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India’s Digital Leverage and the Future of Global Tech Valuations

Author: Sachin Nandha, Director-General at the International Centre for Sustainability Introduction India is now the world’s largest digital marketplace by users, with more than 850 million internet subscribers and 1.2 billion mobile connections (TRAI, 2024). This scale has made the country indispensable to the business models of the world’s largest technology companies. India accounts for 535 million WhatsApp users (23% of the global total), more than 500 million YouTube users (~20%), around 824 million Gmail accounts (~45%), 380 million Instagram users (17%), and 373 million Facebook users (17%) (Statista, 2024; Datareportal, 2024). Amazon Web Services already derives over 10% of its Asia-Pacific cloud revenues from India, with the domestic cloud market expected to reach USD 17.8 billion by 2027 (IDC, 2024). These numbers illustrate how Indian consumers underpin the user scale and revenue growth on which trillion-dollar U.S. valuations rest. Yet the financial returns accrue overwhelmingly to the United States, with most Indian user data hosted offshore in American-controlled data centres. This imbalance raises questions of digital sovereignty and global economic equity. What would happen if India sought to monetise its user base more directly, either through a levy on foreign platforms or through mandatory data localisation? What if Indian policymakers created the environment for domestic platforms to emerge as competitors to U.S. technology firms? This article considers these scenarios and their implications for India, U.S. technology valuations, and the broader global digital order. India as the Backbone of U.S. Tech Growth The commercial models of U.S. technology firms are based on scale. Advertising revenues, data analytics, and product development all depend on large and active user communities. In this respect, Indian users are central. When Meta crossed the USD 1 trillion market capitalisation threshold in 2021, analysts cited emerging market growth—particularly in India—as a decisive factor (Financial Times, 2021). Yet the average revenue per user (ARPU) in India is just $3.43 per quarter for Meta, compared with $56.44 in the United States and Canada (Statista, 2024). This disparity illustrates the paradox: Indian users drive the scale underpinning valuations, but the monetisation of that scale is realised elsewhere. At present, India functions as a low revenue but high-volume market. The contribution is systemic rather than marginal: without India’s hundreds of millions of active users, the valuation multiples of U.S. firms would look materially weaker. Scenario 1: Monetising Indian Users through Data Localisation and User Levies One possible path is the imposition of mandatory local data storage combined with a levy on foreign platforms monetising Indian user data. India has already moved in this direction. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act (2023) requires sensitive personal data to be processed in India, with strict conditions for cross-border transfers (Government of India, 2023). The Reserve Bank of India has separately required payment system operators to store payments data locally since 2018 (RBI, 2018). These measures have catalysed significant investment in domestic data centres. Market reports suggest India’s data-centre capacity could double by 2026, reaching almost 2 gigawatts as localisation rules drive infrastructure expansion (Cushman & Wakefield, 2023). If India were to formalise a User Revenue Service (URS), foreign platforms could be obliged to share a percentage of revenues attributable to Indian users. To illustrate, if Meta were required to repatriate even 5 per cent of estimated Indian user-related revenues (roughly $2–3 billion annually), that sum could be channelled into building digital infrastructure, supporting research and development, and financing skill development (Statista, 2024). For U.S. firms, compliance costs would rise due to both data localisation and revenue-sharing requirements. Margins could narrow, and in turn, market valuations may need to be repriced to account for new liabilities. However, there are also risks for India. Overly onerous rules could disincentivise investment, limit cross-border data flows essential for global trade and invite retaliatory measures from the United States or other jurisdictions (Carnegie Endowment, 2021). The policy challenge is to ensure fairer value capture without slipping into digital protectionism. Scenario 2: Building Domestic Alternatives The second scenario considers the development of indigenous digital platforms capable of competing with U.S. incumbents. India already has experience in creating robust domestic digital infrastructure. The Aadhaar biometric identity system covers over 1.3 billion people, while the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) now processes more than 10 billion transactions monthly, surpassing Visa’s global volumes in 2023 (NPCI, 2024). These Digital Public Infrastructures (DPIs) illustrate India’s capacity to deliver scalable, inclusive platforms at national scale. By extending this model into consumer-facing applications, India could nurture alternatives to global incumbents. The Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC) aims to create an open protocol for e-commerce, challenging the dominance of Amazon and Flipkart. A well-capitalised innovation fund such as the proposed INR 25,000 crore (c. $2.5 billion) for AI and advanced computing could similarly incubate competitive social media, cloud, or AI platforms (MeitY, 2024). If successful, such firms would not only serve domestic markets but also export services across the Global South, where affordability and inclusivity are paramount. The geopolitical implication would be a multipolar digital ecosystem, with India positioned as a third pole alongside the U.S. and China. For U.S. technology companies, this would mean intensified competition in markets they currently dominate. For India, it would translate into higher domestic retention of value, enhanced sovereignty over data, and leadership in shaping global standards. Implications for U.S.–India Relations and Global Digital Governance Both scenarios carry implications beyond economics. For the United States, recognising India’s centrality to technology valuations is becoming unavoidable. Digital trade is now a recurring issue in the U.S.–India Trade Policy Forum, and American policymakers must consider how to accommodate Indian demands for greater equity without triggering fragmentation of the global digital economy (USTR, 2023). For India, digital leverage can translate into negotiating power. By coordinating with other large digital markets, such as Indonesia (220m internet users), Brazil (180m), and Nigeria (130m)—India could spearhead a “Digital Users’ Equity Charter” at the G20 or United Nations Internet Governance Forum (Datareportal, 2024). Such a coalition would echo earlier efforts of resource-rich countries to demand fairer

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How the UK Can Help the Himalayan Water Crisis

Blog, Research Articles / Shruti Kapil

Author: Dr. Jagannath Panda, Head of SCSA-IPA, and Shruti Kapil, Head of Security and Mutual Dependence Desk Shruti Kapil, Head of our Security and Mutual Dependence Desk, has recently co-authored an article published in The National Interest entitled ‘How the UK Can Help the Himalayan Water Crisis’. In collaboration with Jagannath Panda, the article highlights how Britain is in a unique position to elevate the Himalayan Water Crisis from a regional concern to a priority on the global security agenda, aligning with the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt. Exploring how melting glaciers, climate-induced weather events, and unregulated dam construction in the Himalayas are destabilising the vital river systems that sustain nearly two billion people across South Asia, they argue that Britain should urgently lead the drive for for transparent, cooperative transboundary water governance, greater scientific collaboration, and international oversight of mega-dam projects. Read the full article here.

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Votes at 16: A Significant Step Towards a Stronger British Democracy?

Blog, Research Articles / Pravar Petkar

Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of strengthening democracy desk On 17 July 2025, the Labour Government officially announced that it would legislate to ensure 16 and 17-year-olds can vote in all UK elections. This implements one of its key manifesto commitments on democracy and harmonises the voting age across the UK. This is a sensible policy measure which can improve democratic participation in the UK at time of deep distrust. However, the success of ‘votes at 16’ relies upon a more robust civic education system than is presently in place, and this reform should be seen only as a stepping stone towards the aspiration of a more participatory democracy. The importance of harmonising policy across the UK The UK Government’s announcement means that 16- and 17-year-olds will be able to vote in every election managed by the UK Government, including local council and mayoral elections in England and Wales, and the UK General Election in 2029. This equalises the voting age across all UK elections: 16- and 17-year olds were given the right to vote for the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, and in all other Scottish elections from 2015. In Wales, this age group has been able to vote in devolved elections since 2021. This has made England and Northern Ireland the outliers over the last decade. Scottish Government-funded research identified that one of the main drawbacks of introducing votes at 16 in Scotland was the inconsistency of the voting age across the UK, which this policy change rectifies. Allowing 16-year-olds in Scotland to vote resulted in higher turnout for first-time voters, and over time for those who first voted at that age. With a recent survey of public opinion on foreign policy by the British Foreign Policy group highlighting young people’s disillusionment with the current Government’s strategies, measures such as this are needed to politically re-engage young people. Harmonising ‘votes at 16’ across the UK is, with this context in mind, a sound and sensible policy that is well-placed to improve engagement with democracy. There is no guarantee that it will benefit Labour Some immediate responses to the Government’s announcement accused it of attempting to ‘rig’ the political system. However, recent polling by Merlin Strategy on the voting intention of 16 and 17-year-olds suggests otherwise: the two most popular parties are Labour (33% of respondents) and Reform (20%), with the Green Party third (18%). This is consistent with a wider split between the political opinions of young men and young women: in the UK, young women aged 18-29 are, as of 2024, 25 percentage points more liberal than their male counterparts. Sam Freedman highlights that young women are shifting leftwards politically, and towards parties such as the Greens. Assuming that 16- and 17-year-olds are likely to have similar voting preferences those aged 18-25, extending the franchise could leave Labour electorally vulnerable both to Reform on its right, and the Greens on its left. Votes at 16 requires more robust civic education The main critique of the Government’s announcement from campaigners, policymakers and academics is that there is insufficient focus on strengthening citizenship education. The APPG on Political and Media Literacy’s policy brief notes that young people must be equipped with practical skills to exercise their democratic rights effectively, such as being able to register to vote, decipher a manifesto and think critically about media content in an age of AI-driven misinformation. Research on the introduction of votes at 16 in Scotland and Wales suggests that the lack of citizenship education in Wales to accompany the expansion of the franchise led to lower turnout. In Scotland, secondary school students may be offered Modern Studies classes, which help young people understand how the political system works, but do not assist in helping them to participate in it. What is critical, according to Jan Eichhorn and Christine Huebner, is that citizenship education includes opportunities to deliberate about political issues. As a result, though the Government’s ‘votes at 16’ policy creates opportunities for participation, it fails to ensure the conditions for that participation. Research by the ICfS earlier this year has argued this is critical for effectively strengthening democratic participation. Given this, citizenship education across the UK is in urgent need of reform. Most pupils who entered secondary school in September 2024 will be eligible to vote in the 2029 UK General Election. The UK and devolved governments must work with educational institutions, civic society and community groups to ensure that opportunities for citizenship education are available and implemented well in advance of this. Pilot projects on experiential citizenship education should also be part of this strategy. Experiential learning will be critical not only in providing the practical skills and knowledge necessary for effective democratic participation, but the motivation to do so, by facilitating connections between learners and other human and more-than-human communities. A stepping stone to a more participatory democracy? Although this UK-wide extension of the franchise may improve participation, the existing challenges with the UK’s representative democratic system remain. ‘Votes at 16’ will not change the disproportionality of the First-Past-the-Post electoral system, or the lack of opportunities for citizen engagement outside elections. Eichhorn and Huebner’s research from Scotland also suggests that there is no spillover from extending the franchise to other non-electoral democratic engagement, such as participating in demonstrations or signing petitions. ‘Votes at 16’ is therefore, at best, one element of a wider package of reforms that will enhance democratic participation in the UK; further experiments with participatory and deliberative democracy at local levels are also essential in resolving some of the structural challenges facing British democracy. Equalising the voting age across all UK elections is a sensible policy measure with the potential to enhance democratic participation across the UK. However, its success in the short-term is dependent on urgent reform to the UK’s citizenship education offering, which must be practical as well as theoretical. Governments, educational institutions and civil society must jointly create the space for the education that will support and sustain a more participatory democracy in the

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From Surveillance to Strike: Operation Sindoor and the Role of Space in Himalayan Regional Security

Blog, Research Articles / Amy Wonnacott

Author: Amy Wonnacott, Research Intern India’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025 marked a milestone in the military application of space-based technology in the Indo-Pacific. Conducted as a response to the Pahalgam attack on 22 April, the operation was characterised by a high level of integration between terrestrial and space-based systems. Using indigenous satellite communications, Earth observation and navigation technology, India conducted targeted defence responses across the Pakistani border. Though it was not the first global example of satellite integration in conflict, as highlighted by the War in Ukraine, it was a significant moment for conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Territorial disputes are ingrained in regional geopolitics of the Himalayas. The Line of Actual Control between India and China remains undefined and contested, and the conflict in Kashmir has long been a cause of tension between India and Pakistan. As the viability of space resources grows, these earth-based geopolitics will be increasingly reflected in outer space, which could have significant security implications for the region. Indigenous Military Satellite Application The unreliability of traditional communication methods in remote border areas makes space-based satellite systems crucial, with significant investment underway to boost their military application across the Indo-Pacific. Since 2015, China has fundamentally restructured its approach to space and launched an arsenal of dedicated military satellites. India’s space program relies on a higher proportion of dual-use satellites (with both military and civilian application) due to a comparatively late inclusion of security into space policy. Both countries emphasise the development of indigenous satellite systems in three key areas to reduce reliance on foreign technology and ensure strategic autonomy. Satellite communications enable secure data exchange between military units through an in-orbit network. China’s emphasis on informatized warfare means that secure communications are integrated into satellites, enabling coverage over a vast area. The COMSAT system has grown by a factor of 12 in the past eight years, and includes the Shentong series of secure military communication satellites. India’s 14 GSAT communication satellites are mostly dual-use, but there are three for dedicated military communication. ISRO has announced programs to boost the GSAT-7 series to enhance network-centric warfare capabilities. Positioning, Navigation, and Timing systems are crucial for missile guidance and troop movement. The US-owned GPS has long been the dominant provider, but both China and India have developed indigenous systems after limitations in access and concerns over dependency. China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system comprises of 46 operational satellites, providing global coverage and critical situational awareness support to military operations. Its rapid expansion increasingly challenges the US, with BeiDou vs GPS becoming a new battle of geopolitical influence. The Indian NavIC system is much smaller, providing regional coverage using a constellation of 7 satellites for dual civilian and military use. It played a key role during Operation Sindoor to provide accurate strike targeting. ISRO claims the system offers enhanced precision due to its regional focus, but there are still challenges of ground infrastructure and network integration. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites capture imagery for real-time situational awareness. China’s Yaogan series uses optical technology to capture high-resolution images even at night or with heavy cloud cover. Indian satellite observation using the CARTOSAT series has allowed close monitoring of infrastructure developments along the India-Pakistan border since 2005. Data can only be downloaded from CARTOSAT every two weeks, so India retains some reliance on foreign infrastructure, using images from US company MAXAR during Operation Sindoor. In 2025 ISRO announced plans to launch a further 52 satellites dedicated to ISR, completing the move to indigenous capability within this field. This illustrates the geopolitical competition for strategic autonomy in space-based capabilities. Counterspace Capability Satellite technology has become a military target due to its critical role in offensive and defensive strategies across the Indo-Pacific. China and India have rapidly developed counterspace systems which can disrupt, damage or destroy a satellite reversibly or irreversibly to safeguard their own systems. Both India and Pakistan claim that satellite jamming systems disrupted air defence and communications during Operation Sindoor. The application of these systems in conflict scenarios rather than testing indicates the threat which space systems now face. The counterspace landscape has changed significantly in the last two decades. In 2007, China destroyed a defunct weather satellite in a direct-ascent anti-satellite test (ASAT) which caused international outcry as the largest single space debris producing incident in history. It changed the space defence landscape, contributing to the normalisation of ASAT capability. India’s counterspace program has developed as a direct consequence of this, evidenced by demonstration of indigenous DA-ASAT capability, Mission Shakti, in March 2019. Increased reliance on space-based assets and awareness of space sustainability has led to a shift away from hard-kill systems. Instead, states pursue counterspace capability which is diverse, non-detectable and deniable. Technology such as electronic warfare (EW) interferes with radar and communications, disrupting reliance on satellite systems without jeopardising the space environment. China’s counterspace strategy prioritises these soft-kill systems with lower political and escalatory risk. There is evidence of significant EW expansion, which could disrupt data links and access between forces as part of new informatized warfare strategy. An EW drone, tested in 2022, is a significant force-multiplier for China. India’s growing counterspace capabilities echo China’s strategy but are still in early stages. India has completed testing of electronic warfare, and claims that EW systems were crucial during Operation Sindoor to limit Pakistan’s situational awareness, navigation accuracy and munitions capability. ISRO has reported development of a Satellite Navigation System (SNS) Jammer capable of blocking BeiDou signals, a direct sign that India’s counterspace capability is aimed at China. Yet these efforts may negatively impact strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific due to the growing asymmetry between Indian and Chinese military space programmes. Pakistan has recognised India’s counterspace capabilities as a pressing security threat. Its space program is dependent on foreign technology, both for satellite applications and defence, predominately from China. Pakistani capability is boosted by China’s investment, which emphasises their strategic expansion in the Indo-Pacific to counter the influence of India. During Operation Sindoor, Pakistan had access to

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Queer Futures, Ancient Roots: Reimagining Policy Through Indic Knowledge

Blog, Research Articles / Chloe Schuber

Author: Chloe Schuber, Operations and Research Assistant Since the Indian Supreme Court decriminalised consensual same-sex relations in 2018, legal reform has remained largely declaratory. While constitutional protections regarding dignity and privacy were clarified, same-sex partnerships remain excluded from formal legal institutions. Marriage, adoption, inheritance, housing, and welfare remain conditional on a narrow definition of family: the heterosexual, conjugal, nuclear unit, a model that shapes not only legal recognition, but also access to state benefits, taxation, property, and guardianship. Same-sex partnerships are still excluded from institutions like marriage, adoption, inheritance, housing, and welfare. For policymakers, this is not just a question of rights. When entire communities have their social entitlement restricted, it undermines broader development goals, such as economic security and housing access to public health and caregiving infrastructure. A more inclusive policy framework is not only just, but it’s practical. The task of expanding rights for queer and non-heteronormative communities in India is not merely about legal inclusion, rather it requires questioning the colonial and normative categories through which legal recognition itself is granted. Structural Legacy: Imported Legal Frameworks The limitations of the current system can be traced to its institutional lineage. Colonial administrators codified Hindu, Muslim, and Christian family norms through the lens of Victorian morality. These legal interventions not only criminalised non-procreative sexual relations but reconstituted Indian familial systems around a singular ideal: monogamous, heterosexual marriage recognised through ritual and state sanction. Colonial legislation such as Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code and the Criminal Tribes Act of 1871 explicitly targeted forms of intimacy and kinship deemed deviant, redefining relational legitimacy through imported moral norms. Prior to colonisation, relational forms in the subcontinent were more varied. While not uniformly liberal or egalitarian, indigenous legal and ritual traditions recognised a spectrum of household configurations. The codification of personal law under colonial governance actively displaced these practices in favour of uniformity and control. As Indian family law evolved under colonial rule, it encoded a conjugal, heterosexual norm as the only legally recognisable structure, shaping everything from inheritance to guardianship rights. Indic Knowledge, Relationships, and Same-Sex Intimacy Indic knowledge systems offer an alternative foundation for policy design. One that is rooted not in imported legal categories, but in indigenous traditions of ethical and relational reasoning. Concepts such as sambandha (mutual bond or connection), when understood in specific social and affective contexts, illuminate how communities approached caregiving, guardianship, inheritance, and household structure. Rather than privileging institutional form, these frameworks foregrounded the substance of relationships, which were shaped by context, mutual care, and obligation. These relational ideas were reflected in both philosophical texts and lived social practices. For instance, gandharva vivaha—a union based on mutual consent without ritual sanction, was acknowledged in texts such as the Manusmriti as one of several valid forms of marriage. While traditionally framed within a heteronormative context, it opens space to think beyond rigid ritual boundaries when formal recognition is absent. Similarly, regional customs such as matrilineal inheritance in Kerala or collective cohabitation in parts of the Northeast—attest to longstanding recognition of diverse domestic and relational forms. While these traditions were not uniformly egalitarian, they offer indigenous precedents for honouring affective ties and care networks beyond narrow legal definitions. A philosophical lens, especially from schools such as Nyaya and Mimamsa, may further help reinterpret these texts and practices as context-sensitive rather than rigidly prescriptive. This historical depth also extends to the cultural legibility of same-sex intimacy. Public debate often frames such relationships as foreign imports, but Sanskrit texts like the Kamasutra describe a wide range of same-sex acts as legitimate expressions of pleasure and companionship, without attaching stigma or criminal sanction. Temple iconography—especially at Khajuraho and Konark features depictions of same-sex intimacy within sacred spaces, embedded within broader visual narratives of divine and human love. These representations were not marginal or hidden; they were public, canonically endorsed, and culturally integrated. Furthermore, historical records from temple and monastic communities reveal institutional roles for non-conjugal domestic units, especially among ascetic, ritual, and caregiving networks. Together, these Indic traditions challenge the assumption that legal recognition must follow colonial categories of marriage or kinship. They offer a rich normative archive for policymakers seeking more inclusive frameworks grounded in India’s own intellectual and cultural heritage. What policy instruments does this enable? Drawing on Indic cultural knowledge enables the design of concrete policy tools implementable within current government structures. Civil Affidavit Partnerships: A Stepping Stone to Marriage Equality Inspired by the concept of gandharva vivah, civil affidavit partnerships would allow two adults to formalise their relationship through a simple notarised declaration. Though such affidavits are currently used informally in India to evidence live-in relationships or shared tenancy, they are not yet a legally recognised partnership category granting rights. As such, this proposal would transcend existing practice to establish a formal civic category that entitles partners to rights like joint tenancy, medical decision-making authority, pension inheritance, and shared welfare access. While this provides an immediate, low-barrier mechanism for recognition, it is not a substitute for full marriage rights. Denying queer individuals access to marriage reinforces a hierarchy that treats heterosexual unions as inherently more legitimate. Instead, civil affidavit partnerships are a pragmatic transitional tool toward equal access to civil marriage. Jurisdictions such as the UK and New Zealand initially introduced civil partnerships before extending full marriage rights to same-sex couples, illustrating how incremental legal recognition can serve as both a practical and symbolic path to broader equality. Cohabitation Registries: Recognising Shared Life Without Marriage Indic knowledge traditions affirm sambandh. This is a relational bond grounded in mutual care as a legitimate basis for household formation. A national cohabitation registry could recognise long-term, stable co-residential relationships. These could be romantic or platonic and provide partners with access to key benefits such as health care, housing rights, and emergency decision-making authority. Some Indian states already maintain limited forms of such registries under the guise of documenting “live-in relationships.” For instance, the 2024 Uniform Civil Code (UCC) Bill in Uttarakhand implemented a live-in relationship registry—though

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India’s Water Crisis – A National Security Concern

Blog, Research Articles / Shruti Kapil

Author: Shruti kapil, researcher – Security and mutual dependence desk. India, the world’s most populous country, with 1.4 billion people, is facing a serious water crisis. It has 18% of the world’s population but just 4% of water resources, and 70% of the available water is contaminated. Moreover, by 2030, twenty-one major cities will run out of groundwater according to a study by NITI Aayog. Root causes are multifaceted, from over-exploitation of groundwater to poor rainwater harvesting, water mismanagement, pollution, inefficient irrigation, and legal and institutional challenges. But the question is, what makes it a national security concern? Water is hardly ever part of National security discussions. National security is commonly understood as the ability of a country to protect its citizens, economy, and institutions from threats. So, national security discussions often revolve around border disputes, cyberattacks, terrorism, and other conventional security threats. However, the growing water crisis can significantly impact societal peace, regional stability, and strategic interests. It can further affect India’s economic trajectory and geopolitical standing, underscoring the link between water security and national security. This is especially concerning because India’s major river systems – Ganga, Indus, and Brahmaputra originate outside its borders in Tibet, which is under Chinese control. Thus, adding a layer of geopolitical complexity to India’s water challenges. Water Scarcity and Mass Migration Over 600 million Indians face high to extreme water stress, with 200,000 deaths annually due to inadequate safe drinking water. Water shortages are driving migration in the country. A study by the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) revealed that water scarcity remains one of India’s primary reasons for migration. With 39.5% of employed people migrating from urban areas and staggering 67.5% from rural areas due to water shortage. NITI Aayog’s report projects that India’s water demand will double the available supply by 2030. This could potentially lead to mass migration and increased pressure on already overburdened urban infrastructure, creating internal instability. Trigger for Conflict and Violence India, with its diverse geography and climate, has numerous river basins that are shared across multiple states (see Fig. 1). However, the management and distribution of water within these shared basins has become a significant source of tension and disputes between Indian states. To resolve these conflicts, the Indian Parliament enacted the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act in 1956, and various Inter-State Water Dispute Tribunals have been established to settle disputes. There are several river disputes in India centred around the Cauvery(also known as Kaveri) Krishna, and Mandovi Cauvery River dispute, for example, has been a significant source of conflict between the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, as both seek a larger share of the water. The origins of this dispute trace back to agreements in 1892 and 1924 between the Madras Presidency and the Kingdom of Mysore. These agreements are now outdated due to population growth and changing agricultural needs. This conflict has repeatedly resulted in riots and road blockades, endangering civilian lives and requiring significant security deployments. Therefore, these inter-state water disputes in India present more than just a governance challenge; they affect internal stability and, by extension, national security. Fig 1: River map of India highlighting Inter-State rivers and disputes Additionally, the 2023 Global Study on Homicide highlighted that water disputes are a major cause of interpersonal violence in India. The study emphasised the impact of water crisis on societal stability as one in five murders are linked to conflicts over water access. Beyond interpersonal violence, the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) reported 793 water-related disputes and protests in 11 states in 2019 alone. These incidents are warning signs of deeper instability if the crisis remains unaddressed. Food security at risk India ranks among the world’s top crop producers, and more than half of its population relies on agriculture for their livelihoods. As the backbone of India’s economy, the agricultural sector has been the hardest hit by the water crisis, directly threatening India’s food security. Approximately 80 per cent of India’s freshwater is consumed in agricultural practices, making it a major contributor to the crisis and one of the most deeply affected sectors. Moreover, India is one of the largest consumers of groundwater in the world. Over the past 50 years, the country’s groundwater usage has risen dramatically by 500%. This can be explained by the policies implemented during the Green Revolution, promoting water-intensive crops like rice and wheat that have depleted aquifers over the years. These policies, which were necessary to address food security in the 1960s, are no longer sustainable. They have inadvertently locked millions of farmers into unsustainable water usage practices, exacerbating the crisis and threatening both food and water security. The Water-Energy Nexus and Its Economic Impact Another area of concern is India’s energy sector, as both hydro and thermal power plants depend on water. 70% of India’s electricity is provided by thermal power plants, which rely on freshwater for cooling. From 2017 to 2021, water shortages caused energy losses of 8.2 terawatt-hours, which is enough to light up 1.5 million homes for five years. Between 2013 and 2016, 14 of India’s major thermal utilities were forced to shut down due to water shortages. These disruptions highlight the vulnerabilities in the water-energy nexus, directly impacting India’s economic growth. Even Moody’s ratings have warned that India’s worsening water crisis is a significant threat to the country’s economic stability. Hydro Diplomacy and Regional Security The former president of the World Bank once stated that wars in the 21st century will be fought on water. India’s water crisis is not confined within its borders; rather, cross-border water conflicts are a major contention in the region, affecting India and its neighbours alike. Shared rivers like the Brahmaputra and the Indus (see Fig. 2) represent potential flashpoints with countries such as China and Pakistan, already sources of significant security concerns. Figure 2: Major river systems originating from the Tibetan Plateau The recent Pahalgam terror attack killed 26 civilians in Jammu and Kashmir. Following this, India launched Operation Sindoor, and suspended the 65-year-old Indus

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The future of Christianity lies in the Global South, but that’s not the whole story

Blog, Research Articles / Ornicha Daorueng

Author: Ornicha Daorueng, research intern The result of the 2025 papal conclave, which elected Robert Prevost as Pope Leo XIV, the first American and the second pope from the Americas, raises important questions about the future of the Catholic Church. Does his election signal a decisive shift in the Church’s centre of gravity toward the Global South, and a further retreat from Rome’s historic role as the Church’s origin and traditional centre of leadership? In fact, this shift has been underway for decades. John Paul II, elected in 1978, broke a 455-year tradition as the first non-Italian pope coming from Poland. He was followed by Benedict XVI from Germany, and then Francis, the first Latin American pope, born in Argentina. From Italy to broader Europe, and now the Americas, the leadership of the Church has steadily moved away from its traditional centre, confirming what many have long observed: that the “centre of gravity” in Catholicism is shifting southward. This transformation is underscored by global Catholic demographics. As of 2023, over 72% of Catholics live in Latin America, Africa, or Asia, while around 20% reside in Europe. Population projections from Our World in Data confirm this trend: between 2025 and 2050, Europe’s total population is expected to decline by 5.5%, while Africa’s is projected to grow by 60%. Latin America, Asia, and North America are also expected to see more modest growth, ranging from 7% to 11%. This demographic and institutional realignment has fuelled growing calls for Church leadership, including future popes, to come from the Global South. Some fear this could deepen the sense of alienation in Europe, where the Church is already facing a crisis of faith, or raise concerns about the direction the Church might take because of this shift. But the real challenge facing Catholicism today goes beyond demographics. It is whether its leadership can bridge a global Church divided by regional theologies and priorities, while also responding to interfaith tensions and public sentiment between “timeless” tradition and “timely” reform. What ultimately matters to the Church is not where its leaders come from, but whether they can bring unity and purpose to an increasingly fragmented global faith. Regional theologies and priorities Catholicism may be unified in doctrine, but it is far from monolithic. Across the world, different regions have developed distinct theological emphases, cultural expressions of faith, and pastoral priorities shaped by local contexts. For example, African Catholicism often reflects a conservative moral outlook, with an emphasis on family and community values. African bishops have strongly defended traditional Church teachings on sexuality, while challenging Western efforts to liberalise positions on issues such as same-sex unions and communion for the divorced. These stances mirror broader African societal norms, often at odds with Western individualism and liberal values. Latin American Catholicism has long championed liberation theology, a movement that interprets the Gospel through the lens of social justice, economic inequality, and resistance to political oppression. Shaped by regional struggles with poverty and dictatorship, the Church emphasises defending human dignity and standing with the marginalised. Asian Catholicism values interreligious dialogue and inculturation, as reflected in the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences’ “triple dialogue” with cultures, other religions, and the poor. Asian Catholic theology often draws on cultural traditions and communal values like Confucianism and Taoism to express Christian truths. In India, the Church stresses interreligious dialogue amid deep cultural and religious diversity. Asian Catholics’ resilient faith fits pluralist contexts but can spark concern among traditionalists over doctrinal authenticity. European Catholicism, the historic heartland of Christian theology and culture, now navigates a post-Christian landscape marked by declining religious practice and rising secularism. With fewer young people attending Mass and identifying as religious, the Church is increasingly engaged in highly secularised issues, including debates on gender, bioethics, and cultural identity, seeking to stay relevant while articulating faith in an increasingly secular society. While holding diverse internal expectations for guidance and accompaniment, the Church also confronts external challenges, particularly tensions with Islam, a global phenomenon intensified by the rapid expansion of both faiths and the rise of Islamism. This is starkly evident in parts of Africa. For instance, although Nigeria’s constitution guarantees religious freedom, conversion from Islam to Christianity is illegal in the country’s 12 Sharia-governed states. This tension is further underscored by the abduction of a Nigerian Catholic priest by Boko Haram, a militant Islamist group that targets Christian communities. These realities highlight the Church’s priorities, and the Pope’s, in protecting its communities and lead interfaith engagement. Together, these dynamics underscore the challenge of sustaining a unified global Catholic identity while fostering interfaith coexistence. Church leaders must balance, nurture, and reconcile the diverse hopes and needs of Catholics worldwide. Timely and timeless: the Pope’s spiritual leadership in a divided church Expectations of the Pope have grown more complex as society has transformed. Today, both Catholics and non-Catholics increasingly expect the Pope to speak out on pressing timely issues and to do so in an inclusive, liberal tone. Topics such as war, refugee crises, climate change, gender, and economic inequality have become central to the public’s moral expectations of the Church. At the same time, the Pope carries the responsibility of preserving the Church’s 2,000-year-old teachings, guiding the timeless values of Catholic tradition: holiness, truth, and charity. This dual role creates a profound tension. The same response to an issue, such as homosexuality, may be hailed by some as compassionate progress, and by others as a regression and a source of confusion about doctrine. These conflicting expectations are not evenly spread; they are reflected in regional and generational divides, as seen in the differing theological priorities across continents. Moreover, digital media has complicated intra-Church dialogue and interreligious relations. Instead of promoting critical thinking and consensus-building, online platforms often amplify misinformation, hate speech, and toxicity, fostering divisive echo chambers and digital tribalism. The greatest challenge for any 21st-century pope is to represent a truly global Church by balancing the timely with the timeless. This effort became especially visible under Pope Francis, who signalled

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From Capital Gap to Capital Magnet: De-Risking Infrastructure Investment in India

Blog, Research Articles / Sachin Nandha

Author: sachin nandha, trustee and director As India charts its path toward $2.5 trillion in infrastructure investment by 2030, the challenge is no longer why to invest, but how to do so at scale and with confidence. This white paper offers a strategic roadmap to unlock private capital by addressing systemic constraints, ranging from regulatory opacity to uneven returns across sectors and states. Featuring case studies, investor insights, and innovative tools like the Three Centuries Model and the Infrastructure ESG+ India Index, the paper reframes India not as a frontier risk but as a frontier of structured opportunity. Read the full white paper here: From Capital Gap to Capital Magnet De-Risking Infrastructure Investment in India

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How Labour and Democrats Let Youth Down — And Why It Matters for Democracy

Blog, Research Articles / Chloe Schuber

Author: Chloe Schuber, Operations and Research Assistant Young people (18-25) have long been the backbone of progressive politics. However, the 2024 elections in the United States and the United Kingdom highlighted a growing paradox: while young voters overwhelmingly support progressive policies, they are increasingly disillusioned with the traditional left-leaning progressive parties that have historically championed these causes. This frustration was evident in two ways: generally, there was a decline in youth turnout in both countries; and more specifically, the number of young people voting for the Democrats and Labour Party fell. In the US, youth voter participation fell to 42%, down from over 50% in 2020, and for the first time since 2008, Democrats failed to secure at least 60% of the youth vote — a 6% drop, with some shifting to Republicans. In the UK, turnout among young voters plummeted from 47% in 2019 to 37% in 2024, the lowest in at least a decade. Among all age groups, young voters exhibited the most dramatic shifts: Labour’s youth support dropped by 21% to 41%, Conservative backing collapsed by 14% to just 5%, and third-party support surged by 37%, reaching a total of 48% of the youth vote. This trend is more than just an electoral shift: it is a warning sign. When youth abandon not just parties but democratic electoral participation itself, there is a breakdown in representation. Systematic change is essential to restore faith in democracy and ensure its legitimacy for young people. Structural Barriers to Youth Political Engagement  Institutional Distrust and Voting Restrictions Today, there are structural and systemic barriers that discourage youth participation in elections. In the US, restrictive voting laws — such as strict ID requirements and reduced polling locations on college campuses — disproportionately impact young voters. In the UK, the introduction of voter ID laws has made it harder for younger and lower-income voters to participate. Additionally, both countries’ electoral systems – which tend to use the ‘winner takes all’ First-Past-the-Post — incentivise parties to focus on older, more reliable voter blocs rather than investing in long-term youth engagement. Young people can often feel overlooked and unwelcome in their country’s political system, which gradually leads to disengagement and a declining faith in the system’s effectiveness. Institutional distrust also plays a critical role here. Many young voters perceive mainstream parties as beholden to corporate interests, with campaign finance structures — especially in the US — reinforcing a political class that prioritizes wealthy donors over grassroots movements. This cynicism is reflected in increased political activism outside traditional electoral channels, with young people favouring direct action, mutual aid networks, and digital activism over formal party politics.  The Digital Divide: Political Parties’ Failure to Adapt  While young voters are very politically active online, mainstream parties have failed to effectively engage with them in digital spaces. Platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and X have become critical arenas for political discourse in the US and UK, yet the Democratic and Labour parties struggle in maintaining meaningful engagement on this platforms. Instead, younger voters turn to independent content creators, grassroots activists, and alternative media for political information, further weakening their connection to traditional parties.  The rise of digital activism presents both a challenge and an opportunity. While social media has facilitated greater political awareness and the upholding governmental institutions accountable, it has also contributed to growing polarization and distrust in traditional political institutions. To reconnect with young voters, parties must integrate (better) digital outreach into their broader campaign strategies — not merely as a tool for voter mobilisation but as a space for genuine political dialogue.  Contextualizing: The Growing Policy Disconnect Economic Concerns Driving Youth Alienation These structural issues are exacerbated by policy misalignment. Economic concerns remain a top priority for young voters in both countries. Young people experience complex economic distress, from living with their parents due to high rent prices, to unemployment due to limited job opportunities and other struggles relating to the cost-of-living crisis. In the 2024 elections, 64% of young voters in the US and 41% in the UK cited inflation and the cost of living as their top concerns. Despite this, mainstream left parties seem to have fallen short of presenting viable solutions that resonate with younger generations. These political responses feel increasingly detached and signal that young people’s material realities are not being prioritised. In the UK, Labour’s reluctance to introduce rent controls or pursue wealth redistribution has led to disillusionment amongst young people because of the electoral promises made earlier this year, especially as London rents surged by 9.2% in 2024. The party’s reversal on abolishing tuition fees has further eroded trust. 76% of youth believe the political system bears the primary responsibility for this issue, among others, while 50% think the economic system, or at least the way it is currently structured—favouring markets and private interests over public welfare— should also share the burden and look inwards for change. In the US, student debt reached $1.77 trillion in 2024. While President Biden enacted partial loan forgiveness (eliminating around 10%), many young voters found it inadequate. Meanwhile, the median US home price exceeded $400,000, and wage growth failed to keep up with inflation. As a result, many young voters are disengaging from the Democratic Party or seeking alternatives. The collapse of traditional youth support for Democrats and Labour suggests that, unless these parties offer bold solutions to pressing economic issues, they risk further electoral decline among younger generations. Climate Change and Environmental Disillusionment Both the Democrats and Labour have struggled to align with young voters’ urgency on climate issues. The Biden administration’s approval of the Willow Project in Alaska was widely condemned by young environmentalists, reinforcing perceptions that the Democratic Party prioritizes corporate interests over climate action. Democrat-supporting youth have the highest rate of disapproval on Biden’s climate policies (34%) amongst Democrats. In the UK, Labour’s refusal to commit to ending North Sea oil and gas exploration alienated young voters who overwhelmingly support aggressive decarbonization policies. 36% of youth say they would consider voting

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AI’s Invisible Price: Water Use and the Sustainability Dilemma

Blog, Research Articles / Niharikia Girsa

Author: Niharika Girsa, research intern Every time you ask an AI chatbot a question, you might be using more water than you did for your morning coffee or tea. AI, born from human intelligence, represents the next great leap in human innovation since the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution. Unlike those earlier advancements, which focused on reforming tools and processes, AI mimics the way the human brain works, it learns from experience, evolves with new data, and improves through training. Studies from University of Colorado and University of Texas at Arlington has estimated that each ChatGPT session-comprising roughly 20-50 prompts consume the equivalent of a 500 ml bottle of water, used primarily to cool the data centres. Globally training large models like GPT-3 has been shown to consume over 700,000 liters per cycle. While exact national figures are unavailable, if we extrapolate based on India’s growing digital user base it is plausible to say that the country’s AI driven infrastructure could pose significant water demands. On average, a 1-megawatt data centre consumes around 26 million liters of water annually. And with India’s current capacity at approximately 1,255 MW, the cumulative annual water consumption across existing facilities alone could exceed 32.6 billion liters per year. In a nation where over 600 million people are already facing high to extreme water stress, this is more than just a hidden cost, rather it is a Wake-Up call. The water footprint of our digital lives is becoming increasingly visible, and that’s a good thing. As AI becomes embedded in everything we do, it presents us with a powerful opportunity: to not only harness its potential, but to design it responsibly. Now is the moment to ask not just what AI can do for us, but how we can ensure it gives back more than it takes. HOW IT WORKS? Every chatbot response or AI-generated picture conceals a physical space, a data centre, buzzing with computers fuelling these technologies. Often hidden within large warehouses, these facilities operate continuously 24 hours a day, using significant quantities of power to remain cool and run smoothly. AI learns, stores, and gets smarter every day in these climate-controlled centres. Although generative AI operates virtually and holds great potential, it has consequential real-world impacts. Servers are doing hundreds of calculations to produce the best feasible response and process every prompt sent to a generative artificial intelligence model. Located in data centres, these servers generate significant heat during processing. Often, water cooling devices are used to avoid overheating. Much like the human body utilises sweat to control temperature, these systems move the heat to cooling towers, where it is expelled from the data centre. Figure 1: Data centre water footprint: on-site water consumption for data centre cooling, and off-site water consumption for electricity generation. A study by the University of California Riverside and the University of Texas Arlington has uncovered the water consumption linked with AI models, termed the “secret water footprint.” Dr. Venkatesh Uddameri, a leading water resources expert from Texas, points out that a single data centre can consume between 11 and 19 million litres of water each day, roughly matching the daily water needs of a town of 30,000 to 50,000 residents. The researchers also calculated that training GPT-3 in Microsoft’s US data centres can directly consume 700,000 liters of freshwater, which is equivalent to what it takes to produce 370 BMW cars or 320 Tesla electric vehicles. And if this training were to take place in the company’s Asian data centres, the water consumption would have tripled. This is because, unlike temperate regions where data centres can often rely on “free” cooling by using outside air to reject heat, many parts of Asia experience consistently hot and/or dry climates. When the outside air temperature exceeds 85 degrees Fahrenheit or the air is too dry, data centres must rely on water-based cooling methods. Water is needed both for evaporative cooling and for maintaining proper humidity levels. As a result, the climate conditions in Asian regions substantially increase water demand, leading to significantly higher consumption during AI training operations. While the environmental footprint of AI is a global concern, its impact is particularly striking when we look at individual countries. As data centre expansion accelerates in countries like the United Kingdom, and India grapples with acute water scarcity amid rapid digital growth, the hidden “water cost” of the AI revolution has become an urgent issue. The United Kingdom is positioning itself as a future global leader in artificial intelligence, pouring investment into new data centres to drive advances across sectors from healthcare to financial services. However, this digital expansion carries a hidden environmental cost: a growing strain on the country’s water resources. Recent reporting by The Guardian highlights that new AI growth hubs are being proposed in areas such as Culham, Oxfordshire, which are close to the site of a major planned reservoir intended to secure long-term water supplies for London and surrounding counties. Data centres, particularly those supporting AI workloads, require vast amounts of water to cool servers that run non-stop. A single large data centre can consume between 11 and 19 million litres of water daily comparable to the water needs of a town of 30,000 to 50,000 people. Although the UK benefits from a relatively wet climate compared to other parts of the world, it is not immune to droughts and growing regional water stress. Environmental groups are increasingly voicing concerns that the surge in data centre development risks outpacing infrastructure improvements, putting ecosystems and community water supplies under pressure. While the United Kingdom faces mounting concerns over the environmental costs of its AI-driven digital expansion, India’s situation is even more critical. India, one of the fastest-growing digital economies in the world, is quickly expanding its artificial intelligence capacity as demand for cloud computing and AI-powered devices rise. The country’s data centre capacity is projected to grow exponentially, with estimates suggesting it will reach 3,400 MW by 2030, driven by a compound annual growth

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