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Author: Amy Wonnacott, Research Intern Upon the mention of ‘space power’, our first thought will undoubtedly be of the US and Russia (former USSR) in the context of the Space Race. Sputnik, Apollo and the ISS spring to mind. Yet India’s contribution to outer space exploration is comparatively less well-known. The Indian space agency is one of the oldest in the world: established in 1962, it launched its first satellite in 1975 and as recently as August 2023 became the fourth country to land a probe on the moon. These efforts rarely make headlines in the UK. This may be because, until the start of this century, India’s achievements in outer space have emphasised regional socio-economic development, not the technological power projection that characterised the Space Race.   India’s space programme, directed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has entered an ambitious new phase. With plans to launch a fully operational space station by 2035 and its first crewed mission, Gaganyaan, scheduled for 2026, the country is steadily advancing toward ‘space power’ status. Recent milestones like the successful Chandrayaan-3 lunar landing in 2023 and the SpaDeX satellite docking demonstration in March 2025 showcase ISRO’s growing technical capacity.   Despite the strategic importance of outer space, the underlying principle of all human space endeavour is ‘for the benefit of all mankind’. Every space-faring nation has a duty to adopt responsible space behaviours that are peaceful, transparent, sustainable and cooperative. As India’s ambitions for outer space grow, it can have a meaningful impact by actively demonstrating how responsible behaviours can be incorporated into an ambitious space program, and that advancement in the space domain can be conducted with a commitment to sustainability. If India succeeds in this regard, it may raise international standards for space sustainability and boost accountability in this field.  Defining Responsible Space Behaviours  Contrary to the vastness of outer space, Earth’s orbit is a limited resource. In the early days of space exploration, the orbital environment was largely empty and the need to protect it felt distant. Today, space is firmly embedded in daily life from navigation and communication to climate monitoring. With a surge in new space actors, both state and commercial, the challenges have increased: overcrowded orbits, limited regulation, and an absence of binding international space law.   The most significant threat to the orbital space environment is space debris – defunct, human-generated objects in Earth’s orbit such as broken satellites and rocket bodies. There are currently over 40,000 debris fragments larger than 10cm, which could cause significant damage in the event of a collision. Continued production of space debris will lead to Kessler Syndrome, a continuous chain reaction of in-orbit collisions that render space unusable. Current efforts to mitigate this threat are insufficient. It is therefore crucial that all space actors adhere to international guidelines and actively work towards debris mitigation and sustainable space missions.   Measures to ensure space sustainability can be seen as part of a wider category of responsible space behaviours. These voluntary commitments, outlined by the UN in documents such as the 2021 report on reducing space threats, are crucial for increased transparency of outer space actions, reducing hostility. Responsible space behaviours can be summarised as actions which are peaceful, transparent, sustainable and cooperative. These behaviours need to be integrated in all aspects of space activity, both scientific and strategic. As an actor with strong presence in both, India’s adherence to these behaviours is crucial on its path to becoming a space power.   Encouraging responsible space behaviours   ISRO’s focus on socio-economic development puts India in a strong position to champion sustainability in space. But how does India demonstrate space behaviours that are peaceful, transparent, sustainable and cooperative?  Peaceful  The development of ISRO has maintained a focus on space for socio-economic development and not for security. Its first significant project was the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) programme for monitoring agriculture, land and water resources in response to the needs of the nation. However, outer space dynamics are increasingly representative of earth-based geopolitics. Regional terrestrial rivalries are reflected in the race to develop advanced space technologies. In addition to scientific research and sustainability developments, both China and India have made significant advancements in counter-space capability  through the militarisation of their space programs since 2007. From this, it is clear that geopolitics has begun to influence India’s space program, extending its rivalry with China for regional dominance into the outer space domain. While India may perceive these developments as necessary to mitigate a security threat, it is crucial that strategic priorities are compatible with international norms, and signal to the world that India is sensitive to ensuring peaceful behaviours in space, while ensuring its own security.   Transparent  India has been an active member of UN space forums, including chairing the Long-Term Sustainability Working Group in 2021 and supporting international dialogue and information sharing. Technologically, Space Situational Awareness (SSA), the ability to monitor and predict the location of objects in space, is crucial way to increase transparency.  While all space powers have SSA capability to a certain extent, the USA has the most developed system and leads in sharing this data with other space-faring nations. In 2023, ISRO announced the creation of the Space Situational Awareness Control Centre to develop its own SSA capability. By developing and sharing its own capability, India contributes to the transparency and understanding of the outer space environment and solidifies itself as a key leader in responsible behaviours.   Sustainable  In 2024, India pledged to achieve Debris-Free Space Missions (DFSM) by 2030, echoing the European Space Agency’s Zero Debris Charter. This is a key commitment, recognising the threat of space debris and the subsequent actions to be taken. Yet the true test of sustainable space behaviours is seen in practice, and ISRO’s recent technical achievements have made significant progress, bringing it in line with the US’ advanced reusable space technologies. Reusable launch vehicles (RLV) reduce manufacturing expenses and reduce the amount of waste. Presently, the only active RLVs have been developed by

Compiled by: Shruti Kapil, Head of Security & Mutual Dependence Desk and Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk In the aftermath of Pakistan’s drone and missile barrage and India’s intensifying Operation Sindoor, the Indo-Pak conflict has entered a volatile but strategically restrained phase. This briefing cuts through the fog of ongoing skirmishes to examine the broader military, political, and societal implications of the standoff. It details India’s assertive yet calibrated military retaliation and its use of satellite intelligence and cyber capabilities, while spotlighting Pakistan’s asymmetrical strategy and growing internal military rifts. The report underscores India’s economic and defence superiority but warns that Pakistan’s nuclear posture and instability in Balochistan and Kashmir could trigger unintended escalations. Internationally, the UK is positioned as a key de-escalatory actor, though risks to domestic cohesion are rising—especially from diaspora-driven polarisation and religiously charged misinformation. The paper urges a proactive diplomatic strategy and domestic vigilance to contain the conflict’s ripple effects and avert wider destabilisation. Read the full briefing here: India-Pakistan Tensions Key Developments & Future Risk Part 2

Compiled by: Shruti Kapil, Head of Security & Mutual Dependence Desk and Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk Weeks after the Pahalgam terror attack and India’s subsequent Operation Sindoor, tensions between India and Pakistan remain volatile but contained. This briefing note goes beyond the immediate violence to assess the strategic, diplomatic, and societal ripples that continue to unfold. It highlights India’s calibrated military response and diplomatic outreach, Pakistan’s retaliatory rhetoric and shelling, and the uneasy calm that now defines the Line of Control. Critically, the report warns of rising risks to UK social cohesion, as polarised narratives—particularly linking Kashmir to other global conflicts—gain traction in diaspora communities. As geopolitical posturing continues, the paper calls for a clear-eyed, de-escalatory international approach and vigilant domestic management to prevent further instability. Read the full briefing here: India-Pakistan Tensions Key Developments & Future Risk

Authors: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk; Amy Wonnacott, Research Intern; Zoe Neiman, Research Intern The UK-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA), agreed yesterday after years of negotiation, marks a critical moment in the evolving relationship between the two countries. With India poised to become the world’s third-largest economy by the end of the decade, and its middle class expected to reach 60 million by 2030, and 250 million by 2050, the agreement provides the UK with preferential access to one of the fastest-growing consumer markets. By 2035, Indian demand for imports is projected to exceed £1.4 trillion, offering vast opportunities for British exporters and service providers. The economic benefits for both countries could be significant.   £ billion estimate, applied to 2040 predications Percentage change Change in UK GDP + £4.8 billion +0.1% Change in UK exports to India + £15.7 billion +59.4% Change in UK imports from India + £9.8 billion +25.0% Change in total trade between the UK and India +£25.5 billion +38.8% Source: DBT Modelling Sectors Covered by the Agreement The FTA spans a broad range of sectors, offering benefits for both countries. Tariff Reductions The tariff reductions secured under the deal are among the most generous India has ever agreed to. Indian tariffs on 90% of UK export lines will be reduced, with 85% going tariff-free within a decade. Based on 2022 trade figures, Indian tariff reductions will save UK exporters £400 million in the first year and £900 million annually in ten years. As high priority trade partners, the UK and Indian governments have set an ambitious target of $1 trillion export growth by 2030, facilitated by the mutual concessions in this FTA. Goods Previous tariff FTA tariff India Tariffs on UK Alcohol 150% 75%, 40% over decade Automotive 100% 10%, quota system Cosmetics 10-20% 0% Source: GOV.uk Social security benefits Alongside the FTA, the UK and India have “agreed to negotiate” a reciprocal agreement on social security contributions. This would ensure that British workers seconded to India and Indian workers seconded to the UK need only pay National Insurance and its Indian equivalent, a contribution to the Employees’ Provident Fund, in their home country, avoiding ‘double contribution’. The proposed Double Contributions Convention also extends the period of time for which temporary workers contribute to social security in their home country from 1 to 3 years. This has been criticised in the UK for ‘undercutting’ British workers. However, according to the UK’s Business Secretary, Jonathan Reynolds, this applies only to seconded workers, and mirrors agreements the UK has with the EU, Switzerland, Japan, Chile and South Korea. The workers affected would not gain new rights to access benefits, and Indian workers would still have to pay the NHS surcharge in the UK, which totals £1035 per year. This will not incentivise British businesses to recruit Indian workers over British ones, but does give Indian businesses a competitive advantage over other countries with which the UK lacks such an agreement. Higher education and the legal sector There is speculation that the FTA could present an opportunity for British and Indian businesses to pioneer new commercial ventures, including in AI and cybersecurity, bringing benefits to sectors such as higher education. This is a developing market in India: the University of Southampton opened its Delhi campus in July 2025, Coventry University will open in GIFT City (Gujarat International Finance-Tech City) in 2026, and the University of York plans to open a campus in Mumbai. Though the FTA may encourage further transnational educational initiatives, it has no specific reference either to this, or the greater availability of student visas for Indian international students to the UK. The legal sector is another area of potential UK-India collaboration. It was announced in January 2025 that English-qualified lawyers could register to practice permanently in India, liberalising India’s legal market. Yet this has faced pushback from the Society of Indian Law Firms, and concrete progress remains to be seen. The FTA includes no direct reference to the legal sector, which the Law Society views as a “missed opportunity”. Why is this good for the UK and India? This FTA is the most economically significant bilateral trade deal the UK has made since leaving the EU. The forecasted economic benefits for the UK are significant, contributing to the government’s Plan for Change. Modelling by the UK Department of Business and Trade predicts the deal to add £4.8 billion to the UK economy, and increase wages by £2.2 billion each year. For India, the reduction of tariffs in key sectors such as green energy, medical and life sciences will be crucial for its growth trajectory. India’s energy strategy remains reliant on coal, but aims for net-zero emissions by 2070 and has set ambitious targets towards solar and renewables. Facilitating trade in renewable energy equipment will support India’s transition, alongside the opportunity to use expertise from UK businesses and government procurement.  Healthcare is one of India’s largest sectors and is projected to reach $194 billion by 2032. Lowering tariffs on British exports of medical goods will facilitate this rapid growth, improving care quality and reducing the cost of private healthcare. Importantly, the FTA provides a platform from which other deals could be negotiated. Proposals for a follow-up Investment Treaty have been discussed, and the FTA offers the opportunity to deepen economic and strategic ties between two powerful economies, while supporting both manufacturers and consumers and UK presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Author: Zoe Neiman, Research Intern India is widely recognised as a major economy, yet remains one of the most protectionist, having maintained high import tariffs long before Trump’s new trade measures. India’s average tariff rate for trading partners is among the highest for major economies, averaging 13.8% compared to the US’ 3.3%. Certain Indian sectors like agriculture, automobiles and electronics are protected by even steeper duties. India’s protectionism has historical roots in its post-independence strategy of economic self-reliance, shaped by fears of foreign domination, to safeguard domestic industries from hyper-scaled foreign competitors. However, in today’s globalised economy, such a defensive stance risks limiting India’s growth and competitiveness, signifying it is time to reconsider and reduce protectionist barriers. This enduring protectionism has drawn criticism from the Trump administration. He repeatedly cites examples such as the high import duty on Harley-Davidson motorcycles and strong trade barriers on Indian agriculture, arguing the US is being taken advantage of in trade deals. Trump characterises India as the ‘tariff king’, highlighting the disparity between US openness to imports and India’s restrictive barriers. His administration’s retaliatory tariffs were presented as corrective measures aimed at rebalancing trade relationships and pressuring India to reduce its protectionist policy, paving the way for a more reciprocal bilateral trading relationship. Why then, are the tariffs imposed on India so trivial in comparison to its competitors in the region? These tariffs serve to mask a wider calculated strategy, that of continuing Biden’s strategic partnership with India as a counter to China in the Indo-Pacific.  US Tariffs Strengthened Indian Competitiveness  At first glance, India appears to be hard-hit by the 26% US tariffs, particularly in sectors like textiles, electronics, and engineering. However, crucial exports such as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, copper, and energy products remain untaxed. Pharmaceuticals, in particular, were spared due to their importance to the US, with 30% of Indian pharmaceutical exports directed to American markets. Agricultural exports are expected to remain stable or even grow, and India’s electronics and textiles sectors are advantageously positioned, as rival exporters like China (54-79%), Vietnam (46%) and Bangladesh (37%) face much steeper duties. India’s textiles sector is set to gain from the tariffs, as the US is already placed as India’s largest buyer accounting for $10 billion of India’s $36 billion exports in 2023-2024. Additionally, sectors dominated by China and Thailand, such as machinery, automobiles and toys, are vulnerable to tariff-driven supply chain shifts, presenting India with an opportunity to attract investment. Altogether, these subtleties reveal that rather than punishing India, Trump’s strategy strengthens Indian competitiveness, showing the hollowness of his ‘tariff king’ rhetoric.   Bipartisan Prioritisation of India  In 2017, Trump had shifted toward strategic alignment with India, reviving the Quad and placing India under Strategic Trade Authorisation Level 1, equal to NATO allies. Biden’s administration significantly expanded upon and institutionalised the US-India partnership, recognising India’s significance for the US’ wider ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. Developments such as the iCET Initiative (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology), and expanding defence cooperation by increasing military interoperability, joint exercises and agreements like BECA and COMCASA solidified the comprehensive strategic partnership. Biden also elevated India’s role in the Quad and made US-India joint training the most frequent bilateral defence cooperation. Under Biden, the US became India’s largest trading partner, with US goods exports to India at $41.8 billion and Indian exports to the US at $87.4 billion in 2024. India’s trade deficit with the US stands at $45.7 billion (2024) with strong reciprocal trade, whilst it has reached $99.2 billion with China at the beginning of this year.    When analysing the current administration’s India policy, there is a continuation and development of this approach. Looking past Trump’s rhetoric, largely condemning the Biden administration in all policy areas, there is a sharpened strategic commitment to India. Through the expansion of defence cooperation, joint military exercises, promoting arms sales and the co-production of technology, Trump has continued the path set by Biden. Equally, in the economic sector, the tariffs imposed have not translated into a rupture of US-India relations. Rather, it has generated greater momentum for the US-India FTA, to further formalise US-India economic ties. During the 90-day pause set by the Trump administration on 9 April 2025, the US has prioritised bilateral trade negotiations with India, stating a comprehensive FTA will be reached in autumn 2025. Trump has also expressed intent to revive American manufacturing and reduce dependency on China, creating opportunities for India in tech, electronics and manufacturing. India’s manufacturing sector as a whole is not yet strong enough to compete with China. Infrastructure deficiencies, a complex regulatory environment and labour reforms, high input costs, and skilled labour shortages plague Indian manufacturing development, decreasing the likelihood of India maximising on the emerging shift away from Chinese manufacturing. Still, recent developments such as Apple’s decision to relocate all US iPhone production from China to India highlight a growing commitment to de-risking from Chinese supply chains and positioning India as a preferred alternative. Trump’s strategy will further initiatives like Biden’s iCET, continuing India’s inclusion in secure supply chains, albeit framed in terms of economic nationalism rather than cooperative globalisation.   The timing and framing of these tariffs serve two strategic purposes. First, they obscure the continuity between Trump and Biden’s approaches by packaging the policy in economic nationalist rhetoric for domestic political purposes, while quietly expanding cooperation in critical sectors. Second, by presenting the tariffs as part of a universal ‘fair trade’ framework, the US allows its strategic alignment with India, principally in countering China’s trade practices and Indo-Pacific aggression, to remain subtle yet effective. This positioning enables India to absorb foreign investment and supply chain shifts away from China and benefit from trade realignment, all while reinforcing the US-India relationship. In this way, Trump’s tariffs operate less as punitive measures and more as tools to reinforce a strategic partnership already cultivated under Biden, now advancing under a different guise.  Towards Shared Strategic Interests   Recent developments have further revealed this calibrated approach. Vice President Vance’s visit to India was presented

Author: sachin nandha, trustee and director On 25th April at around 2:50pm, a clear afternoon, in the meadows of Pahalgam—a town long associated with Kashmir’s serene beauty and emerging peace—terror struck with ruthless precision. The attack was not random. It was a deliberate assault on the fragile but real gains that Kashmir, and India more broadly, have painstakingly nurtured over the past decade. See Understanding Kashmir post 370. Beyond the immediate tragedy, the Pahalgam attack compels us to ask deeper questions: How must India’s security architecture evolve to meet the demands of an era defined by hybrid threats, proxy warfare, and disinformation? And more fundamentally, how must India’s society renew its long-term commitment to resilience—not just in tactical terms, but as a civilisational imperative? Pahalgam: More Than a Town, A Symbol Pahalgam has, over recent years, become emblematic of a new narrative in Kashmir: one of reconciliation, tourism, and quiet normalcy. Visitors flocked to its valleys, hospitality flourished, and the region began to shed the heavy legacy of insurgency and militarisation. Striking Pahalgam, therefore, was more than an act of terror—it was an attack on the very idea that Kashmir could move beyond cycles of fear. It was designed to reignite trauma, to destabilise confidence, and to fracture India’s carefully woven fabric of recovery. Understanding this symbolic dimension is essential. Security is not just about preventing physical attacks. It is about safeguarding progress itself. A Response Marked by Professionalism It is important to note that the immediate security response to the Pahalgam attack was commendable.  Coordination between agencies was swift, professional, and effective demonstrating that many structural reforms implemented over the past decade have matured into real operational capacity. Even critical observers across political lines have acknowledged the absence of major lapses in either intelligence response or tactical execution. In this specific case, it is perhaps more accurate to describe the operational environment as an intelligence black area:Signals were sparse, patterns were diffuse, and no significant early-warning indicators were available. Thus, while there was no actionable failure, the event reaffirms the need for continual enhancement of India’s intelligence synthesis capabilities—especially in challenging terrains where information gaps persist. Strengthening the Foundations for the Future Building on these gains, India must continue strengthening its security architecture—not as a criticism of what was lacking at Pahalgam, but as a proactive investment in future resilience. First, institutional coordination must be permanently embedded. The establishment of a Unified Security Command at the regional level ensures that in more complex, multi-site scenarios, the clarity of command remains robust. Second, intelligence must be fused, not just collected. Regional Intelligence Fusion Centres, integrating inputs from human, technical, and local sources in real time, can better address intelligence black spaces—especially in an era where adversaries are innovating faster than traditional structures can adapt. Third, strategic vigilance must be redundant but discreet. In Kashmir today, security is increasingly invisible by design—a sign of success, not weakness. Maintaining layers of unseen resilience—through surveillance technologies, predictive analysis, and rapid response forces—ensures that normal life can flourish without overt securitisation. The Cross-Border Reality: Old Tactics, Evolving Strategies The persistence of cross-border terror infrastructures is a reality India cannot ignore.  Groups operating from Pakistani territory, often with varying degrees of state support or tacit complicity, continue to act as force multipliers for instability. While India’s international diplomatic efforts to expose and isolate such tactics are important, the primary lesson is clear: self-reliance is paramount. After the Uri attack in 2016, India’s doctrinal shift toward surgical strikes and proactive countermeasures demonstrated that deterrence can and must be enforced when necessary.The Balakot air strikes of 2019 further expanded India’s willingness to act beyond its borders to defend national security. Pahalgam reaffirms this trajectory. A sustainable security strategy must retain full-spectrum deterrence capabilities—including covert disruption, strategic messaging, economic countermeasures, and calibrated kinetic options. Hybrid Warfare: Securing the Physical and the Psychological The Pahalgam attack was not confined to the physical realm. Within hours, manipulated videos, false flag narratives, and communal polarization efforts began to circulate across social media platforms.  This is the signature of hybrid warfare:The blending of physical attacks with psychological operations to fragment, disorient, and weaken societies from within. India’s security doctrine must now formally treat strategic communications, information security, and societal resilience as critical domains of national defence. Dedicated information command units, real-time media monitoring cells, and partnerships with civil society actors must become the norm, not the exception. India must not only defeat attacks on its borders. It must also defend truth itself. Technology, Human Capital, and Sustainable Security India has rightly invested heavily in security technology, from AI surveillance to smart fencing and sensor networks. However, one key insight from global military practice must be emphasised: Technology must augment high-quality human capital, not substitute for it. In Western military models, technological investments build upon strong human analytic and operational capacities. For India to fully realise the dividends of its technological investments, parallel investments must be made in training, leadership development, and systemic human capital uplift across security forces. Only when people and technology evolve together can true operational transformation occur. Global Context: A Broader Trend What India faces is not unique. The use of disinformation alongside kinetic action is now a staple of global conflicts—from the Ukraine-Russia war to operations in the Middle East. This underscores another vital point: India’s experience, and India’s innovations in hybrid defence, will have global relevance. As India’s geopolitical stature rises, so too will the necessity of sharing best practices, building resilience networks, and shaping global norms for hybrid conflict response. In that sense, India’s fight is part of a broader human struggle—to defend open societies against forces that seek to corrode them from within. Toward a Sustainable Security Strategy From Pahalgam, several imperatives emerge clearly: Operationalise Unified Commands: Seamless, multi-agency coordination must be built into daily operations. Create Regional Intelligence Fusion Centres: Actionable intelligence must move rapidly to prevent, not just respond to, attacks. Maintain Strategic Vigilance: Invisible but constant layers of security must protect

Compiled by: Shruti Kapil, Head of Security & Mutual Dependence Desk and Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk The recent terror attack in Pahalgam, which targeted civilians and marked a serious escalation in violence in Jammu and Kashmir, has reignited pressing concerns about the region’s security environment and its wider geopolitical ramifications. With preliminary evidence indicating the involvement of Pakistan-based terrorist groups, the incident highlights the persistent threat of cross-border militancy. For the United Kingdom, this is more than a distant security issue—it raises important questions about how it responds to terrorism abroad, the narratives it allows to shape public discourse, and the cohesion of its own diverse communities. Accurately framing such incidents is essential, both to uphold international norms and to safeguard the UK’s commitment to pluralism and mutual respect.   This paper explores the wider implications of the Pahalgam attack—regionally and internationally—and makes the case for why a clear-eyed assessment of such events is essential for informed UK policy and social stability. Read the full paper here: The Pahalgam Attack Briefing Paper  

Authors: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk; Zoe Neiman, Research Intern; Niharika Girsa, Research Intern Following a week where the US has imposed tariffs on much of the rest of the world – and quickly reversed that decision – the current system of global cooperation is under significant strain. Yet against the backdrop of the current volatility, the 13th UK-India Economic and Financial Dialogue (EFD) shows that there is still scope for longer-term international cooperation in addressing global challenges. The measures agreed by UK Chancellor Rachel Reeves and Indian Minister of Finance Nirmala Sitharaman represent not only a £400m boost to the British economy, but also a valuable deepening of UK-India bilateral ties. The key outcomes include investment by India’s largest digital payments platform into the UK, the expansion of UK universities into the Indian market, and closer economic ties established through the financial services sector.    What have previous EFDs decided?  The UK-India EFD is a recurring high-level meeting between the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer and India’s Finance Minister, focusing on strengthening bilateral economic and financial ties. These dialogues address areas such as financial services, infrastructure development, sustainable finance and trade. Since 2020, UK-India EFDs have consistently prioritised sustainable financial services, infrastructure investment and green finance, shaping the direction of their economic partnership. The 10th EFD, in October 2020, launched the New Partnership on Infrastructure Financing and Policy to drive sustainable infrastructure investment and launched strategic cooperation on GIFT City (Gujarat International Finance Tec-City), India’s first International Financial Centre, promoting ties with UK’s financial services ecosystem. Progression of both projects followed in the 11th EFD in September 2021, with the UK and India reaffirming commitments to GIFT City development as a global FinTech and sustainable finance hub. The UK also committed $1 billion in climate finance investment in India through British International Investment (the UK’s development finance institution), alongside increased support for the Green Growth Equity Fund and the launch of the Climate Finance Leadership Initiative with India, emphasising the continued prioritisation of sustainable finance and infrastructure investment. The 12th EFD in September 2023 reinforced this direction, with continued focus on GIFT City, the FinTech Joint Working Group, and expanding private sector-led sustainable finance initiatives. Over the past five years sustainable investment and green finance have become central to UK-India economic cooperation.     Could Indian technology support British small businesses?  The commercial package agreed at the 13th EFD includes plans for Paytm, India’s largest digital payments app, to invest in the UK. This will “accelerate access to affordable digital payments and credit for small businesses.” Paytm is a pioneer in digital transactions that has reshaped India’s payment landscape. By rapidly rolling out affordable QR codes, Paytm has successfully brought traditionally cash-reliant merchant segments, from small corner shops to street vendors into the digital payments ecosystem. It has also contributed to financial inclusion at an individual level by leveraging technology to bring banking and financial services to a broader population, accelerating India’s shift towards cashless transactions, enabling both peer-to-peer fund transfers and merchant payments through the United Payments Interface (UPI). The scale of UPI uptake is vast. The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) monthly bulletin highlights an impressive ten-fold increase in UPI transactions over the past four years, soaring from 12.5 billion in 2019-20 to 131 billion in 2023-24. This growth accounts for 80% of India’s total digital payment volume. Notably, UPI transactions grew by 57% year-on-year in FY24, while debit card transactions saw a decline of 43%. The global significance of UPI, and the wider Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) of which it is part, has gained increasing recognition: DPI deployment by 2030 is considered crucial in fulfilling the UN SDGs. With the UK’s Treasury Committee highlighting in May 2024 that British small businesses increasingly lack banking support, Paytm’s investment can bring direct benefits to the British economy whilst also positively contributing to the global financial system.     UK-India university collaboration can strengthen Higher Education globally  With universities in the UK under significant – and worsening – financial strain, many have turned to setting up overseas campuses in recent years. Historically, foreign universities could not establish campuses in India. However, India’s 2020 National Education Policy emphasises the need to open up the Indian Higher Education (HE) sector to international students and researchers. This prompted a regulatory change in 2023, with the University of Southampton becoming the first British university to receive a licence to start a campus in India under the new scheme. Not only does this enhance the quality of HE provision and research in India, fostering knowledge exchange, but it also reinforces the global attractiveness of UK HE institutions, contributing to British soft power. At the 13th EFD, it was announced that Coventry University has received approval to establish a campus in GIFT City, with undergraduate degrees in Business to be offered from 2026. It is the first English university to receive approval in GIFT City, with Queen’s University Belfast beginning operations there in January 2026. With this expansion, there is scope for Coventry University’s online and project-based learning offering to be further extended in India. As well as reinforcing the ‘living bridge’ between the UK and India, this outcome from the 13th EFD marks a move towards a more globally distributed HE system, which recent ICfS research has argued is critical to the future of global HE.    Banking and financial services  Several initiatives were announced at the 13th UK-India EFD concerning the banking and financial sectors. HSBC Bank will expand into 20 additional cities in India, covering 95% of its wealth market, Standard Chartered with open offices in GIFT City, Revolut is preparing for launch in India having received RBI authorisation, the FinTech company Wise plans to open an office in Hyderabad and India will pave the way to allow Indian companies to list internationally, including on the London Stock Exchange. These indicate the potential for closer financial ties between the UK and India going forward, which benefits both India’s efforts to become