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Is UK Becoming “an Island of Strangers?” 

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Author: Ornicha Daorueng, research intern Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer recently warned that the UK is at risk of becoming an “island of strangers,” attributing this to high levels of immigration and proposing stricter immigration policies. His remarks have drawn criticism, with some comparing them to the divisive and racially charged rhetoric of Conservative MP Enoch Powell’s 1968 “Rivers of Blood” speech, in which Powell claimed immigrants had made Britons feel like “strangers in their own country,” fuelling widespread anti-immigrant sentiment. Critics suggest Starmer’s comments may be politically motivated, reacting to Labour’s electoral losses to Reform UK, a party advocating tighter immigration controls. At the same time, Starmer’s stance can also be seen as a genuine attempt to address the challenges of integrating native and immigrant communities while maintaining social cohesion. However, rather than focusing solely on political motives, it is more productive to examine what Starmer means by “an island of strangers,” assess whether this is a fair characterisation, and explore how the UK can bridge the gap between communities and transform those whom Starmer described as strangers into fellow citizens.  The role of bonding social capital in immigrant life   Aristotle asserted that “man is, by nature, a political animal,” highlighting humanity’s inherent need for social connection to survive and thrive. Modern neuroscience affirms this: our brains are wired for social bonding. To fulfil this need, people gravitate toward communities that share familiar identities which offer belonging, trust, and mutual support.   This is particularly evident among immigrant communities. Regardless of their origin, newcomers often face challenges such as unfamiliar cultures, languages, and social systems, which can cause feelings of alienation and insecurity. In response, they form strong bonds with those who share their national, ethnic, linguistic, or religious backgrounds. This strong attachment to inherited identities of “people like us” is known as bonding social capital. These networks help them adjust to new lives by offering social support, legal assistance, employment guidance, and housing, creating close-knit networks across major UK cities. For example, in the West Midlands, Pakistani migrant men gather in mosques and gyms, creating social spaces that reinforce cultural norms and mutual support. In East London’s Brick Lane, known as “Banglatown,” Bangladeshi-owned shops, restaurants, and the Brick Lane Mosque serve as communal hubs, preserving cultural identity while helping newcomers navigate life in their new country.  Why can too much bonding social capital make us strangers?   While bonding social capital offers essential support, it can also deepen divides between immigrant communities and wider society. When individuals primarily interact within their own cultural or religious groups, “us vs. them” mentality can develop. A case in point is the Bangladeshi community’s “Save Brick Lane” campaign, which opposed gentrification and framed hipsters, startups, and investors as cultural threats. Such insularity reduces dialogue, reinforces confirmation bias, and fosters rigid group norms. Moreover, strong alignment with inherited identities can weaken connections to the host country. For instance, 71% of British Muslims identify primarily as Muslim, compared to 27% who identify as British. This disparity can contribute to feelings of alienation, particularly when national policies conflict with religious or political beliefs.  Religious identity may also be linked to authoritarian tendencies. Studies show that Christian and Muslim respondents are more likely to hold socially authoritarian attitudes, valuing order, conformity, and group loyalty. These tendencies can hinder integration and increase vulnerability to populist leaders who promise protection for their group, an important factor that can contribute to the emergence of extremism.   Bonding social capital, when unchecked, can create various forms of “strangeness”: between different immigrant communities, between immigrant communities and the wider British society, and even in the perceptions British citizens hold toward immigrants. Public opinion reflects this divide, with 52% of British citizens supporting reduced immigration and only 14% favouring an increase. This suggests a disconnect between wider society and immigrant communities, which helps explain what Sir Keir Starmer meant by the UK becoming an “island of strangers.”  From strangers to acquaintances: the power of bridging capital   In contrast to bonding, bridging social capital connects people across diverse social groups. These connections are typically based on shared interests or acquired identities, such as education, professions, or hobbies, rather than ethnicity or religion. For migrants, this expansion of social circles is vital to integration and developing a sense of belonging that is rooted in Britishness, rather than the narrow confines of religion or ethnicity.   Successful integration is often driven by economic and educational advancement, providing more pathways for migrants to foster bridging social capital. The Indian diaspora in the UK exemplifies this. With the highest levels of education, a strong presence in professional occupations, and the highest homeownership rates among ethnic groups, Indian migrants exemplify how education leads to professional advancement and ultimately, economic stability. This socio-economic trajectory enables greater connection with broader society, helping many see the UK as their true home.   Communities worldwide have successfully implemented grassroots initiatives to support socio-economic integration. In education, Sweden’s Fryshuset youth organisation creates inclusive spaces through music, sports, and cultural activities, allowing young people to connect beyond ethnic lines. The state-funded SFI program also offers free, flexible language courses to adult immigrants, helping them navigate society and improve their employment prospects. In the economic front, Canada’s TRIEC collaborates with private, public, and non-profit sectors to foster inclusive hiring practices while helping migrants expand their professional networks and understand the local labour market. In the Netherlands, Qredits supports migrant entrepreneurs through business training and microloans.  For civic engagement, Australia’s Stronger Communities Programme funds grassroots organisations and local councils to strengthen community ties and promote social cohesion. These examples show that bridging social circles does not require grand policies; it often begins with simple acts at the grassroots level. This is where the UK has room to learn and invest.   Returning to the question, “Is the UK becoming an island of strangers?” The answer is yes, but not because of who is arriving. It is because we are failing to build shared spaces of connection: in schools, workplaces, neighbourhoods, and

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Could Electoral Reform Solve India’s Delimitation Dilemma? 

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Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk Being the world’s largest democracy is not without its challenges. India currently faces the problem of how to apportion seats in the Lok Sabha, its Lower House, between states with populations that have expanded at very different rates. With re-apportionment not having taken place since 1971, some states currently have around 3m voters per constituency seat, whilst others have fewer than 2m. Government proposals to re-calculate seat share have faced pushback from the leaders of India’s more prosperous and less populous southern states, who argue that re-apportionment will adversely affect their ability to argue for their state’s interests at the national level. Although solutions such as expanding the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha reform have already been touted, policymakers and constitutional designers must also consider whether India must bite the bullet of electoral reform to strengthen its national democracy.  A long-standing problem  The problem India faces is vast and long-standing. Under Art 81(2)(a) of the Constitution of India, the Lok Sabha is capped at 550 members, where each state is allotted a number of seats such that “the ratio between that number and the population of the State is, so far as practicable, the same for all States”. The population figures used are those from the most recent census. Re-apportionment took place following the 1951, 1961 and 1971 censuses. However, the 42nd amendment to the Constitution, imposed during the Emergency (when civil liberties were suspended throughout the country for 2 years), froze Lok Sabha seat share at the proportions calculated in the early 1970s, until at least the 2001 census. This freeze was extended to 2026 by the 84th amendment to the Constitution in 2001, since census proceedings had already begun and “keeping in view the progress of family planning programmes” across the country. By the time the re-apportionment exercise recently announced by the Government takes place, the Lok Sabha seat allocations will be 55 years out of date.   A problem for large democracies?  India’s apportionment problem is an inevitable one for large democracies. Amongst the world’s ten most populous countries, only Bangladesh and China are not organised federally. Countries such as India, the USA and Brazil all face a similar dilemma because of their federal structures: on one hand, population growth at the national level requires legislative seats in the lower house to be re-allocated every so often to maintain the principle of ‘one person, one vote’; on the other, federalism demands equality between the constituent states of a federal system. This leads to a fundamental tension: if a population is asymmetrically distributed, or population growth is asymmetric across different states, representation in the lower house becomes increasingly skewed towards larger states. Maintaining the equality of states requires counterbalancing, which often takes place through a federal second chamber such as the US Senate or the Rajya Sabha, where members represent states and not individual constituencies.  The US Senate, for example, has strict federal representation, with two seats allocated to each state irrespective of their size or population. Seat share in the House of Representatives, by contrast, is recalculated every 10 years based on the national census.  All states receive at least one district seat irrespective of their population, with the total number of seats capped at 435 since 1929. Owing to the changes in population over time, states such as Florida have almost double the number of House seats today as they did in the 1970s, whilst states such as Illinois, Michigan, New York and Ohio have all seen considerable reductions. The changes that have occurred have been largely incremental. By contrast, because re-apportionment has not taken place in India for half a century, Uttar Pradesh – India’s most populous state – would jump from 80 Lok Sabha seats today, to 149 in a Lok Sabha expanded from 543 seats to the 880 available in India’s new Parliament building. Though India’s problem is not unique, the inevitable ‘step-change’ that awaits because of long-standing inaction brings significant challenges. Viewing these challenges in global context both reveals how irresponsible the inaction of Indian politicians on this issue has been over several decades, and indicates deeper structural weaknesses in Indian democracy.  The electoral system creates political incentives against re-apportionment  As in the UK, each Lok Sabha seat represents one geographical constituency that elects a single member on the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) basis: voters simply cast one vote for the candidate of their choice, and the candidate with the most votes wins even if they do not have an absolute majority. As a result, India is no stranger to the disproportionality seen in the wake of the 2024 UK General Election, and at the 2025 local elections. In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) – the Tamil nationalist party led by MK Stalin, one of the most vocal critics of re-apportionment – won 22 out of 39 Lok Sabha seats (a 56.4% share) for Tamil Nadu on just 26.9% of the popular vote. The AIADMK, which broke away from the DMK, won 20.5% of the popular vote without winning a single seat. In Uttar Pradesh, the Samajwadi Party won 37 of the 80 Lok Sabha seats on 33.6% of the vote, whilst the BJP won 41.4% of the vote, but only 33 out of 80 seats. Similar patterns are visible in Kerala, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, with different parties benefiting in each case. Parties with disproportionately large seat shares under the current FPTP system thus have a built-in political incentive to challenge the Government’s delimitation proposals, but one which entrenches a disproportionate democratic model.   Why proportional representation might make a difference  Despite the complications that FPTP creates, electoral reform might also provide a way out of the re-apportionment quandary. A more proportional electoral system, such as the Single Transferable Vote (STV) model where voters select their preference candidates for multi-member constituencies, would take some of the sting out of the current debate. Gone would be the incentive for parties such as

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Unpacking the Results of the 2025 England Local Elections

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Authors: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk; Amy Wonnacott, Research Intern The results of the May 2025 local elections in England caught the eye within hours of being announced. This is in no small part because of the 677 seats gained by Reform UK, which at the last set of elections in 2021 held no local council seats at all. A close analysis of the available data reveals that whilst Reform UK and the Liberal Democrats made some significant gains, both parties disproportionately benefited from the First-Past-the-Post electoral system. These results, viewed in context, should open up conversations around electoral reform towards more proportional representation at both local and national level.   Table 1 displays the total vote and seat share for each party, based on available data.  Total Council Data: 2025  Party  Total Seats Won  Vote Share  Seat Share  Reform UK  677  32.3%  45.9%  Liberal Democrats  370  15.5%  21.3%  Conservative  319  21.7%  16.8%  Labour  98  14.7%  6.4%  Green  79  9.0%  5.4%  Table 1: total seats won, vote share and seat share in the May 2025 council elections. As of 8 May 2025, vote share data was missing for Cornwall County Council.    First-Past-the-Post favoured Reform UK and the Liberal Democrats  The First-Past-the-Post electoral system was used across all the mayoral and council elections that took place in May 2025. For the Cambridgeshire & Peterborough, Doncaster, North Tyneside and West of England mayoralties, this marks a shift from the Supplementary Vote system used in 2021. Under the Supplementary Vote, voters can choose a first preference candidate and a second preference candidate from another party; under First-Past-the-Post, they have only one option. Across 22 of the 23 councils contested, both Reform UK and the Liberal Democrats won a greater share of seats (45.9% and 21.3%) than their respective vote shares (32.3% and 15.5%). Labour, by contrast won a much lower seat share (6.4%) than its vote share (14.7%), which nevertheless was only the fourth highest amongst England’s major parties.   Figure 1: vote share and seat share for the 2025 council elections, for the five main parties. Data from Cornwall County Council was not available as of 8 May 2025.  Some council results saw significantly disproportionate advantages or disadvantages for specific parties, as detailed in Table 2.  Council  Party  Vote Share  Seat Share  Cambridgeshire  Liberal Democrats  27.4%  50.8%  Doncaster  Reform UK  36.2%  67.3%  Durham  Labour  20.9%  4.1%  Gloucestershire  Liberal Democrats  27.2%  49.1%  Kent  Reform  37.0%  70.4%  North Northamptonshire  Labour  17.0%  1.0%  Oxfordshire  Reform  17.8%  1.0%  Staffordshire  Reform  41.0%  79.0%  Table 2: a selection of council results where vote share and seat share were significantly disproportionate.  These figures highlight how the First-Past-the-Post electoral system can produce significantly disproportional outcomes in specific areas. This is typically because of the uneven distribution of votes for any given party across the wards that make up each council area. Sam Freedman highlights that under the First-Past-the-Post system, there is a ‘tipping point’ where vote share produces a disproportionately greater seat share. The available data from the 2025 local elections suggests that the ‘tipping point’ was around 27%. This is shown from the results in Cambridgeshire and Gloucestershire identified in Table 2, as well as the results from Northumberland. There, Reform UK won 33.3% of the seats on 29.3% of the votes, the Conservatives won 37.7% of the seats on 28.9% of the votes and Labour only 11.6% of the seats on 22.3% of the votes. With a more proportional electoral system, we would expect to see Reform UK and the Conservatives winning an almost identical number of seats, with Labour slightly further behind; under First-Past-the-Post, the Conservatives won 26 seats of the available 69, Reform UK won 23 and Labour only 8.  In these elections, it appears that just over a quarter of the vote is sufficient for a party to secure a disproportionately greater seat share.  Reform UK gained votes from both the Conservatives and Labour  Reform UK gained overall control of 10 out of the 23 councils where elections were held. A comparison between the 2025 vote and seat shares in these councils and the equivalent data from the 2021 elections suggests that Reform UK’s gains have largely been at the expense of the Conservatives, and to a lesser extent from Labour. As seen from Figure 2, the Conservatives’ vote share considerably fell from 2021 to 2025 in these 10 council areas. The scale of the Conservatives’ losses are not enough to account for all of Reform UK’s gains in these areas. As a result, these gains are likely down to ‘new’ voters (who did not vote at all in the 2021 elections) and losses from Labour to Reform UK. The changes in seat share – from 62% to 15% for the Conservatives, and 26% to 5% for Labour – are exacerbated by the unpredictability of the First-Past-the-Post electoral system, as highlighted above. These shifts reinforce the fragmented multi-party picture of British democracy that emerged from the 2024 General Election.   Figure 2: vote share and seat share for each of the five main parties in councils where Reform gained overall control in 2025, with the equivalent figures from the 2021 elections for each party.    Proportionality must be viewed in the context of turnout  The results of these local elections must also be viewed in the context of the turnout. The average turnout (from the 11 councils where data is available as of 8 May 2025) was 33.7%. This means that in the councils where Reform UK gained overall control, it won 65% of the seats from only around 13% of registered voters actually having voted for it. Available data from LG Inform highlights that average turnout in local elections since 2015 has been consistently between 30% and 35%. Turnout at the 2024 General Election, by contrast, was 59%. As a result, there is a need for caution before extrapolating too far from the local election results to Westminster constituency results in a General Election. Nevertheless, attention to the turnout figures further highlights that

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From Risk to Reward: The Strategic Edge of Conscious Governance

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Author: sachin nandha, trustee and director In boardrooms across the world, sustainability remains too often treated as a compliance obligation. Often it takes the form of a checklist to satisfy ESG disclosure requirements, reputational expectations, or LP due diligence. That framing, while once sufficient, is no longer fit for purpose. Environmental disruption, legal risk, and capital market realignment have moved sustainability from the periphery to the core of strategic governance.  According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report 2024, four of the top five risks facing the global economy by both likelihood and impact are environmental in nature, including extreme weather, biodiversity loss, and natural resource scarcity. These are not hypothetical challenges. They are today’s boardroom concerns. For directors, especially those leading private equity-backed firms, the question is not whether to act, but how fast their governance models can adapt.  Why This Matters: The Fiduciary Case for Sustainability  This is not a philosophical debate. It is a fiduciary reckoning.  Institutional capital is already moving. Morningstar reports that sustainable funds attracted nearly $30 billion in net inflows in Q3 2023, even as traditional equity and bond funds saw net outflows. CalPERS, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, and Temasek have embedded ESG as core screening criteria, not as a matter of optics, but of resilience and returns.  McKinsey’s 2020 research confirmed that companies with high ESG performance achieved valuation premiums of 10–20% in M&A transactions. Harvard Business School studies show that ESG-integrated firms significantly outperform peers in both profitability and equity returns over the long term. LPs are responding accordingly. BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, now asks companies to demonstrate how sustainability is integrated into long-term strategy, not just risk registers.  This reshapes the capital formation landscape. General partners who lag on sustainability integration may not just lose reputational standing, but they may lose access to capital.  The Rising Tide of Litigation and Regulation  Risk perception is being redefined in real time. The traditional model: governance through quarterly financial oversight and legal compliance is being displaced by a new standard: governance through strategic foresight.  Legal liability is expanding. As of 2023, over 2,500 climate-related legal actions have been filed globally. A landmark example is ClientEarth v. Shell plc (2023), in which the environmental law firm took direct legal action against Shell’s board of directors under the UK Companies Act for failing to manage climate risk as a fiduciary duty. While the case was dismissed, it has set a powerful precedent for future litigation.  Meanwhile, regulators are raising the bar. The EU’s Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) will now apply to over 50,000 companies, including non-EU entities with significant European operations. These firms must disclose governance structures, environmental impact, and forward-looking sustainability metrics under the European Sustainability Reporting Standards (ESRS) by 2025. In the U.S., the SEC’s proposed climate-related disclosure rules, although contested, signal growing convergence between ESG and financial materiality.  Boards, and particularly their chairs, can no longer afford to treat sustainability as an “externality” managed by consultants. They must take direct ownership of ESG oversight and future-proofing.  Private Equity: Positioned to Lead, or to Lag  If this is a governance reset, private equity has a competitive advantage—if it chooses to use it.  Unlike listed companies constrained by diffuse shareholding, PE-backed businesses are governed by tightly aligned boards with short chains of command and long-term planning horizons. This structural clarity should, in theory, make them ideal platforms for ESG integration.  Consider KKR’s Green Portfolio Program, which embedded environmental efficiency practices into 27 portfolio companies, yielding more than $1.2 billion in cost savings while delivering measurable improvements in resource usage. The takeaway is clear: sustainability can drive operational alpha.  But beyond operational gains lies reputational capital. Firms with demonstrable ESG performance are increasingly winning the most attractive bids, gaining regulatory goodwill, and attracting premium buyers at exit. In a world where margin compression and geopolitical uncertainty loom large, sustainability offers something rare: strategic upside with defensive value.  What Conscious Boards Actually Do  Moving from compliance to consciousness does not mean adopting a moral posture. It means developing a deeper, more systemic awareness of the forces shaping risk, value, and legitimacy. Conscious boards embed this thinking into their processes. Five actions distinguish them:  Redefining Materiality They expand beyond traditional financial risk to include upstream ecological stress, labour conditions, and emerging regulatory frameworks, well before they become liabilities.  Diversifying Expertise They bring domain-specific knowledge into the boardroom, whether in environmental systems, supply chain resilience, or digital ethics and avoid groupthink driven by finance-only profiles.  Integrating Long-Term Strategy They view climate and social instability as long-horizon risks that affect valuation at exit and beyond, and they design incentive structures to match that horizon.  Rewiring Executive Accountability They tie CEO and C-suite compensation to ESG performance metrics, not just adjusted EBITDA, making sustainability a matter of leadership credibility.  Engaging Broader Stakeholders They recognise that employees, communities, and regulators are not “external actors” but influence licence to operate, reputational stability, and future deal access.  The PE chair’s playbook: Rethinking governance at the top  For a PE chairman, the challenge is now one of vision and discipline. The firm’s value creation plan must be matched by a governance plan that reflects the new realities of risk and reputation. This does not mean abandoning the principles of high-performance capitalism. It means upgrading them.  Firms must be proactive in asking:  Do our portfolio boards have ESG-literate directors?  Are we monitoring litigation and regulatory exposure beyond national borders?  Are ESG concerns embedded in our value creation plans, or tacked on in the final year before exit?  Can we credibly defend our strategy if challenged by an LP, regulator, or any stakeholder?  The Opportunity Ahead  The boards that embrace this shift will enjoy three key advantages: access to capital from forward-looking LPs, higher exit valuations through operational and reputational premiums, and a lower long-term risk profile in an increasingly volatile operating environment.  At the International Centre for Sustainability, we believe that this decade will define the next generation of boardroom leadership. Governance is no

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Examining India’s role as a rising space power – what duties does it have to encourage responsible space behaviours? 

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Author: Amy Wonnacott, Research Intern Upon the mention of ‘space power’, our first thought will undoubtedly be of the US and Russia (former USSR) in the context of the Space Race. Sputnik, Apollo and the ISS spring to mind. Yet India’s contribution to outer space exploration is comparatively less well-known. The Indian space agency is one of the oldest in the world: established in 1962, it launched its first satellite in 1975 and as recently as August 2023 became the fourth country to land a probe on the moon. These efforts rarely make headlines in the UK. This may be because, until the start of this century, India’s achievements in outer space have emphasised regional socio-economic development, not the technological power projection that characterised the Space Race.   India’s space programme, directed by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has entered an ambitious new phase. With plans to launch a fully operational space station by 2035 and its first crewed mission, Gaganyaan, scheduled for 2026, the country is steadily advancing toward ‘space power’ status. Recent milestones like the successful Chandrayaan-3 lunar landing in 2023 and the SpaDeX satellite docking demonstration in March 2025 showcase ISRO’s growing technical capacity.   Despite the strategic importance of outer space, the underlying principle of all human space endeavour is ‘for the benefit of all mankind’. Every space-faring nation has a duty to adopt responsible space behaviours that are peaceful, transparent, sustainable and cooperative. As India’s ambitions for outer space grow, it can have a meaningful impact by actively demonstrating how responsible behaviours can be incorporated into an ambitious space program, and that advancement in the space domain can be conducted with a commitment to sustainability. If India succeeds in this regard, it may raise international standards for space sustainability and boost accountability in this field.  Defining Responsible Space Behaviours  Contrary to the vastness of outer space, Earth’s orbit is a limited resource. In the early days of space exploration, the orbital environment was largely empty and the need to protect it felt distant. Today, space is firmly embedded in daily life from navigation and communication to climate monitoring. With a surge in new space actors, both state and commercial, the challenges have increased: overcrowded orbits, limited regulation, and an absence of binding international space law.   The most significant threat to the orbital space environment is space debris – defunct, human-generated objects in Earth’s orbit such as broken satellites and rocket bodies. There are currently over 40,000 debris fragments larger than 10cm, which could cause significant damage in the event of a collision. Continued production of space debris will lead to Kessler Syndrome, a continuous chain reaction of in-orbit collisions that render space unusable. Current efforts to mitigate this threat are insufficient. It is therefore crucial that all space actors adhere to international guidelines and actively work towards debris mitigation and sustainable space missions.   Measures to ensure space sustainability can be seen as part of a wider category of responsible space behaviours. These voluntary commitments, outlined by the UN in documents such as the 2021 report on reducing space threats, are crucial for increased transparency of outer space actions, reducing hostility. Responsible space behaviours can be summarised as actions which are peaceful, transparent, sustainable and cooperative. These behaviours need to be integrated in all aspects of space activity, both scientific and strategic. As an actor with strong presence in both, India’s adherence to these behaviours is crucial on its path to becoming a space power.   Encouraging responsible space behaviours   ISRO’s focus on socio-economic development puts India in a strong position to champion sustainability in space. But how does India demonstrate space behaviours that are peaceful, transparent, sustainable and cooperative?  Peaceful  The development of ISRO has maintained a focus on space for socio-economic development and not for security. Its first significant project was the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) programme for monitoring agriculture, land and water resources in response to the needs of the nation. However, outer space dynamics are increasingly representative of earth-based geopolitics. Regional terrestrial rivalries are reflected in the race to develop advanced space technologies. In addition to scientific research and sustainability developments, both China and India have made significant advancements in counter-space capability  through the militarisation of their space programs since 2007. From this, it is clear that geopolitics has begun to influence India’s space program, extending its rivalry with China for regional dominance into the outer space domain. While India may perceive these developments as necessary to mitigate a security threat, it is crucial that strategic priorities are compatible with international norms, and signal to the world that India is sensitive to ensuring peaceful behaviours in space, while ensuring its own security.   Transparent  India has been an active member of UN space forums, including chairing the Long-Term Sustainability Working Group in 2021 and supporting international dialogue and information sharing. Technologically, Space Situational Awareness (SSA), the ability to monitor and predict the location of objects in space, is crucial way to increase transparency.  While all space powers have SSA capability to a certain extent, the USA has the most developed system and leads in sharing this data with other space-faring nations. In 2023, ISRO announced the creation of the Space Situational Awareness Control Centre to develop its own SSA capability. By developing and sharing its own capability, India contributes to the transparency and understanding of the outer space environment and solidifies itself as a key leader in responsible behaviours.   Sustainable  In 2024, India pledged to achieve Debris-Free Space Missions (DFSM) by 2030, echoing the European Space Agency’s Zero Debris Charter. This is a key commitment, recognising the threat of space debris and the subsequent actions to be taken. Yet the true test of sustainable space behaviours is seen in practice, and ISRO’s recent technical achievements have made significant progress, bringing it in line with the US’ advanced reusable space technologies. Reusable launch vehicles (RLV) reduce manufacturing expenses and reduce the amount of waste. Presently, the only active RLVs have been developed by

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India-Pakistan Tensions – Key Developments & Future Risk Part 2

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Compiled by: Shruti Kapil, Head of Security & Mutual Dependence Desk and Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk In the aftermath of Pakistan’s drone and missile barrage and India’s intensifying Operation Sindoor, the Indo-Pak conflict has entered a volatile but strategically restrained phase. This briefing cuts through the fog of ongoing skirmishes to examine the broader military, political, and societal implications of the standoff. It details India’s assertive yet calibrated military retaliation and its use of satellite intelligence and cyber capabilities, while spotlighting Pakistan’s asymmetrical strategy and growing internal military rifts. The report underscores India’s economic and defence superiority but warns that Pakistan’s nuclear posture and instability in Balochistan and Kashmir could trigger unintended escalations. Internationally, the UK is positioned as a key de-escalatory actor, though risks to domestic cohesion are rising—especially from diaspora-driven polarisation and religiously charged misinformation. The paper urges a proactive diplomatic strategy and domestic vigilance to contain the conflict’s ripple effects and avert wider destabilisation. Read the full briefing here: India-Pakistan Tensions Key Developments & Future Risk Part 2

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India-Pakistan Tensions – Key Developments & Future Risk

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Compiled by: Shruti Kapil, Head of Security & Mutual Dependence Desk and Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk Weeks after the Pahalgam terror attack and India’s subsequent Operation Sindoor, tensions between India and Pakistan remain volatile but contained. This briefing note goes beyond the immediate violence to assess the strategic, diplomatic, and societal ripples that continue to unfold. It highlights India’s calibrated military response and diplomatic outreach, Pakistan’s retaliatory rhetoric and shelling, and the uneasy calm that now defines the Line of Control. Critically, the report warns of rising risks to UK social cohesion, as polarised narratives—particularly linking Kashmir to other global conflicts—gain traction in diaspora communities. As geopolitical posturing continues, the paper calls for a clear-eyed, de-escalatory international approach and vigilant domestic management to prevent further instability. Read the full briefing here: India-Pakistan Tensions Key Developments & Future Risk

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Understanding the UK-India FTA

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Authors: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk; Amy Wonnacott, Research Intern; Zoe Neiman, Research Intern The UK-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA), agreed yesterday after years of negotiation, marks a critical moment in the evolving relationship between the two countries. With India poised to become the world’s third-largest economy by the end of the decade, and its middle class expected to reach 60 million by 2030, and 250 million by 2050, the agreement provides the UK with preferential access to one of the fastest-growing consumer markets. By 2035, Indian demand for imports is projected to exceed £1.4 trillion, offering vast opportunities for British exporters and service providers. The economic benefits for both countries could be significant.   £ billion estimate, applied to 2040 predications Percentage change Change in UK GDP + £4.8 billion +0.1% Change in UK exports to India + £15.7 billion +59.4% Change in UK imports from India + £9.8 billion +25.0% Change in total trade between the UK and India +£25.5 billion +38.8% Source: DBT Modelling Sectors Covered by the Agreement The FTA spans a broad range of sectors, offering benefits for both countries. Tariff Reductions The tariff reductions secured under the deal are among the most generous India has ever agreed to. Indian tariffs on 90% of UK export lines will be reduced, with 85% going tariff-free within a decade. Based on 2022 trade figures, Indian tariff reductions will save UK exporters £400 million in the first year and £900 million annually in ten years. As high priority trade partners, the UK and Indian governments have set an ambitious target of $1 trillion export growth by 2030, facilitated by the mutual concessions in this FTA. Goods Previous tariff FTA tariff India Tariffs on UK Alcohol 150% 75%, 40% over decade Automotive 100% 10%, quota system Cosmetics 10-20% 0% Source: GOV.uk Social security benefits Alongside the FTA, the UK and India have “agreed to negotiate” a reciprocal agreement on social security contributions. This would ensure that British workers seconded to India and Indian workers seconded to the UK need only pay National Insurance and its Indian equivalent, a contribution to the Employees’ Provident Fund, in their home country, avoiding ‘double contribution’. The proposed Double Contributions Convention also extends the period of time for which temporary workers contribute to social security in their home country from 1 to 3 years. This has been criticised in the UK for ‘undercutting’ British workers. However, according to the UK’s Business Secretary, Jonathan Reynolds, this applies only to seconded workers, and mirrors agreements the UK has with the EU, Switzerland, Japan, Chile and South Korea. The workers affected would not gain new rights to access benefits, and Indian workers would still have to pay the NHS surcharge in the UK, which totals £1035 per year. This will not incentivise British businesses to recruit Indian workers over British ones, but does give Indian businesses a competitive advantage over other countries with which the UK lacks such an agreement. Higher education and the legal sector There is speculation that the FTA could present an opportunity for British and Indian businesses to pioneer new commercial ventures, including in AI and cybersecurity, bringing benefits to sectors such as higher education. This is a developing market in India: the University of Southampton opened its Delhi campus in July 2025, Coventry University will open in GIFT City (Gujarat International Finance-Tech City) in 2026, and the University of York plans to open a campus in Mumbai. Though the FTA may encourage further transnational educational initiatives, it has no specific reference either to this, or the greater availability of student visas for Indian international students to the UK. The legal sector is another area of potential UK-India collaboration. It was announced in January 2025 that English-qualified lawyers could register to practice permanently in India, liberalising India’s legal market. Yet this has faced pushback from the Society of Indian Law Firms, and concrete progress remains to be seen. The FTA includes no direct reference to the legal sector, which the Law Society views as a “missed opportunity”. Why is this good for the UK and India? This FTA is the most economically significant bilateral trade deal the UK has made since leaving the EU. The forecasted economic benefits for the UK are significant, contributing to the government’s Plan for Change. Modelling by the UK Department of Business and Trade predicts the deal to add £4.8 billion to the UK economy, and increase wages by £2.2 billion each year. For India, the reduction of tariffs in key sectors such as green energy, medical and life sciences will be crucial for its growth trajectory. India’s energy strategy remains reliant on coal, but aims for net-zero emissions by 2070 and has set ambitious targets towards solar and renewables. Facilitating trade in renewable energy equipment will support India’s transition, alongside the opportunity to use expertise from UK businesses and government procurement.  Healthcare is one of India’s largest sectors and is projected to reach $194 billion by 2032. Lowering tariffs on British exports of medical goods will facilitate this rapid growth, improving care quality and reducing the cost of private healthcare. Importantly, the FTA provides a platform from which other deals could be negotiated. Proposals for a follow-up Investment Treaty have been discussed, and the FTA offers the opportunity to deepen economic and strategic ties between two powerful economies, while supporting both manufacturers and consumers and UK presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

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India’s ‘Opportunity’ in the US-China Trade War: Trump’s Strategy Behind India Tariffs 

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Author: Zoe Neiman, Research Intern India is widely recognised as a major economy, yet remains one of the most protectionist, having maintained high import tariffs long before Trump’s new trade measures. India’s average tariff rate for trading partners is among the highest for major economies, averaging 13.8% compared to the US’ 3.3%. Certain Indian sectors like agriculture, automobiles and electronics are protected by even steeper duties. India’s protectionism has historical roots in its post-independence strategy of economic self-reliance, shaped by fears of foreign domination, to safeguard domestic industries from hyper-scaled foreign competitors. However, in today’s globalised economy, such a defensive stance risks limiting India’s growth and competitiveness, signifying it is time to reconsider and reduce protectionist barriers. This enduring protectionism has drawn criticism from the Trump administration. He repeatedly cites examples such as the high import duty on Harley-Davidson motorcycles and strong trade barriers on Indian agriculture, arguing the US is being taken advantage of in trade deals. Trump characterises India as the ‘tariff king’, highlighting the disparity between US openness to imports and India’s restrictive barriers. His administration’s retaliatory tariffs were presented as corrective measures aimed at rebalancing trade relationships and pressuring India to reduce its protectionist policy, paving the way for a more reciprocal bilateral trading relationship. Why then, are the tariffs imposed on India so trivial in comparison to its competitors in the region? These tariffs serve to mask a wider calculated strategy, that of continuing Biden’s strategic partnership with India as a counter to China in the Indo-Pacific.  US Tariffs Strengthened Indian Competitiveness  At first glance, India appears to be hard-hit by the 26% US tariffs, particularly in sectors like textiles, electronics, and engineering. However, crucial exports such as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, copper, and energy products remain untaxed. Pharmaceuticals, in particular, were spared due to their importance to the US, with 30% of Indian pharmaceutical exports directed to American markets. Agricultural exports are expected to remain stable or even grow, and India’s electronics and textiles sectors are advantageously positioned, as rival exporters like China (54-79%), Vietnam (46%) and Bangladesh (37%) face much steeper duties. India’s textiles sector is set to gain from the tariffs, as the US is already placed as India’s largest buyer accounting for $10 billion of India’s $36 billion exports in 2023-2024. Additionally, sectors dominated by China and Thailand, such as machinery, automobiles and toys, are vulnerable to tariff-driven supply chain shifts, presenting India with an opportunity to attract investment. Altogether, these subtleties reveal that rather than punishing India, Trump’s strategy strengthens Indian competitiveness, showing the hollowness of his ‘tariff king’ rhetoric.   Bipartisan Prioritisation of India  In 2017, Trump had shifted toward strategic alignment with India, reviving the Quad and placing India under Strategic Trade Authorisation Level 1, equal to NATO allies. Biden’s administration significantly expanded upon and institutionalised the US-India partnership, recognising India’s significance for the US’ wider ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy. Developments such as the iCET Initiative (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology), and expanding defence cooperation by increasing military interoperability, joint exercises and agreements like BECA and COMCASA solidified the comprehensive strategic partnership. Biden also elevated India’s role in the Quad and made US-India joint training the most frequent bilateral defence cooperation. Under Biden, the US became India’s largest trading partner, with US goods exports to India at $41.8 billion and Indian exports to the US at $87.4 billion in 2024. India’s trade deficit with the US stands at $45.7 billion (2024) with strong reciprocal trade, whilst it has reached $99.2 billion with China at the beginning of this year.    When analysing the current administration’s India policy, there is a continuation and development of this approach. Looking past Trump’s rhetoric, largely condemning the Biden administration in all policy areas, there is a sharpened strategic commitment to India. Through the expansion of defence cooperation, joint military exercises, promoting arms sales and the co-production of technology, Trump has continued the path set by Biden. Equally, in the economic sector, the tariffs imposed have not translated into a rupture of US-India relations. Rather, it has generated greater momentum for the US-India FTA, to further formalise US-India economic ties. During the 90-day pause set by the Trump administration on 9 April 2025, the US has prioritised bilateral trade negotiations with India, stating a comprehensive FTA will be reached in autumn 2025. Trump has also expressed intent to revive American manufacturing and reduce dependency on China, creating opportunities for India in tech, electronics and manufacturing. India’s manufacturing sector as a whole is not yet strong enough to compete with China. Infrastructure deficiencies, a complex regulatory environment and labour reforms, high input costs, and skilled labour shortages plague Indian manufacturing development, decreasing the likelihood of India maximising on the emerging shift away from Chinese manufacturing. Still, recent developments such as Apple’s decision to relocate all US iPhone production from China to India highlight a growing commitment to de-risking from Chinese supply chains and positioning India as a preferred alternative. Trump’s strategy will further initiatives like Biden’s iCET, continuing India’s inclusion in secure supply chains, albeit framed in terms of economic nationalism rather than cooperative globalisation.   The timing and framing of these tariffs serve two strategic purposes. First, they obscure the continuity between Trump and Biden’s approaches by packaging the policy in economic nationalist rhetoric for domestic political purposes, while quietly expanding cooperation in critical sectors. Second, by presenting the tariffs as part of a universal ‘fair trade’ framework, the US allows its strategic alignment with India, principally in countering China’s trade practices and Indo-Pacific aggression, to remain subtle yet effective. This positioning enables India to absorb foreign investment and supply chain shifts away from China and benefit from trade realignment, all while reinforcing the US-India relationship. In this way, Trump’s tariffs operate less as punitive measures and more as tools to reinforce a strategic partnership already cultivated under Biden, now advancing under a different guise.  Towards Shared Strategic Interests   Recent developments have further revealed this calibrated approach. Vice President Vance’s visit to India was presented

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Securing India’s Future: Lessons from the Pahalgam Terror Attack

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Author: sachin nandha, trustee and director On 25th April at around 2:50pm, a clear afternoon, in the meadows of Pahalgam—a town long associated with Kashmir’s serene beauty and emerging peace—terror struck with ruthless precision. The attack was not random. It was a deliberate assault on the fragile but real gains that Kashmir, and India more broadly, have painstakingly nurtured over the past decade. See Understanding Kashmir post 370. Beyond the immediate tragedy, the Pahalgam attack compels us to ask deeper questions: How must India’s security architecture evolve to meet the demands of an era defined by hybrid threats, proxy warfare, and disinformation? And more fundamentally, how must India’s society renew its long-term commitment to resilience—not just in tactical terms, but as a civilisational imperative? Pahalgam: More Than a Town, A Symbol Pahalgam has, over recent years, become emblematic of a new narrative in Kashmir: one of reconciliation, tourism, and quiet normalcy. Visitors flocked to its valleys, hospitality flourished, and the region began to shed the heavy legacy of insurgency and militarisation. Striking Pahalgam, therefore, was more than an act of terror—it was an attack on the very idea that Kashmir could move beyond cycles of fear. It was designed to reignite trauma, to destabilise confidence, and to fracture India’s carefully woven fabric of recovery. Understanding this symbolic dimension is essential. Security is not just about preventing physical attacks. It is about safeguarding progress itself. A Response Marked by Professionalism It is important to note that the immediate security response to the Pahalgam attack was commendable.  Coordination between agencies was swift, professional, and effective demonstrating that many structural reforms implemented over the past decade have matured into real operational capacity. Even critical observers across political lines have acknowledged the absence of major lapses in either intelligence response or tactical execution. In this specific case, it is perhaps more accurate to describe the operational environment as an intelligence black area:Signals were sparse, patterns were diffuse, and no significant early-warning indicators were available. Thus, while there was no actionable failure, the event reaffirms the need for continual enhancement of India’s intelligence synthesis capabilities—especially in challenging terrains where information gaps persist. Strengthening the Foundations for the Future Building on these gains, India must continue strengthening its security architecture—not as a criticism of what was lacking at Pahalgam, but as a proactive investment in future resilience. First, institutional coordination must be permanently embedded. The establishment of a Unified Security Command at the regional level ensures that in more complex, multi-site scenarios, the clarity of command remains robust. Second, intelligence must be fused, not just collected. Regional Intelligence Fusion Centres, integrating inputs from human, technical, and local sources in real time, can better address intelligence black spaces—especially in an era where adversaries are innovating faster than traditional structures can adapt. Third, strategic vigilance must be redundant but discreet. In Kashmir today, security is increasingly invisible by design—a sign of success, not weakness. Maintaining layers of unseen resilience—through surveillance technologies, predictive analysis, and rapid response forces—ensures that normal life can flourish without overt securitisation. The Cross-Border Reality: Old Tactics, Evolving Strategies The persistence of cross-border terror infrastructures is a reality India cannot ignore.  Groups operating from Pakistani territory, often with varying degrees of state support or tacit complicity, continue to act as force multipliers for instability. While India’s international diplomatic efforts to expose and isolate such tactics are important, the primary lesson is clear: self-reliance is paramount. After the Uri attack in 2016, India’s doctrinal shift toward surgical strikes and proactive countermeasures demonstrated that deterrence can and must be enforced when necessary.The Balakot air strikes of 2019 further expanded India’s willingness to act beyond its borders to defend national security. Pahalgam reaffirms this trajectory. A sustainable security strategy must retain full-spectrum deterrence capabilities—including covert disruption, strategic messaging, economic countermeasures, and calibrated kinetic options. Hybrid Warfare: Securing the Physical and the Psychological The Pahalgam attack was not confined to the physical realm. Within hours, manipulated videos, false flag narratives, and communal polarization efforts began to circulate across social media platforms.  This is the signature of hybrid warfare:The blending of physical attacks with psychological operations to fragment, disorient, and weaken societies from within. India’s security doctrine must now formally treat strategic communications, information security, and societal resilience as critical domains of national defence. Dedicated information command units, real-time media monitoring cells, and partnerships with civil society actors must become the norm, not the exception. India must not only defeat attacks on its borders. It must also defend truth itself. Technology, Human Capital, and Sustainable Security India has rightly invested heavily in security technology, from AI surveillance to smart fencing and sensor networks. However, one key insight from global military practice must be emphasised: Technology must augment high-quality human capital, not substitute for it. In Western military models, technological investments build upon strong human analytic and operational capacities. For India to fully realise the dividends of its technological investments, parallel investments must be made in training, leadership development, and systemic human capital uplift across security forces. Only when people and technology evolve together can true operational transformation occur. Global Context: A Broader Trend What India faces is not unique. The use of disinformation alongside kinetic action is now a staple of global conflicts—from the Ukraine-Russia war to operations in the Middle East. This underscores another vital point: India’s experience, and India’s innovations in hybrid defence, will have global relevance. As India’s geopolitical stature rises, so too will the necessity of sharing best practices, building resilience networks, and shaping global norms for hybrid conflict response. In that sense, India’s fight is part of a broader human struggle—to defend open societies against forces that seek to corrode them from within. Toward a Sustainable Security Strategy From Pahalgam, several imperatives emerge clearly: Operationalise Unified Commands: Seamless, multi-agency coordination must be built into daily operations. Create Regional Intelligence Fusion Centres: Actionable intelligence must move rapidly to prevent, not just respond to, attacks. Maintain Strategic Vigilance: Invisible but constant layers of security must protect

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