Research Articles

India’s Democracy in 2025: Structural Issues to the Fore

Authors: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk; Annabel Kauffmann, Research Intern; Samuel Lewis, Research Intern 2025 has seen the focus of Indian democracy shift away from national-level campaigning towards State Assembly elections in Delhi and Bihar, and other local and national issues outside the realm of day-to-day politics. This explainer explores these issues, analysing what impression they give of India’s democratic health at the present time. From the six examples discussed here, it is clear that Indian democracy faces structural challenges relating to its federal system, electoral system, voter registration process and more which demand attention across the political spectrum. The Lok Sabha’s Delimitation Dilemma Large federal democracies face a common and often intractable challenge: as the population and economy grows at different rates in different parts of the country, how is equal representation in legislatures ensured? Most such democracies undertake periodic re-apportionment exercises (termed ‘delimitation’ in India), adjusting the number of legislative seats available to each state following a national census. India is no stranger to this challenge, but for structural reasons is suffering more than most as the Lok Sabha – its lower house – becomes increasingly unrepresentative. Under the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution of India, Lok Sabha seat shares for each state were frozen to their share of the population in 1971. This was extended by the 84th Amendment to the Constitution in 2001, making current allocations over 50 years out of date. The design history of the Lok Sabha suggests that it was supposed to be constituted based on population share, and not equal representation for each. The current imbalances also create a welfare problem, with the less economically prosperous but more populous northern states under-represented in comparison to the more prosperous but less populous southern states. Fixing decades of inaction requires a step-change in the system. As research by the ICfS has suggested, the existing structural problems are exacerbated by the Lok Sabha’s First-Past-the-Post electoral system: several state-level critics of the forthcoming delimitation exercise would lose out on Lok Sabha representation following any changes, creating an unintended incentive to resist what ought to be a routine exercise. Whilst electoral reform is unlikely in the near future, a preferential voting system would remove this barrier and give more space to smaller parties. India has not had a census since 2011, as the scheduled 2021 census was delayed due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The Government of India has announced that the next census will take place on 1 March 2027, with an earlier date of 1 October 2026 for the areas of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand. Re-apportionment of seats can only take place once official census results have been published. Given that previous delimitation exercises have taken around two years to complete, there are risks that the process will be rushed so that it can be completed before the 2029 General Election. Devadasan has also highlighted concerns around the independence of the Delimitation Commission, one member of which is India’s Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). The Union Cabinet has had a 2:1 majority on the panel to appoint the CEC since 2023, with the result that the CEC is structurally more likely to tow the Government line. Several solutions to India’s delimitation dilemma have been put forward over the course of this year. Expanding the Lok Sabha is one option: India’s new Parliament Building can seat up to 880 Lok Sabha members, and Devadasan has pointed out that smaller constituencies reduce barriers to less well-resourced candidates, given the cost of campaigning. Rajya Sabha reform may strengthen India’s federal system. The Delimitation Commission must also operate within a transparent framework, with clear restrictions on the geographical size and number of eligible voters in each new constituency to minimise gerrymandering based on religion, caste or economic status. Who rules in India’s states? On 8 April 2025, India’s Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment, ruling that State Governors cannot absolutely veto or fail to approve Bills passed by State Legislatures. The Court outlined that the Governor of Tamil Nadu, RN Ravi, acted unconstitutionally and illegally by withholding or granting assent to 10 state Bills. The judgment ended a lengthy 5-year battle between the State of Tamil Nadu through the DMK-led legislature and its Governor.  Under Article 200 of the Constitution of India, upon receiving a bill, the Governor may choose to either grant assent, withhold assent or pass the bill for the President’s consideration (under Article 201). The Court, guided by the precedent of Union of India v Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary (1979), observed that withholding assent from a Bill is only valid if the Governor returns the legislation to the legislature, and a re-passed Bill must be granted assent after being returned. April’s ruling mandates a specific timeframe within which Governors must respond to Bills, depending on whether the Governor sought advice and if the Bill was reconsidered by the legislature. The Bench further clarified that under Article 201, if the Governor chooses to pass a Bill to the President of India, they also cannot withhold assent without specified time limits. The case in Tamil Nadu proved especially contentious as it sought to amend the limits of gubernatorial powers, transferring authority over institutional oversight and executive appointments processes of state universities to the state legislative assembly. Similar cases have also arisen in Kerala and Punjab in 2023. Within India’s federal system, Governors essentially act as the constitutional head of state at state level holding a range of legislative powers, including the ability to summon and prorogue the legislature. In practice, the exercise of legislative authority by States is highly significant in policymaking processes because States are responsible for issues such as public order, public health, land use, trade and for collecting taxes. The Supreme Court’s ruling is highly significant to India’s democratic health as it reaffirmed the parliamentary nature of India’s federal system, in this instance, Governor Ravi overreached his authority by acting against the spirit of the Constitution and the advice of his Cabinet ministers, undermining the principles of representative democracy. Furthermore, the judgment upholds the integrity of the federal system by limiting the

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Are Referenda in the UK Dead? 

Author: Sam Lewis, Research Intern The UK is a representative democracy. At the UK-wide level, decisions are made by a parliament which is elected around once every five years. However, in the 2010s the UK experimented with referenda (when the public are asked directly on a specific issue) to inform decision-making. There were three major referenda in this period:  Date  Question  Turnout  Result  2011  “At present the UK uses the “first past the post” system to elect MPs to the House of Commons. Should the “alternative vote” system be used instead?”    42.2%  Yes: 32.1%  No: 67.9%  2012  “Should Scotland be an independent country”    84.6%   Yes: 44.7%  No: 55.3%  2016  “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?  72.2%  Remain: 48.1%  Leave: 51.9%  However, in the 2020s referenda are no longer popular. This is a problem as, by association, discussions about more direct democratic participation have been abandoned. Due to this spillover effect, it is important to once again discuss referenda in the context of strengthening British democracy.   Issues that emerged  To have this discussion within the policy and research space, it is important to understand three principal issues that emerged from the experiments.  What does a ‘once in a generation vote’ mean?   The Alternative Vote (AV), Scottish independence and EU referendum campaigns all claimed that they were an attempt to settle their issue ‘for a generation’. But how does one define a generation? The number usually brought up was once every 20 years (the gap between each of the 1979, 1998 and 2014 Scottish referenda). However, there is no legal requirement for the gap to be so long. The Northern Ireland Act allows a seven-year gap between secession referenda. This is an issue that remains unresolved, with the UK having no general procedure for enacting a referendum. Therefore, there was no agreement about the frequency with which they should be a part of the democratic process.  What subject-matter warrants a referendum?  Linked to this, there was also confusion about what issues warrant holding a referendum. There was some consensus since the 1990s that referendums should be held on questions of devolution, but even that was fairly weak. For example, in 2011 there was a referendum to grant Wales more devolved powers but later it was decided that the Welsh Assembly could be given income tax powers without a referendum. This was also seen with the Brexit process as neither the Maastricht Treaty nor the UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement were directly taken to the public. However, instead of having discussion about what requires the direct consultation of voters, the UK has simply returned to the default of representative decision-making.  Referenda refused to silence the debates on the issues they sought to address  Given that all these referenda were on divisive issues, it is not surprising that the ‘loosing camps’ continued to remain vocal following the results. Despite losing the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum the Scottish National Party continues to be a political force, having won two more elections in Holyrood whilst repeatedly calling for a second referendum. This was also seen through the People’s Vote campaign following the 2016 EU referendum. Six million people signed a petition to rejoin the EU and hundreds of thousands attended a march calling for a second vote. That they were incapable of silencing these issues reveals problems with the binary nature of these referenda. All three of the referenda were anti-pluralist, turning complicated issues into binary questions with the ‘winner’ simply needing over 50%. Given the controversy of the issues this was not a fair way of representing the plurality of opinions that the public had. However, at no point were different forms of referenda (such as including more than two options) seriously considered as a solution for the future.  It is important to acknowledge these issues as the questions they raise are still as relevant as they were in the 2010s. These include questions such as when decisions require direct consultation of voters and how best to reflect the plurality of their opinions. Having these discussions is essential for strengthening democracy in the UK.  Why do we need to discuss referenda?  It is important to discuss these in relation to referenda because they are not dead. The 2010s were not an isolated experiment but instead a ‘third wave’; the first started with the Northern Ireland border poll in 1973 and ended with the Scottish devolution referendum in 1979, and the second occurred between 1998 and 2004 around the creation of devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, Greater London and North East England (the last of which was overwhelmingly rejected). Therefore, referenda are simply dormant and there is no reason they could not become popular again. Policy discussion therefore must take referenda seriously lest the same mistakes are made again.  It is also important to have this discussion because it involves looking outside of Westminster. Devolved and local authorities provide opportunities for experimenting with different forms of democratic participation. This is seen at the moment with the use of citizens assemblies or digital democracy. At the local level there have been important referenda following Brexit such as Bristol voting in 2022 to abolish elected mayors. These examples can provide us with a great opportunity for providing greater insight into the potential role of different forms of democratic participation.   However, Parliament has not published a report of referenda in local authorities since 2016. This is an apt metaphor for the reluctance of policymakers to continue engaging with the advantages and disadvantages of referenda, even though there are still many discussions to have. The responsibility of this should be taken up by think-tanks and researchers. If research communities take referenda seriously, both other researchers and policymakers can have a better understanding of their merits and drawbacks. This will lead to far more constructive discussions about the nature of democratic representation in the UK and the role that more direct forms of decision making can have in the country’s

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The Online Safety Act: the antithesis of liberal governance? 

Author: Annabel Kauffmann, Research Intern The introduction of the Online Safety Act 2023 has been hailed as the most advanced piece of content moderation legislation passed by the UK Parliament to date, and one of the most ambitious worldwide. Despite its initial praise, the Online Safety Act has unassumingly backslid from its liberal aspirations, cautiously over-censoring harmless online content, ‘age-gating’ the internet and de-pluralising the internet.  July 2025 saw the implementation of the second phase of the Online Safety Act (OSA), ‘The Protection of Children Codes of Practice’. The legal responsibility for content moderation will now fall upon ‘user-to-user’ sites; these platforms exist where the content produced by one user (photos, videos, music, data or any written text) can be encountered by another, either on social media sites, discussion boards or online marketplaces. The scope of ‘legal but harmful’ child content is notably broad, from self-harm, suicide and pornographic material to content that is ‘hate-driven’ and ‘related to’ violence. The act has faced vehement opposition from civil society groups such as Open Rights Group and Big Brother Watch, citing concerns of free speech, privacy and access to information restrictions. Over 540,000 Britons have signed a petition to overturn the Online Safety Act. Most surprisingly, it has managed to unite the most unlikely political bedfellows: Reform UK leader Nigel Farage and left-wing commentator Owen Jones. The Government quickly ruled out its repeal, with then Secretary of State for Science and Technology, Peter Kyle having stated that anyone against the Act was “on the side of predators”.  Age verification and 3rd-party data storage  The initial outrage at the second phase’s implementation came with the ‘age-gating’ of ‘user-to-user’ sites, where individuals are now required to verify their age before accessing sites displaying ‘harmful but legal content’ such as pornography, self-harm and suicidal content. The Act’s age verification mechanisms include facial age estimation, credit card checks, photo-ID matching, and open banking require the sharing of sensitive personal data with 3rd party age verification platforms. The new measures have disproportionately targeted small discussion sites, many of which have reluctantly closed their sites due to operational difficulties implementing the new systems and fear of non-compliance. The public has questioned how secure personal data will be from third-party sales or security breaches in light of recent high-profile cyberattacks against the Ministry of Defence and national retail giants. Within three months of Phase 2’s implementation, the scheme endured further criticism as 70,000 personal ID images uploaded to Discord’s third-party age verification service were leaked publicly, with Discord citing a ransomware attack, a breach many deemed inevitable. This raises the pressing concern that if technological safeguards are not enough to protect our information, should sites simply not collect sensitive data in the first instance?  The introduction of ‘age-gating’ the internet raises broader civil liberties concerns as adults are compelled to disclose their biometric data or personal identification to engage in life, online. This is an arguably illiberal move which inhibits one’s right to anonymity and autonomy. In practice, this choice has been further curtailed as users of sites such as X and Telegram report being denied the choice of age verification methods and forced to comply with a single, unregulated service. Wikipedia recently lost a legal challenge against the government in which it argued the OSA’s verification rules were ‘too broad and logically flawed’ as they could undermine users’ rights to privacy and safety. Normalising age verification in an open society risks turning Britain into a ‘papers, please’ state, countering Britain’s historically liberal approach to formal identification measures. The British public has historically met this with hostility and scepticism: previous attempts at identification schemes faltered as they lacked a sustained, practical purpose and evidenced government overreach through ‘function creep’.   Following the outrage at Phase 2’s implementation, the success of ‘age-gating’ pornographic material from children has been quickly overcome by a national onset in VPN usage downloads to bypass the content restriction. The BBC reported a 1,800% surge in downloads for Proton VPN after the introduction of the new controls on 25 July. The effectiveness of the scheme remains questionable when new regulations and enforcement controls can be so easily evaded by children.   ‘Speech-policing’ online expression   Phase 2’s implementation has further proved controversial due to Ofcom’s requirement for sites to moderate ambiguous ‘legal but harmful’ content under new legal child safety duties. Netizens have experienced ‘age-gating’ when trying to access a range of innocuous content online, from gaming forums to political speech, with critics of the scheme citing a suppression of free speech and right to privacy. An investigation from Big Brother Watch found users blocked from trivial Reddit pages of fantasy football team names and a page dedicated to cider lovers. Ironically, a 16-year-old can go to the pub with their parents and drink a cider, but can’t access a cider-lovers’ forum unless they’re over 18. Politically charged posts on ‘X’, such as an MP’s Commons speech on grooming gangs, anti-migrant protests, satirical commentary of multicultural Britain, and Journalistic reporting on conflict in Ukraine and Gaza on Reddit, have all been flagged under ‘age-gating’ restrictions. Such over-censoring could be attributed to Ofcom’s vague categorisation of ‘legal but harmful’ content, as online sites have chosen to over-apply the law out of fear of prosecution for non-compliance. This censorship threatens not only our freedom of expression, privacy and anonymity, but the public’s right to access distressing information on behalf of the public interest. Our ability to engage in open debate online has been tainted as the threshold for content explicitly glorifying violence, and that of reporting, satire and disagreement regarding violence, has been blurred.   US websites ‘Kiwi Farm’ and ‘4Chan’ were among the first US firms to launch a legal complaint against Ofcom, arguing Ofcom’s demand for risk assessments and compliance procedure violated their 1st, 4th and 5th Amendment rights. As ‘4Chan’ has previously refused to pay Ofcom’s fines for non-compliance, questions remain as to the effectiveness of Ofcom’s extraterritorial enforcement for non-British websites, and what this means if non-compliance

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Decoding the Delhi Blast: Exploring How Evolving Security Risks In India Impact UK and US Interests

Author: Shruti Kapil, Head of Security & Mutual Dependence Desk The 10th November 2025 Delhi blast marks a shift from cross-border militancy to homegrown radicalisation driven by transnational digital networks. A group of Indian professionals was reportedly radicalised online by handlers abroad, reflecting a global pattern seen in the UK, US, and Europe since 9/11. The incident shows how extremist ideologies now spread through digital spaces, merging local grievances with global Islamist narratives. For the UK and US, the Delhi attack underscores the shared challenge of preventing radicalisation within interconnected communities and the growing need for deeper cooperation with India. Strengthening intelligence partnerships and long-term counter-radicalisation efforts is essential to address the evolving threat of homegrown extremism. Read the full explainer here: Decoding the Delhi Blast Add Your Heading Text Here

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Engagement without recognition: How democracies abandoned Afghan women

Author: Ornicha Daorueng Since the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, no country in the world has formally recognised them as the legitimate government. One of the strongest barriers to recognition has been the Taliban’s failure to meet certain informal conditions: forming an inclusive government and respecting human rights, particularly the rights of women and girls. Diplomatic pressure intensified after the Taliban banned women from education and employment. The US Secretary of State warned that “there are going to be costs if this is not reversed.” The United Kingdom likewise declared that it “unequivocally condemns this ban and all others that restrict Afghan women’s and girls’ rights and fundamental freedoms.” India voiced concern over the Taliban’s university ban, urging the formation of an inclusive government in Kabul that guarantees equal rights for women and girls across Afghan society. At the 79th United Nations General Assembly, eighty-three countries issued a joint statement condemning the Taliban’s “institutionalised and systematic discrimination” against women and girls, and urged the regime to immediately reverse all edicts targeting them. On paper, the international community stands united in condemning the Taliban’s gender apartheid. In practice, however, the response has been weak and even contradictory. Many governments have opted for quiet “pragmatic engagement,” seeking common ground in the name of humanitarian access and regional stability. But is this truly the right path forward? The September 2025 earthquake revealed how Afghan women remain invisible even in tragedy, a stark reminder of what “engagement” has failed to change. Moreover, how can democracies founded on liberty, equality and human dignity remain passive in the face of Afghan women’s struggle? Engagement without conviction: how internationals justify engaging with the Taliban Beyond diplomatic isolation and conditional aid, no government has taken concrete steps to pressure the Taliban on women’s rights. Instead, a policy of “engagement without recognition” has emerged. The UK and US have not recognised the Taliban, but both maintain contact through third countries. The UK operates a “UK Mission to Afghanistan” inside its embassy in Doha, Qatar, and pursue a policy of “limited and pragmatic” engagement when it serves national interests. The US follows the same model, with officials meeting Taliban representatives in Doha whenever Washington deems it to be in its interest. India, too, has re-established a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan by sending a technical team to reopen its Kabul embassy. Most recently, in October 2025, Afghanistan’s Taliban Foreign Minister met with India’s External Affairs Minister, marking the highest-level visit by a Taliban official since the group took control in 2021.  During the trip, India announced plans to reopen its embassy in Kabul and to restore trade, investment, and humanitarian cooperation with Afghanistan. Even in the Muslim world, countries such as Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and several Central Asian states, while publicly criticising the Taliban regime, have nevertheless maintained ties, from reopening embassies in Kabul to hosting the Taliban’s political office. Governments justify this engagement on humanitarian, security, and geopolitical grounds, including aid delivery and economic stabilisation to narcotics control, counter-terrorism, and security assurances amid regional tensions. Officials insist that boycotting the Taliban would only deepen polarisation, whereas dialogue might create common ground and shape Afghanistan’s future. However, whatever the motive, whether humanitarian or strategic, the effect remains the same. Every meeting, mission, and handshake signals to the Taliban that the world still seeks their cooperation for access, stability, and control. As a result, Taliban representatives speak to the United Nations with confidence that they “do not wish to create obstacles” to its work, while declaring that their treatment of women is an internal matter that the international community should “respect.” Beyond rhetoric: acting on the courage of democratic values Every democracy, every member of the United Nations, especially those that signed the joint statement condemning the Taliban regime, claims to be built on liberty, equality, and human dignity. Yet the diplomatic practice of “engagement without recognition”, combined with a lack of real pressure or action, has reduced those values to rhetoric. Governments justify this approach by arguing that isolating the Taliban would only hurt ordinary Afghans, but in practice it allows diplomats to speak of women’s rights while sitting across from those who erase them. This is not pragmatic realism; it is a loss of democratic conviction.   There are actions that align principle with effectiveness. First, impose sanctions for gender apartheid. The existing sanctions regime, last substantively updated in 2011 with a focus on counter-terrorism, has never addressed gender-based persecution. The United Nations could reassert its credibility by enforcing and expanding targeted sanctions on Taliban leaders responsible for the systematic oppression of women and girls. Second, condition humanitarian aid on women’s rights. Under current humanitarian exemptions, billions of dollars in aid, including $4.4 billion in 2022, $4.6 billion in 2023, and more than $3.4 billion from the United States since its withdrawal, have kept Afghanistan afloat, covering food, health, and shelter. But the Taliban’s response to such generosity was to punish women further: in December 2022 they barred Afghan women from working for NGOs, and four months later, for the UN itself. The UN and donors should use existing humanitarian exemptions to make aid conditional on tangible progress in restoring women’s education, employment, and participation in public life. They should also channel funding to Afghan women-led organisations that quietly run underground schools, clinics, and community programmes, providing them with political protection and sustained support as rightful partners in rebuilding their country. Finally, governments could fast-track asylum and resettlement for Afghan women, not men, prioritising those most at risk: journalists, educators, activists, and judges. This is both to ensure their safety and to affirm the democratic values their struggle represents. These are only a few examples of how moral conviction can be translated into meaningful action, proof that defending values need not come at the expense of effectiveness. ** In dealing with extremists, polite engagement will never bring change. It is not their language, nor the conduct of a regime that has brutalised its own

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This Is Not Islam: The Taliban’s Rule over Women Shames Humanity

Author: Ornicha Daorueng A magnitude 6 earthquake struck eastern Afghanistan on the night of 31 August, killing at least 2,200 people, injuring more than 3,600, and destroying over 5,000 homes. More than half a million people have been affected, with hundreds of families displaced to temporary camps, while medical teams continue to treat the injured amid ongoing aftershocks. Amid this humanitarian catastrophe, one striking reality stands out: the absence of women. In nearly all the images and footage emerging from the earthquake zone, women are nowhere to be seen, not in rescue operations, not in relief camps, not even among the wounded in hospitals. This absence is tragic, though not surprising. Under Taliban rule, both before and after its return to power in 2021, Afghan women have been systematically erased from public life, banned from education, barred from employment, and excluded from almost every sphere of social participation. This gender apartheid is so absolute that even a natural disaster could not shake its walls. The fact that women remain invisible amid mass death and destruction is more than a tragedy to mourn or a “cultural difference” to excuse. It is a moral alarm to the world, a call to act. For non-Muslims, it is a demand to stop excusing injustice in the name of culture; for Muslims, it is an urgent duty to reclaim Islam’s true image from those who have distorted it. The Taliban’s regime: a “gender apartheid” The Taliban is an Islamist militant movement that emerged in the early 1990s with the aim of turning Afghanistan into an Islamic state. They captured Kabul in 1996 and ruled the country until 2001, before returning to power in 2021 following the US withdrawal. The Taliban are Islamist fundamentalists who enforce a rigid interpretation of Islamic law and are notorious for widespread human rights abuses. Under their version of Sharia, women and girls are banned from attending school, working, leaving the house without a male guardian, showing their skin in public, receiving medical care from male doctors, engaging in politics, or even speaking publicly. In other words, women have been erased from public life and confined within the home, with no control over their own lives. These are not isolated incidents of discrimination but a systemic denial of the most basic rights, simply because they are women. UN human rights officials have reported that these policies “seek to completely erase women’s presence in public.” Ashraf Ghani, the former Afghan president who fled the country as the Taliban seized power in August 2021, described it as “a vivid sign of gender apartheid in the 21st century.” Muslim world rejects the Taliban’s interpretation The Taliban claim their bans reflect Islamic law and teachings. Yet Afghanistan remains the only Muslim country in the world where girls are barred from secondary school and university. Across the Muslim world, leaders and scholars have rejected this as un-Islamic. From Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, to Indonesia and many other governments and religious authorities have publicly condemned the Taliban’s ban, especially on women’s education.  Turkey: “The ban is neither Islamic nor humane… Islam encourages education and science.” United Arab Emirates: “Bans on girls’ and women’s education violate fundamental human rights, contradict the teachings of Islam, and must be swiftly reversed.” Qatar: “It is very disappointing to see steps backwards… In Qatar’s Islamic system, women outnumber men in government, the workforce, and higher education.” Indonesia: “Education is a fundamental right for all men and women. Indonesia urges the Taliban to ensure uninterrupted access to education for women.” Al-Azhar’s Grand Imam (Cairo): “Banning Afghan women from university contradicts Sharia and Islam’s call for both men and women to seek knowledge.” In an interview with the ICfS, Paul Salahuddin Armstrong, Managing Director (Amir) of the Association of British Muslims, reflected: “the Prophet himself empowered women and encouraged women’s education. Within Islam, the woman is the first teacher of her children and her family.” He added, “the Taliban are Islamists who use the excuse of Islam to impose policies and actions aimed at controlling society.” Taken together, these statements show a clear consensus across the Muslim world: the Taliban’s treatment of women is fundamentally wrong. Their edicts are not a defence of Islam, but a pursuit of political control disguised in religious language. Neither the holy texts nor Islam’s mainstream traditions endorse this kind of oppression imposed on women in Afghanistan today. Reclaiming human rights and Islam from the Taliban’s ideology Religion is not monolithic. Islam, like Christianity, Hinduism, or Buddhism, is not a fixed block of belief but a living tradition, shaped by multiple schools of thought, interpretations, and cultural expressions. As Paul Salahuddin Armstrong remarked, “As Islam spread around the world, it absorbed different cultures.” Many practices now labelled “Islamic” may, in fact, stem from local customs that merged with the faith as it expanded across regions. In pluralistic democracies, people are free to worship and live according to their faith. Yet liberty, equality, and human dignity form a universal baseline that no religion or culture can override. If we believe in liberty, equality, and human dignity as universal rights, then we must uphold them consistently, not only within our own borders but wherever they are denied. That means having the moral clarity to critique the Taliban’s ideology without fear of being labelled as “Islamophobic.” Defending universal rights is not an attack on faith; it is an affirmation of our shared humanity, and a way of shaping faith into a force for compassion, not oppression. Ultimately, the most powerful rejection of the Taliban’s ideology will not come from outsiders but from Muslims themselves. Muslims around the world must speak out for their own faith and against those who exploit and distort it. The strongest voices, and the best starting point, may come from Muslims living in democracies such as the US, the UK and India. They are among those who most deeply understand and live by the values of freedom, equality and dignity, in sharp contrast to the

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A Functional Analysis of UK House of Lords Reform

Author: Pravar petkar and Amy wonnacott The House of Lords is one of the largest and longest-standing parliamentary chambers in the world. For some, an unelected chamber at the heart of the British governing apparatus is a relic of a bygone era, incompatible with the demands of a modern democracy. For others, it represents a vital check on the party-political House of Commons, drawing on its members’ deep experience in public and professional life in revising legislation. Many nevertheless agree that the House of Lords is in need of some reform. But where should that reform begin?   This research paper argues that any effort to reform the House of Lords must start by articulating the chamber’s purpose – without this, reform efforts risk undermining what makes the House of Lords successful today. Read the full report here: A Functional Analysis of UK House of Lords Reform

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From Beijing to Delhi: Britain’s New Bet

Author: Sachin Nandha, DIrector-General Last week, Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer made his first state visit to India, arriving with a 125-strong delegation of business, academic, and cultural leaders. The official reason was to advance the recently signed UK–India Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). The deeper reality, however, was a decisive tilt in Britain’s foreign economic orientation away from the embattled Sino-centric axis of previous years and toward a future in which Delhi may matter more than Beijing. In July 2025, the United Kingdom and India signed their long-anticipated free trade agreement after three years of negotiation. The deal promises to eliminate tariffs on more than 90 percent of UK exports to India, including cosmetics, clothing, and Scotch whisky, and to offer zero duty on 99 percent of Indian exports to the UK. India will also reduce duties on cars, currently above 100 percent, to 10 percent under a quota, while providing enhanced access to procurement and services sectors (Reuters, 23 July 2025). The two countries also agreed to reset a Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) to manage implementation and launched new cooperative initiatives in innovation, connectivity, and artificial intelligence (Government of the United Kingdom, 9 October 2025). What Britain hopes to gain is clear. Access to India’s fast-growing market projected to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2028, is the sort of expansion that post-Brexit Britain urgently needs (Reuters, 7 October 2025). The agreement is projected to generate around 6,900 new UK jobs across sectors such as engineering, creative industries, and technology. The deal also strengthens Britain’s credibility in South Asia’s strategic landscape, a valuable asset at a time when global power rivalries are sharpening. India’s gains are equally significant. Indian exporters of textiles, agricultural goods, and pharmaceuticals will now enjoy much greater access to UK markets, often duty free (Reuters, 7 October 2025). Delhi also secured commitments for nine UK universities to open campuses in India and for increased collaboration in technology and artificial intelligence (NDTV, “India–UK Trade Pact to Boost MSMEs, Create Jobs,” 2025). In addition, a new mobility scheme will allow 3,000 Indians and 3,000 Britons to live and work in each other’s countries for up to two years. Politically, the deal enhances India’s stature as a preferred partner of a major Western democracy. However, the partnership is not without its difficulties. India failed to secure an exemption from Britain’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, meaning that high-emission exports may face additional cost burdens (Reuters, 23 July 2025). A bilateral investment treaty remains unresolved, and key issues such as rules of origin, liberalisation of financial services, and certain visa provisions are still under negotiation or only partially settled. Furthermore, British firms face stiff competition from Chinese, Korean, and ASEAN rivals that benefit from greater state support and more favourable regulatory regimes. This situation invites comparison with Britain’s recent China strategy. Over the past decade, the UK’s relationship with China has evolved from enthusiastic engagement to cautious distance. In early 2025, the United Kingdom prepared to resume trade talks with China for the first time in seven years, reviving the Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETCO) that had been dormant since 2018 (Government of the United Kingdom, 2025). In January 2025, during the UK–China Economic and Financial Dialogue, Beijing agreed to re-list UK pork processors, ease access for legal services, grant better export certification for wool, andopen doors for Scotch whisky labelling (Government of the United Kingdom, “2025 UK–China Economic and Financial Dialogue Fact Sheet”). Despite these gestures, the numbers tell a less flattering story. According to the UK Department for Business and Trade, UK goods exports to China fell by 25.7 percent in the year to the first quarter of 2025, while imports from China rose by more than 5 percent, resulting in a trade deficit of £42 billion (UK Government, “China Trade and Investment Factsheet,” 19 September 2025). Britain’s approach to China has become a balancing act between commercial opportunity and security risk, as noted by analysts at Chatham House (“What the UK Must Get Right in its China Strategy,” July 2025). It is therefore no coincidence that Britain now courts India with enthusiasm. India’s democratic governance and relatively lower geopolitical risk make it a safer bet than Beijing’s opaque state capitalism. Where China represents an enormous but fraught dependency, India represents a promising partnership built on aspiration and mutual political legitimacy. Britain is effectively pivoting from a relationship based on dependence toward one based on alignment. Still, the success of this realignment depends on consistent implementation. Britain must ensure that Indian exporters do not simply displace other partners, and that small and medium-sized British enterprises not only large corporations benefit from the trade deal. India, for its part, must resist the temptation to reintroduce protectionist measures that could stall liberalisation. In summary, the Starmer mission to Mumbai symbolised ambition more than certainty. The new trade pact could yet become the crown jewel of Britain’s post-Brexit trade policy—or another well-intentioned treaty that fades under the weight of bureaucracy. For now, London and Delhi walk forward hand in hand, in a world where China still looms large, but no longer dictates the direction of travel. References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. Reuters (23 July 2025). Britain and India sign landmark free trade pact during Modi visit. https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britain-india-sign-landmark-free-trade-pact-during-modi-visit-2025-07-23 Reuters (7 October 2025). UK PM Starmer visits India to build business ties after clinching trade deal. Government of the United Kingdom (9 October 2025). India–UK Joint Statement. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/india-uk-joint-statement-9-october-2025 NDTV (2025). India–UK Trade Pact to Boost MSMEs, Create Jobs. Wikipedia. India–United Kingdom Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. Government of the United Kingdom (2025). UK–China Economic and Financial Dialogue Fact Sheet. UK Government (19 September 2025). China Trade and Investment Factsheet. Chatham House (July 2025). What the UK Must Get Right in its China Strategy.

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Cultured Meat: An Economic and Environmental Imperative for Investors

Author: Sachin Nandha, DIrector-General The global food system is on the brink of its most profound transformation in over a century. For decades, the economics of animal agriculture have been taken for granted, with vast tracts of land devoted to livestock and feed production. Yet a new competitor is emerging that could upend this model: cultured meat. This technology, which produces real meat by growing animal cells in controlled environments, is moving rapidly from the laboratory to industrial scale. For investors, policymakers and food producers, the implications are immense. The Economic Case The economic rationale for cultured meat is strengthening each year. Between 2015 and 2023, investment in cultivated meat and seafood companies surpassed 3.1 billion US dollars, spread across more than 150 start-ups worldwide (United States Department of Agriculture, 2023). The global market for cultured meat, valued at just over 1 billion US dollars in 2024, is projected to grow to 10.8g billion US dollars by 2033, representing a compound annual growth rate of 16.5 per cent (Straits Research, 2024). Costs, long cited as the principal barrier, are falling due to breakthroughs in bioreactor design, cell line optimisation and the dramatic decline in the cost of growth media. Once regulatory approvals are secured in large consumer markets such as the United Kingdom and the European Union, production at scale will erode the cost advantage of conventional beef and dairy. At that point, cultured meat will cease to be a niche luxury and will become a mass-market competitor. The economics of animal agriculture are also inherently inefficient. Producing one kilogram of beef requires up to 25 kilograms of feed and 15,000 litres of water (Poore and Nemecek, 2018). By bypassing the animal and producing meat directly from cells, cultured systems eliminate much of this waste. Investors should note that in industries where efficiency gains of even 10 per cent drive long-term profitability, cultured meat offers an order of magnitude shift. The Environmental Case The environmental argument is equally compelling. Conventional livestock farming is responsible for approximately 14.5 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, largely through methane and nitrous oxide (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2013). Cultured beef, when produced with renewable energy, has the potential to reduce emissions by as much as 92 per cent compared to traditional beef (FoodChain ID, 2024). Land use is perhaps the most striking area of impact. In the United Kingdom, 17 million hectares are classified as utilised agricultural area, representing around 70 per cent of the country’s landmass. Of this, 9.7 million hectares are permanent grassland used overwhelmingly for grazing livestock (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2024). A further 2 million hectares of arable land are devoted to growing feed for animals, roughly the size of Wales (World Wide Fund for Nature, 2022). If cultured meat were to displace even half of the current beef and dairy sector, millions of hectares could be released for rewilding, carbon sequestration and biodiversity restoration. Globally, researchers estimate that replacing animal agriculture with plant-based or cultured systems could reduce land use by up to 75 per cent (Our World in Data, 2019). The implications for climate policy, food security and ecological recovery are profound. The Investor Opportunity For investors, the opportunity is immediate. The technology is moving out of the start-up phase and into industrial deployment. Regulatory frameworks are advancing: the Food Standards Agency in the United Kingdom is preparing approval pathways for cultured products, while Singapore and the United States have already authorised commercial sales. Once approvals in the UK and European Union are finalised, consumer adoption will accelerate. Cultured meat offers a multi-layered return profile. In the short term, early entrants will capture premium margins by marketing climate-friendly, ethically produced meat. In the medium term, cost parity with conventional meat will drive volume growth. In the long term, ancillary value will accrue from the release of land for carbon credits, nature-based solutions and ecosystem services. The investment logic is therefore clear. This is not merely a food story. It is a convergence of three megatrends: climate action, technological innovation and consumer demand for transparency and ethics. Institutional investors who position early will secure intellectual property, supply chain leadership and reputational advantage. Those who delay will face a compressed window, as incumbents in the meat industry pivot and as sovereign wealth funds and family offices increasingly allocate to food transition strategies. A Polite Confrontation For beef and dairy farmers, these trends represent an existential challenge. Current business models depend on land-intensive, emissions-heavy practices that will become increasingly untenable under both market and policy pressure. This is not an argument against farmers, but a recognition that the model must evolve. The choice will be stark: to pivot towards regenerative land management, ecosystem stewardship and specialty value chains, or to face decline. History shows that industries resistant to change eventually lose relevance. The cultured meat revolution is not a matter of if, but when. For investors and leaders, the real question is whether they will seize the opportunity to shape this future or be left reacting to it. The scale of land, capital and emissions at stake demands urgency. Cultured meat is no longer a thought experiment. It is an economic and environmental imperative. References Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2024). Farming Evidence Pack: Key Statistics. GOV.UK. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2013). Tackling Climate Change through Livestock. FAO, Rome. FoodChain ID (2024). Lab-grown Meat as an Alternative for Traditional Meat Production. FoodChain ID, April 2024. Our World in Data (2019). Land Use by the World’s Diets. Available at: https://ourworldindata.org/land-use-diets. Poore, J. and Nemecek, T. (2018). ‘Reducing food’s environmental impacts through producers and consumers’, Science, 360(6392), pp. 987–992. Straits Research (2024). Cultured Meat Market Size, Share and Growth Analysis 2024–2033. United States Department of Agriculture (2023). Economic Research Report 342: Emerging Alternative Proteins. USDA Economic Research Service. World Wide Fund for Nature (2022). The Future of Feed: Understanding UK Land Use. WWF UK.

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Investigating Perceptions of Anti-Hindu Hate and discrimination in the UK

Author: Ornicha Daorueng, Head of future of Faith Desk Anti-Hindu hate and discrimination in the UK is an increasing concern that has received limited attention. Despite being the third-largest religious group in the country, Hindus face hostility that remains poorly defined, inconsistently recorded, and largely absent from policy conversations. Although incidents such as the 2022 Leicester unrest were widely recognised and gained national attention, there remains no systemic engagement with anti-Hindu hate and discrimination at either governmental or institutional levels. This report, by the ICfS in partnership with Vichaar Manthan, a public engagement platform within the Hindu community, is grounded in recognition of that gap, drawing on survey responses from Hindu individuals and educational institutions in the UK. It seeks not only to examine the lived realities of anti-Hindu hate and discrimination, but also to understand how such hostility emerges, and why it has remained largely unrecognised. The report aims to bring greater visibility and an evidence-based understanding to the issue, and to offer practical recommendations that support more informed public debate, inclusive policy design, and long-term structural reform. Read the full report here: Investigating Perceptions of Anti-Hindu Hate and Discrimination in the UK

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