservoir intended to secure long-term water supplies for London and surrounding counties. Data centres, particularly those supporting AI workloads, require vast amounts of water to cool servers that run non-stop. A single large data centre can consume between 11 and 19 million litres of water daily comparable to the water needs of a town of 30,000 to 50,000 people.  Although the UK benefits from a relatively wet climate compared to other parts of the world, it is not immune to droughts and growing regional water stress. Environmental groups are increasingly voicing concerns that the surge in data centre development risks outpacing infrastructure improvements, putting ecosystems and community water supplies under pressure.  While the United Kingdom faces mounting concerns over the environmental costs of its AI-driven digital expansion, India’s situation is even more critical. India, one of the fastest-growing digital economies in the world, is quickly expanding its artificial intelligence capacity as demand for cloud computing and AI-powered devices rise. The country’s data centre capacity is projected to grow exponentially, with estimates suggesting it will reach 3,400 MW by 2030, driven by a compound annual growth

Author: Ornicha Daorueng, research intern Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer recently warned that the UK is at risk of becoming an “island of strangers,” attributing this to high levels of immigration and proposing stricter immigration policies. His remarks have drawn criticism, with some comparing them to the divisive and racially charged rhetoric of Conservative MP Enoch Powell’s 1968 “Rivers of Blood” speech, in which Powell claimed immigrants had made Britons feel like “strangers in their own country,” fuelling widespread anti-immigrant sentiment. Critics suggest Starmer’s comments may be politically motivated, reacting to Labour’s electoral losses to Reform UK, a party advocating tighter immigration controls. At the same time, Starmer’s stance can also be seen as a genuine attempt to address the challenges of integrating native and immigrant communities while maintaining social cohesion. However, rather than focusing solely on political motives, it is more productive to examine what Starmer means by “an island of strangers,” assess whether this is a fair characterisation, and explore how the UK can bridge the gap between communities and transform those whom Starmer described as strangers into fellow citizens.  The role of bonding social capital in immigrant life   Aristotle asserted that “man is, by nature, a political animal,” highlighting humanity’s inherent need for social connection to survive and thrive. Modern neuroscience affirms this: our brains are wired for social bonding. To fulfil this need, people gravitate toward communities that share familiar identities which offer belonging, trust, and mutual support.   This is particularly evident among immigrant communities. Regardless of their origin, newcomers often face challenges such as unfamiliar cultures, languages, and social systems, which can cause feelings of alienation and insecurity. In response, they form strong bonds with those who share their national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious backgrounds. This strong attachment to inherited identities of “people like us” is known as bonding social capital. These networks help them adjust to new lives by offering social support, legal assistance, employment guidance, and housing, creating close-knit networks across major UK cities. For example, in the West Midlands, Pakistani migrant men gather in mosques and gyms, creating social spaces that reinforce cultural norms and mutual support. In East London’s Brick Lane, known as “Banglatown,” Bangladeshi-owned shops, restaurants, and the Brick Lane Mosque serve as communal hubs, preserving cultural identity while helping newcomers navigate life in their new country.  Why can too much bonding social capital make us strangers?   While bonding social capital offers essential support, it can also deepen divides between immigrant communities and wider society. When individuals primarily interact within their own cultural or religious groups, “us vs. them” mentality can develop. A case in point is the Bangladeshi community’s “Save Brick Lane” campaign, which opposed gentrification and framed hipsters, startups, and investors as cultural threats. Such insularity reduces dialogue, reinforces confirmation bias, and fosters rigid group norms. Moreover, strong alignment with inherited identities can weaken connections to the host country. For instance, 71% of British Muslims identify primarily as Muslim, compared to 27% who identify as British. This disparity can contribute to feelings of alienation, particularly when national policies conflict with religious or political beliefs.  Religious identity may also be linked to authoritarian tendencies. Studies show that Christian and Muslim respondents are more likely to hold socially authoritarian attitudes, valuing order, conformity, and group loyalty. These tendencies can hinder integration and increase vulnerability to populist leaders who promise protection for their group, an important factor that can contribute to the emergence of extremism.   Bonding social capital, when unchecked, can create various forms of “strangeness”: between different immigrant communities, between immigrant communities and the wider British society, and even in the perceptions British citizens hold toward immigrants. Public opinion reflects this divide, with 52% of British citizens supporting reduced immigration and only 14% favouring an increase. This suggests a disconnect between wider society and immigrant communities, which helps explain what Sir Keir Starmer meant by the UK becoming an “island of strangers.”  From strangers to acquaintances: the power of bridging capital   In contrast to bonding, bridging social capital connects people across diverse social groups. These connections are typically based on shared interests or acquired identities, such as education, professions, or hobbies, rather than ethnicity or religion. For migrants, this expansion of social circles is vital to integration and developing a sense of belonging that is rooted in Britishness, rather than the narrow confines of religion or ethnicity.   Successful integration is often driven by economic and educational advancement, providing more pathways for migrants to foster bridging social capital. The Indian diaspora in the UK exemplifies this. With the highest levels of education, a strong presence in professional occupations, and the highest homeownership rates among ethnic groups, Indian migrants exemplify how education leads to professional advancement and ultimately, economic stability. This socio-economic trajectory enables greater connection with broader society, helping many see the UK as their true home.   Communities worldwide have successfully implemented grassroots initiatives to support socio-economic integration. In education, Sweden’s Fryshuset youth organisation creates inclusive spaces through music, sports, and cultural activities, allowing young people to connect beyond ethnic lines. The state-funded SFI program also offers free, flexible language courses to adult immigrants, helping them navigate society and improve their employment prospects. In the economic front, Canada’s TRIEC collaborates with private, public, and non-profit sectors to foster inclusive hiring practices while helping migrants expand their professional networks and understand the local labour market. In the Netherlands, Qredits supports migrant entrepreneurs through business training and microloans.  For civic engagement, Australia’s Stronger Communities Programme funds grassroots organisations and local councils to strengthen community ties and promote social cohesion. These examples show that bridging social circles does not require grand policies; it often begins with simple acts at the grassroots level. This is where the UK has room to learn and invest.   Returning to the question, “Is the UK becoming an island of strangers?” The answer is yes, but not because of who is arriving. It is because we are failing to build shared spaces of connection: in schools, workplaces, neighbourhoods, and

Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk Being the world’s largest democracy is not without its challenges. India currently faces the problem of how to apportion seats in the Lok Sabha, its Lower House, between states with populations that have expanded at very different rates. With re-apportionment not having taken place since 1971, some states currently have around 3m voters per constituency seat, whilst others have fewer than 2m. Government proposals to re-calculate seat share have faced pushback from the leaders of India’s more prosperous and less populous southern states, who argue that re-apportionment will adversely affect their ability to argue for their state’s interests at the national level. Although solutions such as expanding the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha reform have already been touted, policymakers and constitutional designers must also consider whether India must bite the bullet of electoral reform to strengthen its national democracy.  A long-standing problem  The problem India faces is vast and long-standing. Under Art 81(2)(a) of the Constitution of India, the Lok Sabha is capped at 550 members, where each state is allotted a number of seats such that “the ratio between that number and the population of the State is, so far as practicable, the same for all States”. The population figures used are those from the most recent census. Re-apportionment took place following the 1951, 1961 and 1971 censuses. However, the 42nd amendment to the Constitution, imposed during the Emergency (when civil liberties were suspended throughout the country for 2 years), froze Lok Sabha seat share at the proportions calculated in the early 1970s, until at least the 2001 census. This freeze was extended to 2026 by the 84th amendment to the Constitution in 2001, since census proceedings had already begun and “keeping in view the progress of family planning programmes” across the country. By the time the re-apportionment exercise recently announced by the Government takes place, the Lok Sabha seat allocations will be 55 years out of date.   A problem for large democracies?  India’s apportionment problem is an inevitable one for large democracies. Amongst the world’s ten most populous countries, only Bangladesh and China are not organised federally. Countries such as India, the USA and Brazil all face a similar dilemma because of their federal structures: on one hand, population growth at the national level requires legislative seats in the lower house to be re-allocated every so often to maintain the principle of ‘one person, one vote’; on the other, federalism demands equality between the constituent states of a federal system. This leads to a fundamental tension: if a population is asymmetrically distributed, or population growth is asymmetric across different states, representation in the lower house becomes increasingly skewed towards larger states. Maintaining the equality of states requires counterbalancing, which often takes place through a federal second chamber such as the US Senate or the Rajya Sabha, where members represent states and not individual constituencies.  The US Senate, for example, has strict federal representation, with two seats allocated to each state irrespective of their size or population. Seat share in the House of Representatives, by contrast, is recalculated every 10 years based on the national census.  All states receive at least one district seat irrespective of their population, with the total number of seats capped at 435 since 1929. Owing to the changes in population over time, states such as Florida have almost double the number of House seats today as they did in the 1970s, whilst states such as Illinois, Michigan, New York and Ohio have all seen considerable reductions. The changes that have occurred have been largely incremental. By contrast, because re-apportionment has not taken place in India for half a century, Uttar Pradesh – India’s most populous state – would jump from 80 Lok Sabha seats today, to 149 in a Lok Sabha expanded from 543 seats to the 880 available in India’s new Parliament building. Though India’s problem is not unique, the inevitable ‘step-change’ that awaits because of long-standing inaction brings significant challenges. Viewing these challenges in global context both reveals how irresponsible the inaction of Indian politicians on this issue has been over several decades, and indicates deeper structural weaknesses in Indian democracy.  The electoral system creates political incentives against re-apportionment  As in the UK, each Lok Sabha seat represents one geographical constituency that elects a single member on the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) basis: voters simply cast one vote for the candidate of their choice, and the candidate with the most votes wins even if they do not have an absolute majority. As a result, India is no stranger to the disproportionality seen in the wake of the 2024 UK General Election, and at the 2025 local elections. In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) – the Tamil nationalist party led by MK Stalin, one of the most vocal critics of re-apportionment – won 22 out of 39 Lok Sabha seats (a 56.4% share) for Tamil Nadu on just 26.9% of the popular vote. The AIADMK, which broke away from the DMK, won 20.5% of the popular vote without winning a single seat. In Uttar Pradesh, the Samajwadi Party won 37 of the 80 Lok Sabha seats on 33.6% of the vote, whilst the BJP won 41.4% of the vote, but only 33 out of 80 seats. Similar patterns are visible in Kerala, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, with different parties benefiting in each case. Parties with disproportionately large seat shares under the current FPTP system thus have a built-in political incentive to challenge the Government’s delimitation proposals, but one which entrenches a disproportionate democratic model.   Why proportional representation might make a difference  Despite the complications that FPTP creates, electoral reform might also provide a way out of the re-apportionment quandary. A more proportional electoral system, such as the Single Transferable Vote (STV) model where voters select their preference candidates for multi-member constituencies, would take some of the sting out of the current debate. Gone would be the incentive for parties such as

Authors: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk; Amy Wonnacott, Research Intern The results of the May 2025 local elections in England caught the eye within hours of being announced. This is in no small part because of the 677 seats gained by Reform UK, which at the last set of elections in 2021 held no local council seats at all. A close analysis of the available data reveals that whilst Reform UK and the Liberal Democrats made some significant gains, both parties disproportionately benefited from the First-Past-the-Post electoral system. These results, viewed in context, should open up conversations around electoral reform towards more proportional representation at both local and national level.   Table 1 displays the total vote and seat share for each party, based on available data.  Total Council Data: 2025  Party  Total Seats Won  Vote Share  Seat Share  Reform UK  677  32.3%  45.9%  Liberal Democrats  370  15.5%  21.3%  Conservative  319  21.7%  16.8%  Labour  98  14.7%  6.4%  Green  79  9.0%  5.4%  Table 1: total seats won, vote share and seat share in the May 2025 council elections. As of 8 May 2025, vote share data was missing for Cornwall County Council.    First-Past-the-Post favoured Reform UK and the Liberal Democrats  The First-Past-the-Post electoral system was used across all the mayoral and council elections that took place in May 2025. For the Cambridgeshire & Peterborough, Doncaster, North Tyneside and West of England mayoralties, this marks a shift from the Supplementary Vote system used in 2021. Under the Supplementary Vote, voters can choose a first preference candidate and a second preference candidate from another party; under First-Past-the-Post, they have only one option. Across 22 of the 23 councils contested, both Reform UK and the Liberal Democrats won a greater share of seats (45.9% and 21.3%) than their respective vote shares (32.3% and 15.5%). Labour, by contrast won a much lower seat share (6.4%) than its vote share (14.7%), which nevertheless was only the fourth highest amongst England’s major parties.   Figure 1: vote share and seat share for the 2025 council elections, for the five main parties. Data from Cornwall County Council was not available as of 8 May 2025.  Some council results saw significantly disproportionate advantages or disadvantages for specific parties, as detailed in Table 2.  Council  Party  Vote Share  Seat Share  Cambridgeshire  Liberal Democrats  27.4%  50.8%  Doncaster  Reform UK  36.2%  67.3%  Durham  Labour  20.9%  4.1%  Gloucestershire  Liberal Democrats  27.2%  49.1%  Kent  Reform  37.0%  70.4%  North Northamptonshire  Labour  17.0%  1.0%  Oxfordshire  Reform  17.8%  1.0%  Staffordshire  Reform  41.0%  79.0%  Table 2: a selection of council results where vote share and seat share were significantly disproportionate.  These figures highlight how the First-Past-the-Post electoral system can produce significantly disproportional outcomes in specific areas. This is typically because of the uneven distribution of votes for any given party across the wards that make up each council area. Sam Freedman highlights that under the First-Past-the-Post system, there is a ‘tipping point’ where vote share produces a disproportionately greater seat share. The available data from the 2025 local elections suggests that the ‘tipping point’ was around 27%. This is shown from the results in Cambridgeshire and Gloucestershire identified in Table 2, as well as the results from Northumberland. There, Reform UK won 33.3% of the seats on 29.3% of the votes, the Conservatives won 37.7% of the seats on 28.9% of the votes and Labour only 11.6% of the seats on 22.3% of the votes. With a more proportional electoral system, we would expect to see Reform UK and the Conservatives winning an almost identical number of seats, with Labour slightly further behind; under First-Past-the-Post, the Conservatives won 26 seats of the available 69, Reform UK won 23 and Labour only 8.  In these elections, it appears that just over a quarter of the vote is sufficient for a party to secure a disproportionately greater seat share.  Reform UK gained votes from both the Conservatives and Labour  Reform UK gained overall control of 10 out of the 23 councils where elections were held. A comparison between the 2025 vote and seat shares in these councils and the equivalent data from the 2021 elections suggests that Reform UK’s gains have largely been at the expense of the Conservatives, and to a lesser extent from Labour. As seen from Figure 2, the Conservatives’ vote share considerably fell from 2021 to 2025 in these 10 council areas. The scale of the Conservatives’ losses are not enough to account for all of Reform UK’s gains in these areas. As a result, these gains are likely down to ‘new’ voters (who did not vote at all in the 2021 elections) and losses from Labour to Reform UK. The changes in seat share – from 62% to 15% for the Conservatives, and 26% to 5% for Labour – are exacerbated by the unpredictability of the First-Past-the-Post electoral system, as highlighted above. These shifts reinforce the fragmented multi-party picture of British democracy that emerged from the 2024 General Election.   Figure 2: vote share and seat share for each of the five main parties in councils where Reform gained overall control in 2025, with the equivalent figures from the 2021 elections for each party.    Proportionality must be viewed in the context of turnout  The results of these local elections must also be viewed in the context of the turnout. The average turnout (from the 11 councils where data is available as of 8 May 2025) was 33.7%. This means that in the councils where Reform UK gained overall control, it won 65% of the seats from only around 13% of registered voters actually having voted for it. Available data from LG Inform highlights that average turnout in local elections since 2015 has been consistently between 30% and 35%. Turnout at the 2024 General Election, by contrast, was 59%. As a result, there is a need for caution before extrapolating too far from the local election results to Westminster constituency results in a General Election. Nevertheless, attention to the turnout figures further highlights that

Author: sachin nandha, trustee and director In boardrooms across the world, sustainability remains too often treated as a compliance obligation. Often it takes the form of a checklist to satisfy ESG disclosure requirements, reputational expectations, or LP due diligence. That framing, while once sufficient, is no longer fit for purpose. Environmental disruption, legal risk, and capital market realignment have moved sustainability from the periphery to the core of strategic governance.  According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2024, four of the top five risks facing the global economy by both likelihood and impact are environmental in nature, including extreme weather, biodiversity loss, and natural resource scarcity. These are not hypothetical challenges. They are today’s boardroom concerns. For directors, especially those leading private equity-backed firms, the question is not whether to act, but how fast their governance models can adapt.  Why This Matters: The Fiduciary Case for Sustainability  This is not a philosophical debate. It is a fiduciary reckoning.  Institutional capital is already moving. Morningstar reports that sustainable funds attracted nearly $30 billion in net inflows in Q3 2023, even as traditional equity and bond funds saw net outflows. CalPERS, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, and Temasek have embedded ESG as core screening criteria, not as a matter of optics, but of resilience and returns.  McKinsey’s 2020 research confirmed that companies with high ESG performance achieved valuation premiums of 10–20% in M&A transactions. Harvard Business School studies show that ESG-integrated firms significantly outperform peers in both profitability and equity returns over the long term. LPs are responding accordingly. BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, now asks companies to demonstrate how sustainability is integrated into long-term strategy, not just risk registers.  This reshapes the capital formation landscape. General partners who lag on sustainability integration may not just lose reputational standing, but they may lose access to capital.  The Rising Tide of Litigation and Regulation  Risk perception is being redefined in real time. The traditional model: governance through quarterly financial oversight and legal compliance is being displaced by a new standard: governance through strategic foresight.  Legal liability is expanding. As of 2023, over 2,500 climate-related legal actions have been filed globally. A landmark example is ClientEarth v. Shell plc (2023), in which the environmental law firm took direct legal action against Shell’s board of directors under the UK Companies Act for failing to manage climate risk as a fiduciary duty. While the case was dismissed, it has set a powerful precedent for future litigation.  Meanwhile, regulators are raising the bar. The EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) will now apply to over 50,000 companies, including non-EU entities with significant European operations. These firms must disclose governance structures, environmental impact, and forward-looking sustainability metrics under the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) by 2025. In the U.S., the SEC’s proposed climate-related disclosure rules, although contested, signal growing convergence between ESG and financial materiality.  Boards, and particularly their chairs, can no longer afford to treat sustainability as an “externality” managed by consultants. They must take direct ownership of ESG oversight and future-proofing.  Private Equity: Positioned to Lead, or to Lag  If this is a governance reset, private equity has a competitive advantage—if it chooses to use it.  Unlike listed companies constrained by diffuse shareholding, PE-backed businesses are governed by tightly aligned boards with short chains of command and long-term planning horizons. This structural clarity should, in theory, make them ideal platforms for ESG integration.  Consider KKR’s Green Portfolio Program, which embedded environmental efficiency practices into 27 portfolio companies, yielding more than $1.2 billion in cost savings while delivering measurable improvements in resource usage. The takeaway is clear: sustainability can drive operational alpha.  But beyond operational gains lies reputational capital. Firms with demonstrable ESG performance are increasingly winning the most attractive bids, gaining regulatory goodwill, and attracting premium buyers at exit. In a world where margin compression and geopolitical uncertainty loom large, sustainability offers something rare: strategic upside with defensive value.  What Conscious Boards Actually Do  Moving from compliance to consciousness does not mean adopting a moral posture. It means developing a deeper, more systemic awareness of the forces shaping risk, value, and legitimacy. Conscious boards embed this thinking into their processes. Five actions distinguish them:  Redefining Materiality They expand beyond traditional financial risk to include upstream ecological stress, labour conditions, and emerging regulatory frameworks, well before they become liabilities.  Diversifying Expertise They bring domain-specific knowledge into the boardroom, whether in environmental systems, supply chain resilience, or digital ethics and avoid groupthink driven by finance-only profiles.  Integrating Long-Term Strategy They view climate and social instability as long-horizon risks that affect valuation at exit and beyond, and they design incentive structures to match that horizon.  Rewiring Executive Accountability They tie CEO and C-suite compensation to ESG performance metrics, not just adjusted EBITDA, making sustainability a matter of leadership credibility.  Engaging Broader Stakeholders They recognise that employees, communities, and regulators are not “external actors” but influence licence to operate, reputational stability, and future deal access.  The PE chair’s playbook: Rethinking governance at the top  For a PE chairman, the challenge is now one of vision and discipline. The firm’s value creation plan must be matched by a governance plan that reflects the new realities of risk and reputation. This does not mean abandoning the principles of high-performance capitalism. It means upgrading them.  Firms must be proactive in asking:  Do our portfolio boards have ESG-literate directors?  Are we monitoring litigation and regulatory exposure beyond national borders?  Are ESG concerns embedded in our value creation plans, or tacked on in the final year before exit?  Can we credibly defend our strategy if challenged by an LP, regulator, or any stakeholder?  The Opportunity Ahead  The boards that embrace this shift will enjoy three key advantages: access to capital from forward-looking LPs, higher exit valuations through operational and reputational premiums, and a lower long-term risk profile in an increasingly volatile operating environment.  At the International Centre for Sustainability, we believe that this decade will define the next generation of boardroom leadership. Governance is no