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India’s pragmatic diplomacy can guide UK’s long-term goals

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Author: Asian Voice and Nitish Parwani This article was written by the journal Asian Voice featuring one of our researchers, Nitish Parwani. To view the original article click here. This week marked a significant escalation in the ongoing war in Ukraine, as the US and UK crossed a boundary set by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Both nations allowed Ukraine to fire Western-supplied longer-range missiles into Russian territory, intensifying the conflict. The UK is believed to have allowed its Storm Shadow missiles to be used in Russia’s Kursk region, while the US has given the green light for its ATACMS weapons to target sites within Russia. In response, Putin issued a stark warning to the UK, the US, and any other nations providing such weapons, stating that Russia considers itself entitled to strike military facilities in those countries that enable the use of their weapons against Russian targets. As the war enters its third year, Putin’s threats raise an urgent question about what he will do next. The Kremlin has accused the “collective West” of escalating the war, despite a history of being the primary actor driving escalation in the quest to assert control over Ukraine or, at the very least, to secure peace on his terms. From his initial full-scale invasion to his annexation of Ukrainian territories, Putin has repeatedly raised the stakes. This week alone, he deployed North Korean troops to the Kursk region and  targeted Ukraine’s Dnipro with a new hypersonic missile apart from issuing explicit threats to the West. Nitish Rai Parwani, Head of the ‘Diasporic communities’ desk at the International Centre for Sustainability (ICfS), shared his perspective on this whole situation with Asian Voice, stating, “The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, now nearing its third year, continues to reshape global geopolitics. With leadership change in the United States, the dynamics of international involvement are likely to shift significantly. Donald Trump has hinted at reducing US funding to Ukraine and prioritising negotiations, signalling a possible pivot in Western strategy. As a NATO member, a US ally, and a friend of Ukraine, the UK has supported Ukraine through military aid and sanctions on Russia, despite the economic costs. However, a shift in US policy may prompt the UK to reconsider its approach. “The UK faces critical decisions as these dynamics evolve. A potential improvement in US-Russia relations under Trump, alongside Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO or other global alliances, demands a careful balancing act. Furthermore, the post-war landscape will require the UK to reassess its international engagement strategy, fostering ties with both nations while safeguarding its national interests. Adopting India’s pragmatic diplomacy could guide the UK in aligning its long-term goals with global peace and stability. “Amid this, India’s diplomatic stance stands out as a model of balance and maturity. By maintaining cordial relations with both Russia and Ukraine, India has leveraged its position to advocate for dialogue and a peaceful resolution while avoiding overt alignment. This strategy has allowed India to safeguard its strategic interests and promote peace simultaneously.” Diplomatic tensions heighten Russia expelled a British diplomat on Tuesday, accusing him of espionage and escalating tensions between the two countries. Moscow stated that it would not tolerate “undeclared” intelligence officers operating on its soil, further fuelling an ongoing diplomatic dispute with London. The British government has denied the allegations, rejecting claims that one of its embassy employees was a spy. This marks the latest in a series of espionage accusations that have contributed to the already fraught relationship between the two nations. The Russian foreign ministry summoned British Ambassador Nigel Casey after the FSB (Federal Security Service) claimed to have uncovered a British spy. The FSB identified the diplomat as the embassy’s second secretary and accused him of conducting “intelligence and subversive activities” that threatened Russia’s national security. Moscow’s foreign ministry stated that the diplomat was being expelled for providing false information on his visa and accreditation applications. State media footage showed Ambassador Casey surrounded by journalists as he arrived at the foreign ministry in Moscow. The UK government quickly rejected the accusations, dismissing them as malicious and unfounded. A Foreign Office spokesperson stated, “This is not the first time that Russia has made baseless accusations against our staff. We will respond in due course.” This expulsion follows the earlier ejection of six British diplomats by Russia, also on espionage charges. In a separate move, Russia’s foreign ministry announced a travel ban on several British cabinet ministers, citing what it described as London’s “Russophobic” policies. Among those targeted were Chancellor Rachel Reeves, Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner, and ministers from various sectors including education, environment, health, and energy. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has added hundreds of Western politicians, journalists, and business leaders to its “stop list” in retaliation for Western sanctions and travel restrictions. The US Embassy in Kyiv was closed on Wednesday, November 20, due to concerns over a “potential significant air attack,” according to a statement from the Department of State’s Consular Affairs. “Out of an abundance of caution, the embassy will be closed, and embassy personnel have been instructed to shelter in place,” the statement read. “The US Embassy advises American citizens to be prepared to take shelter immediately if an air alert is issued,” the message posted on the embassy’s website added.  

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Evolving Democracy in the Age of AI

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Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk As we near the end of the ‘year of elections’, liberal democracy’s report card is a decidedly mixed one. Although there have been peaceful transfers of power across the world, elections in the UK and France have raised issues of legislative representation and coalition formation. The recent US election has seen misinformation and polarisation in campaigning, and India’s elections continue to be vulnerable to vote buying and identity politics. A recent roundtable discussion hosted by the ICfS considered how we might improve democracy with the aid of emerging technology in this climate. The discussion highlighted that countries across the world should experiment with new ways of doing democracy at the grassroots level, supported by technology. This innovation must nonetheless be accompanied by greater enforcement of existing regulations and more agile development of rules, given the real risks posed by the rapid growth of AI.  Participation is the way forward – at the grassroots level at least  Trust in the current model of popular government has been falling in some of the world’s most long-standing democracies, including the UK and the US. This is for several reasons. There are structural flaws in the election systems of representative democracies: the UK election saw a large majority on little over one-third of the vote, whilst discussion of the US election was dominated by votes in seven key ‘swing states’. These are perhaps exacerbated by misinformation, as seen in the US election campaign. Moreover, once representatives are elected, they must deliver on their promises: yet in the UK in particular, public service delivery has deteriorated significantly over the course of decades. These various systemic flaws require new ways of ‘doing democracy’ to restore that trust.  After a successful citizens’ assembly on abortion in Ireland led to its legalisation in 2018, and the open-source Pol.is platform was used by the vTaiwan initiative to generate popular consensus on Uber licensing, interest has grown in finding new ways to directly engage citizens in public decision-making. Yet putting an issue to the people at national level does not always produce change, as shown by the French Citizens’ Convention on the Climate, amongst others. The design of these mechanisms is key, and not all topics are suitable. Putting major issues of economic policy to a participatory assembly, for example, could have adverse effects for market confidence. Local democracy, then, is perhaps the best starting point, with several instances of citizen participation at local council level in recent years. Evidence of success at local level is needed to make a stronger case for it at the national level.   The benefits of participation are not limited to better or more inclusive decision-making. The polarisation that affects democracy in the UK, US and elsewhere can, in part, be put down to a lack of faith in our fellow citizens to make sound decisions: in the US, many Republicans and Democrats view each other as a ‘threat’. Addressing this requires a means of fostering genuine citizenship, where all those living in a society view themselves as engaged in a common enterprise. Well-designed participatory processes can help here by directing citizens towards engaging with each other on a shared problem.  Technology is here to stay  Alongside participatory experiments, there is growing innovation in ‘DelibTech’ – technological solutions that facilitate deliberation and discussion between citizens. In Libya, the UN used the Remesh AI platform as part of its peacekeeping efforts to gather and cluster opinions and create ‘bridging statements’ to generate consensus amongst society, with the proposals put to a Government of National Unity. The Consensus AI tool has also supported the Conference on the Future of Europe, offering participants the opportunity to vote on statements and submit their own until a 60% majority in favour of one has emerged. The Decidim platform was used in the French Citizens’ Convention on the Climate for external contributions. Greater experimentation with these tools at local level – beyond simply holding deliberative assemblies over video-conferencing – can create the groundswell for future change.   The cost of participatory democracy means DelibTech will have an important role in scaling up these processes in due course. For example, Demos estimates a single 8-day citizens’ assembly with 100 participants would cost between £800k and £1.2m. This high level of expenditure would mean that holding multiple in-person citizens’ assemblies of this kind each year would quickly become financially unsustainable; cheaper options are required, whilst preserving the ability of all citizens to engage in democracy without compromising on the income needed to maintain a reasonable standard of living.  Mechanisms such as Pol.is, Remesh and Consensus AI are also different to social media sites such as Facebook and X: whilst participants can ‘upvote’ others’ comments and add their own, the conversation ‘threads’ that can often generate hostility on other platforms are absent. Whilst many may hold the view that this is good enough reason to avoid technology entirely, a tech-free future is hardly realistic: indeed, the recent migration of social media users from X to newer platforms such as BlueSky only reinforces that technology is here to stay.  The future of democracy requires better tech regulation and education  Whilst emerging technology can play an important role in opening up new opportunities for citizen participation, it is not without its own risks and challenges. Since Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT became widely available from late 2022, concerns have been raised around cybersecurity, data bias, privacy, copyright and the dissemination of false information. Questions were raised in this roundtable discussion about the ability of regulatory systems to keep up with rapid AI development, and whether existing regulations could be better enforced. There is also the risk that as systems such as Pol.is and Consensus AI grow, they will be taken over by large corporations. As Marietje Schaake has argued in The Tech Coup, companies such as Microsoft, Google and Meta can evade accountability from nation-states because of the practical power they wield and their influence within

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After Trump’s Victory: A Changing Global Order, Strained Democracies and Weakening Guardrails

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Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk Donald Trump will be the 47th President of the US, having crossed the threshold of 270 votes required from the Electoral College and having won the popular vote in the 2024 US elections. The Republican Party has also crossed a majority in the US Senate and currently holds a plurality of seats in the House of Representatives. Trump has promised to make a number of policy changes immediately upon entering office, many of which are encapsulated in the ‘Project 2025’ policy wish-list. In addition to the domestic policy changes proposed, the results and the manner of campaigning have implications both internationally and for the robustness of US democracy. In particular, the US-India relationship is set to continue across various sectors, the UK will be prompted to calibrate its own approach to China and there are reasons to be sceptical about the robustness of democracy in the face of misinformation and corporate control of technology.  The US-India relationship will continue  Trump’s presidency is unlikely to alter some aspects of the US-India relationship. There is a bipartisan consensus in the US at present that China is the principal geopolitical threat to US national interests. Trump’s approach to US-China relations – and to foreign policy in general – is hyper-realist: his overriding motivation will be to protect US national interests in whatever way he sees fit. Given this, India will retain its role as a geopolitical and economic ‘shield’ for the US, and an important collaborator in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad will not be suddenly disbanded, nor is Trump likely to renege on existing defence and intelligence sharing agreements as long as they continue to serve his aims. However, there are questions around the continuation of the US-India Climate and Clean Energy partnership launched in 2021, especially considering Trump’s desire to pull the US out of the Paris Agreement. The imposition of higher tariffs on trade with India cannot be ruled out either, despite the apparent camaraderie between Trump and PM Modi. Yet as Trump seeks a decoupling from China, and with the US running a significant trade deficit with India, there are good reasons for the Trump administration to pursue a closer relationship.  The UK needs a clear strategy on China  Given the importance the Trump administration will place on tackling the threat it perceives that China poses to US interests, the UK’s own strategy on China will be critical in future US-UK relations. Over the last decade, the UK has had a much more open approach to China than the US has, with collaboration under the 2010 coalition government replaced with greater wariness in recent years, especially concerning China’s imposition of the national security law in Hong Kong, its use of force around Taiwan and concerns about human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet. The Labour Government’s review of UK-China relations thus comes at a critical moment. Economic benefits for the UK currently appear to be top of the agenda, though there will undoubtedly be pressure from the Trump administration to fall in line with the US approach, with possible tensions between the two emerging if the US seeks a more detached relationship in trading terms. As well as being a litmus test of Labour’s ‘progressive realism’ strategy, the UK’s approach to relations with China will have knock-on effects elsewhere, including for the UK-India relationship: given the tensions between India and China, any ‘Himalayan strategy’ the UK develops will impact the UK-China picture in the round.  ‘Offline’ misinformation is still an issue in the online world  Concerns were raised in early 2024 about how emerging technology – including generative AI and its potential to churn out deepfake video and images – would affect the integrity of some of the world’s most important elections. The 2024 US elections show that ‘offline’ misinformation – falsehoods uttered by politicians in campaign speeches – remain a challenge. The most prominent example was Trump’s claim that Haitian immigrants in Springfield, Ohio were eating cats and dogs, despite having no evidence to support this. The remark was challenged in real time by the moderators, but this may not be enough in today’s climate, for two reasons. First, short clips from televised political debates are routinely shared on social media, often without full context or with sections – including the moderators’ response – cut out. Second, the polarisation of US political debate, along with the perception that it is less and less grounded in objective fact, impairs moderators’ legitimacy and ability to intervene. Some Republicans had claimed that the that the ABC moderators were biased against Trump, especially in what one Senator termed “so-called fact-checking”. Further innovation in fact-checking – especially for online platforms – will be necessary going forward to restore the shared information base that is necessary for democracies the world over the flourish.   Corporate control of the public sphere erodes democracy  Figures released earlier this year by Pew Research Center indicate that 59% of X (formerly Twitter) users in the US get their news from there. With over 100 million active X users in the US, this is a sizeable number. Elon Musk, the owner of X, has described it as the world’s “global town square”, which ought to be a space where people can freely exchange views and deliberate without national boundaries. However, as Marietje Schaake argues in her book The Tech Coup, corporate control of major tech platforms (especially in respect of content moderation) creates a significant accountability gap. National governments seem unable to regulate big social media companies such as Meta and X on which the public sphere is increasingly constructed. With Musk having donated significant amounts of money to the Trump campaign, and having been praised as a “star” in Trump’s victory speech, X is no longer a neutral public space. The bounds of free expression and the availability of information on which citizens make decisions about how their society is run is now controlled by private actors to a far greater

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What will the next US President’s approach to China mean for a rising India?

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Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk How does a global ruling power react to a rising power? Harvard Professor Graham Allison argues that the ruling power’s fear can provoke conflict with the rising power, in what he terms the ‘Thucydides Trap’. For him, the US and China are locked in such a struggle. As India continues to aspire to global superpower status in the future, how will the US respond in the medium term, based on its ongoing tensions with China? Examining how the two candidates in the US presidential election approach the US-China relationship suggests that how India pursues greater influence will be critical to future US-India relations, with comments on its democratic credentials less significant in the current geopolitical climate.  The Harris approach  For the Democrats, there are two broad reasons why the US distrusts China. The first is more realist: China seeks supremacy in the Indo-Pacific for its own ends. It is catching up to the US in economic terms and has rapidly expanded in military terms. What John Hulsman calls the ‘Roosevelt Rule’ – that the primary geopolitical interest of the US is that no hegemon emerges on the Eurasian landmass, owing to the risks to the Western hemisphere – seems to be in play here, setting a notably realist base for Democrat policy. The second reason is more values-based: China is anti-democratic and seeks to reshape the international order to suit its own interests and way of governing, as the 2022 National Security Strategy notes. Ian Bremmer suggests that President Biden and Vice-President Harris approach this from different perspectives: for Biden, the key concern is the contest between democracies and autocracies, whereas for Harris, it is adherence to international norms and the upholding of a rules-based order. For the Democrats, the US must still cooperate with other nations to counter China, whatever their democratic credentials, and with China itself, to resolve shared global challenges. The idealism of the 20th century appears to have given away to a more pragmatic mindset: the Democratic administration does “not, however, believe that governments and societies everywhere must be remade in America’s image for us to be secure.”  The Trump approach  The evidence of the 2016-2020 Trump presidency and the claims of Project 2025 leave no doubt that Donald Trump views China as a major threat to US national interests. The US Strategic Approach to China from 2020 emphasises the risks of Beijing’s predatory economic practices, intellectual property theft and exploitation of other nations through the agreements made under the One Belt, One Road initiative.  For Trump, the interests of the US ought to come first in any bilateral agreements, resulting in a transactional approach that some regard as bringing a cost-benefit analysis into every interaction. This had made Trump’s foreign policy approach an unpredictable one, with US-China relations deteriorating during his presidency and the risks of an escalating trade war if he is re-elected and tariffs are raised on both sides. Yet Trump has also praised Xi Jinping in a rally in Michigan, and whilst president, agreed a deal to export semiconductors and chipmaking equipment to China which was later amended, perhaps due to national security considerations. What is certain is that Trump’s foreign policy approach to China will seek to prioritise at every turn what he views as the interests of the US.  A shared pragmatism  There is a shared degree of pragmatism in both the Republican and Democrat approaches to China that is likely to be transferred to US policy on a rising India. Both parties view the need to preserve the national interests of the US as essential: this is central to Trump’s approach, and notable in the willingness of the Democrats to work with countries that are not democracies to counter shared threats. This means criticism about India’s democratic credentials from within the US will not wholly determine the nature of the US-India relationship under the Democrats.   The trade relations between the US, India and China add important context here. In the 2023-24 year, India had a trade surplus of c.$37 billion with the US, and a trade deficit of $85 billion with China. The US has a trade deficit of $185 billion with China between January and August 2024. Whilst it is unlikely that either India or the US will decouple from China entirely in the next five years, a Trump presidency in particular may seek to deepen the US-India trading relationship to reduce the US’s dependence on China. A recent joint paper from the Takshashila Institute and the Hudson Institute highlights the potential for economic cooperation between the US and India on emerging technology, especially keeping in mind the threat China poses to both countries’ national security interests.  The manner of India’s rise  The manner of India’s rise will be of interest to both Republicans and Democrats in this context, given the nuances of their foreign policy approaches to China. Were Trump to adopt something like the Roosevelt Rule – as Hulsman argues the Republicans ought to do – then the US-India relationship may sour going forward if the US sees India as the ‘next China’, asserting its military might and engaging in predatory economic behaviour. This is unlikely in practice: as Tim Marshall has identified, China’s military expansion owes itself to geographical barriers in the territorial waters of the South China Sea that simply do not apply to India. Moreover, the idea of India as a vishwa guru (‘world teacher’) seems to prioritise sharing cultural values, resources and technology to benefit both India and the world, rather than the hegemony represented by contemporary China. As William Dalrymple charts in his recent book The Golden Road, this was precisely the role of the Indian subcontinent in the first millennium CE, as it interacted with Southeast Asia, China and the Roman world.  The Democrats under Vice-President Harris will be more concerned about how a rising India situates itself within the rules-based international order created in the aftermath of World War II.

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Why India is a Critical Geopolitical Partner for the United States

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Author: Shruti kapil, researcher – Security and mutual dependence desk. Over the past decade, the United States and India, the world’s two largest democracies, have forged a strategic partnership shaped by shifting global dynamics. India’s increasing significance in United States foreign policy can be attributed to three key factors: its emergence as one of the fastest-growing economies, positioning itself as a leader of the Global South; the expanding influence of China in the region; and the shared democratic values that unite the world’s largest and oldest democracies. India and the United States have a comprehensive global strategic partnership, and this relationship will continue to receive bipartisan support whatever the outcome of next week’s election.  Historical context     The India-US relationship has seen it all – the good, bad and ugly. The Cold War era had strategic divergences between the two countries. The 1971 India-Pakistan war had a significant impact on India-US relations because, despite the evidence of atrocities committed by the Pakistani Army against its own citizens in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the Nixon administration supported Islamabad.    This led India to forge even closer ties with the Soviet Union, which culminated in a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The relationship hit a new low when the US imposed sanctions on India after its 1998 nuclear tests. However, as the new millennium approached, the relationship between the two countries began to shift, gradually changing course amid the ever-shifting tides of geopolitics.    In 2016 the US designated India as a “major defence partner”. This relationship has deepened with the 2+2 dialogues that began in 2018, and several defence agreements signed including the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) in 2020 which facilitates the exchange of geospatial intelligence. These agreements have established a foundation for defence cooperation, further strengthened by joint military exercises and intelligence sharing. India and the US have evolved significantly, transforming from estranged democracies into comprehensive strategic partners.     India’s growing economic power  In 2023, India overtook China as the most populous country in the world. China had its first negative population growth in 60 years while India is growing at 1%. A generation from now India’s working population is expected to be 50 percent larger than China’s. India’s demographic profile is of a young, tech-savvy, English-speaking workforce and with a strong work ethic. China has an ageing population like the US and that poses challenges to its economic and social structures. According to the IMF, China will grow at 3-4% while India will grow at 6-7%. Overall, India’s growth prospects look positive for the next 10-15 years.  With the world’s largest population, the fourth largest stock market, the highest growth rate among large countries, substantial foreign investment inflows, the rise of start-ups, key player in global AI ecosystem and digital India initiatives, India is expected to grow dramatically during the next 30 years. Also, as the world’s largest democracy, India offers greater stability, unlike its authoritarian neighbour. This stability is a distinct advantage for India which the US highly values.  The economic triangle of India, China and the US encompasses multiple facets – trade, investment and strategic concerns. In 2022, U.S.-India trade reached $191 billion, nearly double the level of 2014. The US was India’s largest trading partner in 2021-22 and 2022-23 and has been the primary source of FDI for the second year in a row. The trade dynamics show a $37 billion trade surplus in India’s favour, mostly due to the progress in areas of technology and manufacturing.   When it comes to the India-China economic relationship, imports from China have continued to grow unabated. In 2023, China overtook the US to become India’s number one trading partner. The situation has resulted in a trade deficit of $85 billion for India, meaning India is heavily dependent on Chinese manufacturing. Similarly, in 2022, the US trade deficit in goods and services with China reached $367 billion, marking the highest deficit in all its bilateral trade relationships. The India-US economic ties are a strategic alternative to India’s dependence on Chinese imports, as the US is also trying to reduce its dependence on China. India can play an important geopolitical role for the US by providing an opportunity to de-risk from China’s manufacturing sector. India’s ability to balance relations with both China and the United States will be critical to its long-term economic independence and position on the global stage.   Rising Chinese influence in Indo-Pacific   The Indo-Pacific is of immense strategic importance because of its critical sea trade routes which connect the Middle East, Africa and East Asia to Europe and the US. The Indo-Pacific region, spanning from India to the western Pacific, is inhabited by over 3.5 billion people and has a combined GDP exceeding $20 trillion. These routes facilitate most of the world’s oil trade and a third of global trade. There are choke points along this route that if blocked could disrupt the global economy. Moreover, this region has three of the world’s biggest economies—China, India and Japan—and seven of the largest militaries.  India’s 9000 miles of land borders limit cross-border trade due to political, security, and difficult terrain issues. This makes the Indian Ocean region crucial as a key driver of India’s future economic growth. The importance of the Indian Ocean Region to India is multifaceted: geography, energy, trade routes, natural resources, sea lines of communication, security concerns and regional geopolitics. Given these factors, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made the Indian Ocean Region a priority which is evident from India’s maritime initiative—Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).  China’s aggressive expansionism poses a serious challenge to India, stretched to both land and maritime domains in the Indo-Pacific region.  China’s territorial ambitions have led to regional instability, directly impacting India’s interests—from the contested border and the violent 2020 clashes between Indian and Chinese forces to Beijing’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh and encroachments into Bhutan and Nepal. And China’s

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Navigating US-India Relations in the Context of the 2024 Elections: Trump vs. Harris

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Author: Chloe Schuber, Research & Operations Assistant : Strengthening Democracy Desk As the 2024 US presidential election nears, US-India relations stand at a critical juncture, shaped by global events and the divergent foreign policy approaches of the candidates. Former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris offer sharply contrasting visions for this key partnership. Trump’s strategy centres on defence and protectionism, while Harris appears to prioritise broader collaboration in areas like climate change, technology, and multilateral diplomacy. With China’s growing assertiveness in the region, the direction of US-India relations in the coming years will be crucial. Donald Trump and India: Strategic Gains, Economic Tensions During his presidency (2017–2021), Donald Trump deepened US-India relations, anchored in his personal camaraderie with Prime Minister Modi. This connection was highlighted by high-profile events such as the “Howdy Modi” rally in Houston (2019) – organised by the US Indian diaspora – and the “Namaste Trump” event in Ahmedabad (2020). These gatherings showcased a key mutual strategic alignment focused on countering China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific, and strengthening defence ties, economic cooperation, and regional security partnerships. Under Trump’s administration, US-India relations saw substantial progress in defence and security cooperation. Major defence deals and enhanced intelligence-sharing agreements positioned India as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific. This collaboration was institutionalised through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia. India’s strategic importance in this alliance, aimed at balancing China’s military and economic influence, became central. As Trump campaigns for a return to the White House in 2024, his approach to US-India relations is likely to be shaped by the “Project 2025” initiative, which emphasises countering China’s influence as a one of its key strategic objectives. Defence cooperation would remain a central pillar, building on previous achievements such as enhanced arms sales, intelligence sharing, and agreements like COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement). This cooperation is particularly significant as it represents a shift away from India’s historical dependence on Russian military hardware, appearing to bring it closer to Western strategic interests whilst serving India’s goals of multi-alignment. However, Trump’s “America First” economic policies could again create tensions, particularly in sectors like high-tech and pharmaceuticals. His previous actions, such as imposing tariffs on Indian steel and aluminium and removing India from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programme, led to trade frictions. A second Trump administration might continue to push for greater market access and address trade imbalances, potentially leading to renewed economic challenges in the bilateral relationship. Kamala Harris: Potential for Re-Engagement Kamala Harris’s historic rise as the first female Vice-President of the US, with her Indian ancestry, initially generated enthusiasm in India. However, her personal heritage has not translated into significant diplomatic engagement with India. Harris has focused largely on domestic issues, leaving foreign policy, including US-India relations, to other officials within the Biden administration. A key moment of tension came in 2019, when Harris made remarks on the sensitive issue of Kashmir. She voiced concerns over India’s actions following the revocation of Article 370, stating, “We have to remind Kashmiris they are not alone in the world. We are watching.” This was viewed in India as undue criticism of the government’s domestic policies, which sparked backlash given the country’s sensitivity to foreign commentary on Kashmir. Her comments, while reflective of broader Democratic concerns around human rights and democracy, were seen as lacking in constructive engagement with India on this complex issue. Despite this friction, Harris’s remarks are unlikely to be a dealbreaker. US-India relations are driven by shared strategic interests—particularly in defence, technology, and trade—so while her comments were poorly received, they have not fundamentally altered the overall trajectory of the partnership. Climate Change as a Pillar of Future Cooperation Climate change is emerging as one of the most critical areas for US-India cooperation. For Harris, whose platform prioritises environmental sustainability, climate action could be a cornerstone of her foreign policy, especially in relation to India. Both countries are committed to global frameworks such as the Paris Agreement, and their shared goals in renewable energy present opportunities for deeper cooperation. Whilst both countries are part of the top three largest emitter of greenhouse gases (with the US often ranking first) is also, India is striving to transition to clean energy, aiming to generate 50% of its electricity from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030. The US could play a pivotal role in supporting this transition through technological partnerships, investment in green infrastructure, and clean energy technology transfer. Collaborations in solar power, wind energy, and electric vehicles would not only help India meet its renewable energy goals but also create new market opportunities for US companies. For India, like the US, climate change is more than an environmental issue; it is also a matter of national security. Rising temperatures, unpredictable monsoons, and extreme weather events threaten India’s agriculture, water resources, and infrastructure. US-India cooperation on climate resilience, particularly in areas like water management and sustainable agriculture, could mitigate these risks. In contrast, Trump’s past downplaying of climate change and his withdrawal from the Paris Agreement suggest that environmental cooperation would not be a priority in a second Trump administration. However, given the economic potential of the green energy sector, even Trump may recognise the value of engaging with India on clean energy projects, particularly as India looks to diversify its energy sources. The Strategic Importance of China Beyond climate change, US-India relations will continue to be shaped by strategic concerns, particularly regarding China. US-China tensions have become a bipartisan issue with both Trump and Harris acknowledging China as a significant geopolitical competitor. As a result, any future US-India partnership will need to effectively navigate this complex geopolitical landscape. A second Trump term would likely maintain a strong focus on this challenge, while Harris, though less directly involved with India to date, would also need to prioritize defense and security cooperation in response to China’s growing assertiveness. Conclusion: Shaping a Multi-Faceted Partnership The 2024 US presidential election offers two different approaches to US-India

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Why Britain Needs a Himalayan Strategy

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Author: sachin nandha, trustee and director As Britain redefines its global strategic role post-Brexit and navigates the Indo-Pacific tilt, the Himalayan region, often overlooked in British defence discussions, holds vital importance. While the South and East China Seas and the Indian Ocean are frequently discussed as strategic theatres, the Himalayas, as a geopolitical frontier, remain underappreciated. A focused “Himalayan strategy” can be a critical component of the UK’s broader defence and foreign policy, completing its Indo-Pacific strategy and countering China’s growing influence in South Asia. Geopolitical Importance of the Himalayas The Himalayas have historically been a buffer zone between major powers, most notably China and India. However, with China’s increasing assertiveness, this buffer is eroding. In recent years, Beijing has shifted its focus towards expanding its influence over this mountainous region, leveraging its strategic control over Tibet, redrawing borders, and controlling critical water flows. The British government’s defence and security review, known as the Integrated Review, should widen its Indo-Pacific focus to include the Himalayas. China’s aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea, where artificial islands have been militarized, is mirrored in the Himalayan region. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been actively building infrastructure in disputed territories, such as Bhutan, and exerting control over strategic river systems like the Brahmaputra. Beijing’s willingness to act unilaterally and reshape the regional status quo suggests a pattern of geopolitical ambition that requires British and allied countermeasures. Why the UK Lacks a Himalayan Strategy Historically, the UK was a significant power in the Himalayan region. During the British Empire, British India was a strategic actor in the region’s geopolitics. However, post-empire, the UK’s interests in the Himalayas have diminished. Britain’s current Indo-Pacific strategy focuses heavily on maritime security, trade routes, and partnerships, leaving terrestrial theatres like the Himalayas out of the conversation. Furthermore, Britain no longer sees itself as a direct player in South Asia’s territorial disputes, leaving these concerns primarily to regional actors like India. Another barrier to a UK Himalayan strategy is the perception that the Himalayas are an impenetrable and remote region, limiting the UK’s scope of influence. This view fails to appreciate that Chinese actions in the Himalayas are part of a broader geopolitical strategy to secure dominance over South Asia. The UK, which prides itself on its global reach, cannot afford to ignore the long-term implications of Chinese dominance over the Himalayan region. Moreover, the lack of a clear policy framework toward the Himalayas reflects an outdated view of the region as strategically peripheral. However, as China extends its reach into South Asia through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the UK must re-evaluate its approach. Failure to address this gap in British strategy will only increase China’s leverage in the region. Multilateral Approaches and Environmental Diplomacy The UK can enhance its Himalayan strategy by leveraging its diplomatic expertise in multilateralism. Rather than acting alone, Britain can use its influence to convene stakeholders in the region, particularly India, Nepal, Bhutan, and possibly others, to address shared concerns around environmental diplomacy and cooperation. The Himalayan region is home to some of the world’s most vital water sources, and climate change is exacerbating the pressure on these resources. By facilitating dialogue on transboundary water management, conservation efforts, and sustainable development, the UK can position itself as a neutral broker. These efforts could be advanced through existing multilateral frameworks like the United Nations or through regional initiatives supported by institutions such as the World Bank. This would enable the UK to promote confidence-building measures, encouraging cooperation on environmental security, which, in turn, could ease geopolitical tensions. By facilitating this dialogue, the UK would not only strengthen its diplomatic presence in the region but also contribute to a more stable and cooperative environment in South Asia. Such a multilateral approach aligns with Britain’s broader goal of ensuring that its Indo-Pacific strategy incorporates both security and sustainable development, creating an enduring platform for collaboration among regional powers. How the British saw the world in the 19th century. Water Wars: The Strategic Importance of Himalayan Rivers One of the most concerning aspects of China’s dominance in the Himalayas is its control over major river systems, including the Brahmaputra. Known as the “water tower” of Asia, the Tibetan Plateau and Himalayan glaciers feed into rivers that are critical to the livelihoods of nearly 2 billion people. China’s upper riparian status over these rivers gives it the ability to control water flow into countries downstream, most notably India and Bangladesh. British policymakers must recognize that water scarcity and control over river systems are becoming pivotal issues in South Asia’s geopolitics. Beijing’s dam-building activities and its potential ability to manipulate water supplies for political leverage should be of significant concern to the UK. As the impacts of climate change exacerbate water stress in the region, China’s grip over Himalayan rivers could trigger conflicts, adding another layer of instability to an already volatile region. By supporting regional initiatives on water management, promoting transboundary water-sharing agreements, and engaging with multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the UK can play a role in mitigating these risks. A UK Himalayan strategy that prioritizes environmental diplomacy would enhance the country’s standing as a responsible global power while addressing a critical dimension of China’s growing dominance. Countering China’s Influence China’s moves in the Himalayas are not merely defensive. They represent a broader strategy to encircle India, secure critical water resources, and project influence throughout South Asia. By constructing infrastructure in disputed areas of Bhutan, increasing economic leverage over Nepal, and militarising border areas, China is reshaping the region’s geopolitics to its advantage. For the UK, countering China’s influence in the Himalayas complements its broader Indo-Pacific strategy. A well-defined Himalayan strategy would not only safeguard British interests but also strengthen partnerships with like-minded countries like India. Strengthening India’s role as a regional counterbalance to China aligns with the UK’s broader goals of ensuring stability in the Indo-Pacific. The UK’s focus on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, such as its collaboration

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Jammu & Kashmir elections: A demonstration of India’s democratic spirit

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Author: Shruti kapil, researcher – Security and mutual dependence desk. October 8 was a watershed moment for Jammu and Kashmir as the election results were announced following six years of direct rule from Delhi. A week later, on October 13, the President’s Rule was revoked, enabling formation of government elected by the people of J&K. The three-phase election was held from September 18 to October 1, and 90 assembly members were elected. This was the first election in a decade and came after the historic abrogation of Article 370, which led to a drastic shift in the political landscape of the region.  Exit polls had predicted a hung assembly and independent candidates making a significant impact. However, the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC) and Indian National Congress (INC) achieved a majority and crossed the halfway mark. Independent candidates failed to make a mark in these elections.  Omar Abdullah, the president of the National Conference, was sworn in as the Chief Minister (CM) of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir on October 16th in Srinagar. He has served as a CM of Jammu and Kashmir from 2009 to 2014. However, this is a new beginning, as Jammu and Kashmir is now a Union Territory with limited powers of the new CM.  The Election Commission recorded a 63% overall turnout in the 2024 Jammu and Kashmir elections, with 64% male, 63% female, and 38% third gender. While this is a big jump from the 58% in this year’s Assembly elections, it is still below the 65% in the 2014 elections, which shows a slight decline in voting over the last decade, but overall participation remains robust.  In the 2014 Jammu & Kashmir elections, only 28 women contested out of 831 candidates across 87 seats. In 2024, 44 women are in the fray out of 908 nominations, a 57% increase. While progress is slow, it’s steady. In these elections, three women have won—Shagun Parihar from the BJP and Sakina Itoo and Shamima Firdous from the JKNC—highlighting a growing, if gradual, presence of women in J&K politics.  Figure 1: 2024 J&K assembly elections party-wise results. Data sourced from the Election Commission of India (ECI) website.  Figure 2: 2014 and 2024 J&K Assembly elections party-wise results. Source: ECI  Above in figures 1 and 2 are tables depicting how each party performed in this year’s election compared to the 2014 elections. While direct comparison is difficult due to delimitation changes that changed the constituency boundaries and voter distribution, the data gives a broader view of how national and regional parties performed in these two electoral cycles.   Figure 3: Vote share of major parties in J&K Assembly elections from 1996 to 2024. Source: ECI.  The graph above shows how the vote share of major parties in the Jammu & Kashmir Assembly elections has shifted from 1996 to 2024. BJP is steadily increasing its vote share. Though BJP secured 25% of the votes and JKNC 23%, JKNC has won more seats. This reflects a curious imbalance in the electoral outcome.    This anomaly is because of the ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) system like in the UK, where the candidate with the most votes in a constituency wins the seat regardless of overall vote share. This often leads to odd results where a party with fewer total votes can win more seats, leaving voters questioning if the outcome truly reflects the will of the people.  For instance, in the 2014 J&K elections, the BJP contested 33 seats in Kashmir and received 2.5% of the votes. In 2024, they reduced their candidates to 19 and secured 5.8% of the votes but failed to win a single seat. This raises questions if the FPTP system is accurately translating voter preferences into political representation, as a party’s growing popularity may not translate into actual power— leaving room to question how well the system reflects the people’s true choices.  The 2024 J&K elections revealed sharp regional divisions. JKNC won 35 of 47 seats in Muslim majority Kashmir, and the BJP won 29 of 43 seats in Hindu majority Jammu.   The regional political priorities were contrasting—Kashmir was focused on the restoration of Article 370 while Jammu was focused on security and the fight against cross-border terrorism. Jammu was relatively peaceful, but in the last few years, it has seen a rise in militant attacks as insurgents have shifted their focus to Jammu after the abrogation of Article 370. Despite these threats, voter turnout in Jammu was strong, indicating the region’s resolve in the face of challenges to stability. No major violence was reported, which is a noteworthy change from 170 violent incidents recorded in the 2014 elections.  Another noteworthy change was extremists and separatists embracing the democratic process. They not only voted but also contested the elections. While this signals progress as those who boycotted elections are now participating in the democratic process, it also raises concerns. The inclusion of separatist elements in the mainstream can amplify their ideology and challenge the Indian state’s efforts to maintain peace and stability in Jammu and Kashmir.   Early signs are positive. Candidates linked to banned Jamaat-e-Islami and similar ideologies received minimal support in these elections, indicating the electorate is moving away from extremism and towards peace and development.  International observers should be clear: the road ahead for Jammu and Kashmir is unchartered and challenging. As a Union Territory, there are two authorities in charge: the Omar Abdullah-led state government, in charge of state affairs, and the Lieutenant Governor, in charge of public order, law enforcement, and bureaucracy. The differing views of these two governments further complicate the situation and may lead to governance challenges that can affect the functioning of the state.  The new government in J&K faces a daunting task to deliver on its promise of restoring Article 370, an issue closely tied to the Kashmiri identity. Restoration of Article 370 was the main agenda of most regional parties in the election campaign, as it resonates deeply with a section of the Muslim electorate. However, the

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The Citizens’ Jury on Assisted Dying – How Not to Do Deliberative Democracy 

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Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk Have we found the solution to navigating assisted dying in England? The recent citizens’ jury on assisted dying, organised by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, would appear to suggest so. Yet, research suggests that though a welcome innovation, the jury instead shows us how not to do deliberative democracy. This is down to the lack of a pathway to influence Government, the limited public awareness of the process and its small scale. This apparent failure should not put us off, but instead encourage further experiments on new ways to do democracy.  What are citizens’ juries?  A citizens’ jury is a three-stage process in which a randomly selected group of citizens comes together to learn about an issue, deliberate upon it and produce recommendations for policymakers. It is usually regarded as a smaller version of a citizens’ assembly, following the same process in a shorter time and with fewer participants. Citizens’ juries are examples of deliberative and participatory democracy: they rely on directly bringing citizens into the policy process to come to reasoned conclusions.  What did this citizens’ jury decide?  The jury members agreed that the law should change to permit assisted dying in England where adults with decision-making capacity are terminally ill. This could be either through physician-assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia. This follows the introduction of a Private Members’ Bill on assisted dying into the House of Lords, and a similar Bill into the Scottish Parliament. The Lords’ Bill is expected to be withdrawn, as a Bill is to be introduced into the House of Commons on 16 October 2024.  Best practice: the Irish case  The best example of a deliberative exercise on a morally controversial issue is the Ireland Citizens’ Assembly on abortion, which took place between 2016 and 2018. 99 randomly selected citizens came together as an independent body established by the Irish Parliament for five structured weekends, at the end of which they produced a series of recommendations. Each weekend featured expert presentations and the consideration of submissions from members of the public, followed by structured roundtable discussions on specific issues. A committee of both chambers of the Irish Parliament considered the assembly’s recommendations to replace the constitutional ban on abortion with a provision allowing Parliament to legislate on the matter. The proposal was approved by Parliament, and then the people in a referendum on 25 May 2018. The evidence sessions were broadcast to the public, providing objective information for the referendum vote and creating wide awareness of the assembly process.  The Jersey case: success closer to home  Deliberative democracy has already been tried in the UK on the matter of assisted dying. In 2021, a citizen’s jury met in Jersey to provide its legislators with a detailed community response to the medical, ethical, legal and regulatory issues involved in permitting assisted dying. Following ten sessions of learning and deliberation, each lasting between 2 and 2.5 hours, the citizens’ jury recommended that assisted dying be permitted for Jersey residents aged 18 or over with a terminal illness or who were experiencing unbearable suffering. The citizens’ jury discussed a series of safeguards for the process, including a pre-approval process, the necessary involvement of medical professionals and the rights of those professionals to be conscientious objectors to the procedure. Two months’ later, Jersey’s legislature (the States Assembly) approved the availability of ‘assisted dying’ in principle. A Bill to allow assisted dying is now being drafted.  What went wrong in England?  Since both the Ireland citizens’ assembly and the citizens’ jury in Jersey were successful in both driving change and meaningfully engaging citizens, it seems logical to repeat the exercise in England, as the Nuffield Council on Bioethics did. Despite this, there are three design issues with the citizens’ jury that reduce its effectiveness and legitimacy:  No clear pathway for the jury’s recommendations to influence Parliament.  Where citizens’ juries are set up by institutions external to the official decision-making process, there is no guarantee that decision-makers will consider the jury’s recommendations, still less that they will follow them. The most successful citizens’ juries in the UK have been initiated by local councils which have then directly implemented the recommendations.  Limited public awareness of the process.  A crucial factor in both the Irish case and the citizens’ jury in Jersey was the public awareness around the process. This occurred through making the learning sessions of the deliberative process publicly available. In Jersey, moreover, the citizens’ jury followed an e-petition and an online public survey. Yet in England, only the results of the jury have been covered in the media, with seemingly little public information on the topics and experts who presented. It is difficult to view it as a genuinely ‘national’ conversation.  The scale of the citizens’ jury was perhaps too small.  The citizens’ jury on assisted dying in England had 30 participants. This is slightly bigger than Jersey’s citizens’ jury, but a third of the size of Ireland’s citizens’ assembly. Even though the 30 participants were randomly selected by an objectively fair algorithm, many might doubt that there were enough participants to genuinely represent the views of over 55m people.   The need for further experiments  No process of experimentation or innovation has a 100% success rate; partial successes and errors are valuable in pointing in the right direction. The citizens’ jury on assisted dying in England plays a role like this, identifying some pitfalls to avoid as the country mulls over this complex issue. Yet there is enough evidence from elsewhere in the world to suggest we are barking up the right tree. Further deliberative exercises taking into account some of the issues raised here will benefit us, not only in resolving the issue of assisted dying but in crafting a more effective British democracy. 

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Should India’s ‘One Nation’ have One Election? 

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Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk How do you conduct elections in the world’s largest democracy? A new proposal by the Indian Government, called ‘One Nation, One Election’ says, “all at once”. Indian elections today are like a feast with an endless number of courses, coming one after the other. The ‘One Nation, One Election’ scheme initially aims to synchronise national and state elections to a fixed period every 5 years. Though it will certainly make elections more efficient, the proposals raise questions about whether local issues will be sidelined and the accountability of state legislators to their constituents.  What will it involve?  Elections for the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the national parliament) and the Vidhan Sabha (state legislatures) occur every five years, but not at the same time. Following the 2024 General Election, there will be state elections in Jammu & Kashmir, Haryana, Maharashtra and Jharkhand before the year is out. The ‘One Nation, One Election’ scheme would synchronise all state and national elections across the country initially; a proposed second phase would also synchronise some municipal elections, though some local bodies have different term lengths.  Fewer elections, more governance  India’s elections are some of the costliest in the world, not least because of their size and scale: for the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the Finance Ministry requested an additional Rs 3,147.92 crore (around £282m) for election-related expenses, and Rs 73.67 crore (around £6.6m) to cover the Election Commission of India’s administration costs. The report of the High-Level Committee on ‘One Nation, One Election’ claims the cost of holding Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections in the current format is Rs 4,500 crore (around £402m). It did not indicate how much might be saved through simultaneous elections, though identifies scope for savings on administrative expenses, transporting voting machines and re-deploying people from other jobs to assist with election conduct. This should be welcomed as long as election integrity is not compromised.  When elections take place in India, governance stops. This is because of the Model Code of Conduct, a set of rules governing what parties, candidates and incumbent governments can and cannot do. It ensures incumbents cannot use the state’s power to unduly influence voters during the campaign, a necessity in a country where welfare schemes are crucial to politics at all levels. The Code prohibits new financial grants, the initiation of new projects, promises to construct roads and even the provision of drinking water facilities. Ongoing welfare projects can continue only if work has already started. Other projects, including some forms of emergency relief, require the Election Commission’s permission to proceed. Several political parties (both national and regional ones) reported to the High-Level Committee that many days of governance were lost because of the frequent imposition of the Code, with a reported 307 days lost in Maharashtra between 2016 and 2017. Although the Code is a necessary safeguard, streamlining its imposition can safeguard democracy and ensure the conditions for local growth.  National issues may dominate over local ones  Some critics see the proposal for simultaneous elections as a threat to India’s federal system. However, India’s central Election Commission holds responsibility for Vidhan Sabha elections, and none of the proposals made affect states’ powers or the status of their legislatures. There are questions whether synchronising elections will sideline local issues in favour of national ones. The High-Level Committee itself reports that in 24 out of 31 previous instances of simultaneous elections between 1989 and 2014, the major parties had similar polling numbers in the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha. This trend continued in 2024: the Bharatiya Janata Party and the state incumbent Biju Janata Dal returned similar numbers in both the national and state elections in Odisha, whilst the Telugu Desam Party came out on top in Andhra Pradesh in both votes. The 2024 UK local elections show how national and international issues – here, the Israel-Palestine conflict – can shape local politics in some areas. In campaigning for the Haryana state elections, Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath sought to garner votes for the BJP by focusing on the revocation of Art 370 in Jammu & Kashmir and the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, despite neither of these relating to local issues. Simultaneous elections will only worsen this state of affairs.  Fixed-term parliaments risk deadlock and disempowerment  Simultaneous elections also require the parliamentary term to be fixed at no more – and crucially no less (in ordinary circumstances) – than five years. State legislatures can lodge a Vote of No Confidence in their governments if they do not hit the mark. If this passes on a simple majority, the Governor must invite the second-largest party to form a new government. Although a Vidhan Sabha can be dissolved mid-term, this would not ‘reset the clock’ under the new proposals: the newly elected legislature would sit only until the next simultaneous election period. With an inevitable election at fixed intervals and coalition government the norm, the incentive for an early election to seek a fresh mandate from the people will vanish – instead, there will be more ‘horse trading’ within the legislature if coalitions break down, where parties might compromise on their manifesto commitments. This disempowers voters, who will likely lose the opportunity to influence their representatives during the five-year term, making accountability more challenging. It can also lead to policy deadlock: where coalitions shift, some policies can get stuck, and it may be difficult for governments to find a majority for others, as happened to the UK during the infamous Brexit deadlock of 2017-2019 under its own (now abolished) fixed-term parliamentary system.  Where do we go from here?  Efforts to ensure the efficiency of Indian elections should be encouraged, given their vast scale. Whilst the ‘One Nation, One Election’ proposals as they stand do raise issues for local politics and accountability, careful design can ensure that simultaneous elections can go ahead. First, policymakers must consider how to strengthen local party politics and

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