Research Articles

Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk The 2024 General Election in the UK has brought an end to 14 years of Conservative government, ushering in a Labour regime with a landslide election victory. Of the 650 seats in the UK Parliament, the Labour Party has won 412, with the Conservatives on 121, and the Liberal Democrats on 71, on a turnout of 60%.[i] This represents the largest majority in the UK Parliament since the New Labour victory in 1997. However, the result has troubling implications both for the UK’s First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) electoral system and the prospects for reform, and will also shape the legitimacy of the new government’s major policy and constitutional reform proposals. FPTP and the 2024 General Election Results Under FPTP in the UK, Members of Parliament are elected in 650 single-member constituencies across the country. These are winner-takes-all contests: the candidate with the most votes will win the seat, even if they fall short of an overall majority. In the 2024 General Election, this has produced the following results: Party Seats Seat Share Votes Vote Share Votes per Seat Labour 412 63.4% 9,804,655 33.7% 23,798 Conservatives 121 18.6% 6,827,311 23.7% 56,424 Liberal Democrats 72 11.1% 3,519,199 12.2% 48,878 Scottish National Party (SNP) 9 1.4% 724,758 2.5% 80,529 Sinn Fein 7 1.1% 210,891 0.7% 30,127 Independent 6 0.9% 564,243 2.0% 94,041 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 5 0.8% 172,058 0.6% 34,412 Reform UK 5 0.8% 4,117,221 14.3% 823,444 Green Parties 4 0.6% 1,943,265 6.7% 485,816 Plaid Cymru 4 0.6% 194,811 0.7% 48,703 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 2 0.3% 86,861 0.3% 43,431 Alliance Party 1 0.2% 117,191 0.4% 117,191 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 1 0.2% 94,779 0.3% 94,779 Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 1 0.2% 48,685 0.2% 48,685 Table 1: UK General Election Results 2024 The table above indicates some startling results. The total number of votes won by Labour is smaller than in the 2019 General Election by around half a million,[ii] yet this translated in 2024 to more than double the number of seats. Reform UK won the third-highest number of popular votes yet rank only joint seventh-highest (including the grouping of Independent MPs) in terms of seat share. Indeed, its vote share across the UK was higher than that of the Liberal Democrats, which won more than 14 times the number of seats. To gain any one seat, the Green Party needed over 20 times as many votes as Labour did for their respective seats, and Reform UK required almost 35 times as many votes. This indicates significant disparities in respect of the practical impact of individual votes under the current FPTP system in the UK. The data above verifies the pre-election predictions that this contest would produce one of the most disproportionate Parliaments in the history of the UK. FPTP has proven itself unsuitable to translating citizens’ preferences into legislative representation in what has become a genuine multi-party landscape. This reduces the extent to which the UK’s representative democratic system can be considered genuine popular self-government, the principle at the heart of modern democracy. Against this background, the case for reform is overwhelming. Alternatives to FPTP Amongst the alternatives, two forms of proportional representation emerge as potential candidates. The first is the nationwide system of proportional representation (PR) used in countries such as the Netherlands and Israel. Under this form of PR, the entire country acts as a ‘nationwide’ constituency, with seats in the legislature allocated in proportion to the number of votes cast for each party using either the d’Hondt or Saint-Lague formulas. Some such systems have a minimum overall threshold of votes which parties must reach to win a seat. This is designed to protect against the fragmentation of legislatures that would otherwise result from the representation of several small parties.[iii] However, a ‘nationwide’ constituency is not an appropriate hypothetical framework for any UK-wide election. Where the PR constituency is ‘nationwide’, all the political parties on the ballot paper must be nationwide political parties. This is because neither the d’Hondt nor the Saint-Lague systems for allocating seats are designed to differentiate between regional and national parties; this must instead be done when designing the constituencies for a PR system. The UK has several regional parties: the Scottish National Party only contests seats in Scotland, Plaid Cymru only contests seats in Wales, and Northern Ireland has its own political parties not found elsewhere in the UK (including Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party). Were the UK analysed as a ‘nationwide’ constituency using the d’Hondt formula and the number of votes actually cast for each party in the 2024 election, the following results might hypothetically be produced:[iv] Party Votes Vote Share Seats Seat Share Labour 9,804,655 33.7% 229 35.2% Conservatives 6,827,311 23.7% 159 24.5% Reform UK 4,117,221 14.3% 96 14.8% Liberal Democrats 3,519,199 12.2% 82 12.6% Green Parties 1,943,265 6.8% 45 6.9% SNP 724,758 2.5% 16 2.5% Sinn Fein 210,891 0.7% 4 0.6% Workers Party 210,194 0.7% 4 0.6% Plaid Cymru 194,811 0.7% 4 0.6% DUP 172,058 0.6% 4 0.6% Alliance Party 117,191 0.4% 2 0.3% UUP 94,779 0.3% 2 0.3% SDLP 86,861 0.3% 2 0.3% TUV 48,685 0.2% 1 0.2% Table 2: UK General Election Results 2024 – on ‘nationwide’ party list PR system With 326 seats required for an overall majority, a coalition would be required, with the most likely option being one between Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Parties (356 seats) producing a narrow majority. This would amount to 54.7% of the total seats in the UK Parliament on 52.7% of the popular vote, thus producing a considerably more proportionate outcome. Because the ‘nationwide’ constituency requires, in practice, a certain threshold of votes in order to secure a single seat, it is unlikely that any Independent candidates would be elected. However, it is unwise to draw major conclusions from this analysis, because it treats the SNP, Plaid Cymru and all the Northern Irish parties as if they were national parties. Given this, a preferable hypothetical model

Author: Pravar Petkar, Head of Strengthening Democracy Desk The world’s largest democratic exercise has now concluded. The BJP’s Prime Ministerial candidate and incumbent PM Narendra Modi is set for a third term in office. Yet the dynamics now are very different to those in 2014 and 2019: gone is the BJP’s overall majority; Modi instead must govern in a coalition with the BJP’s partners in the National Democratic Alliance, which collectively won 293 out of the 543 seats in India’s Lok Sabha (Lower House). The result shows India’s democracy is alive and kicking: to borrow Mark Twain’s phrase, reports of its death are greatly exaggerated. No democracy worth its salt can fail to have free and fair elections, with a peaceful transfer of power and the possibility that incumbents might be voted out. The results of the 2024 Lok Sabha elections show a democracy in action. From 2019, the BJP lost 63 seats (falling from 303 to 240), with the NDA as a whole dropping 60 seats. Conversely, the Indian National Congress (INC) almost doubled its vote share from 2019, rising from 52 seats to 99. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) of which the INC was part held only 91 seats in 2019, but the newly formed INDI Alliance (Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance), established before the campaign began, secured 234 seats in total. This represents a significant anti-incumbent swing, with around 642 million of the 970 million registered voters having turned out to vote (approximately 66%). This puts some perspective on allegations by the INC before the announcement of the results that the counting process was rigged in favour of the BJP. There is also little concrete evidence that Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) were manipulated, with the Supreme Court of India affirming the integrity of the process in April 2024. In fact, the celebration of the results by all the major parties only lends further credibility to India’s electoral arrangements. The results suggest that Indian democracy is shaped by a complex series of factors that cannot be reduced to the politics of religion. Some commentators have suggested that the BJP’s loss of seats demonstrates that economic issues will always trump the politics of religion. Whilst the BJP campaign did draw on religion – including an address by PM Modi in Rajasthan in which he claimed that under the INC, Muslims would have “the first right” over people’s wealth – both parties highlighted India’s current issues of youth unemployment. That said, the INC manifesto was headlined by a proposal for a nationwide socio-economic and caste census, and the promise of increased affirmative action for Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST) and Other Backward Class (OBC) groups. As they have in previous elections, caste politics may have shaped the outcomes in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state. For many, the question is whether the politics of religion have run aground on the rocks of democracy: the answer is not yet clear. For most, the outcome of these elections is rather unexpected. It had been assumed across the world in the lead-up that the BJP would secure another overall majority. Amit Shah, the Home Minister from 2019 to 2024, had even suggested that the NDA was aiming for 400 Lok Sabha seats, a record majority. It is difficult to square the BJP’s downturn with the view – expressed by the INC, members of the international media and academic commentators – that India had simply ceased to be a democracy between 2014 and 2024 because the BJP was in power. As Rahul Verma of the Centre for Policy Research in Delhi puts it, “the assertion that the erosion of democratic values is the creation of one party and its recent electoral success is an untenable oversimplification.” This is neither to obscure nor deny the religious nationalism of the 2019 BJP Government, or the way in which a one-party government has led to the centralisation of political authority in India. However, judgments about the health of any country’s democracy must be made based on structural and long-term factors, and as Verma suggests, by reference to standards attuned to each country’s unique institutional and cultural features. A flourishing and sustainable democracy does not cease to be so simply because a different party comes into power, nor does democracy suddenly become re-awakened when authoritarian, populist or anti-democratic parties are voted out. There are nevertheless two structural challenges to Indian democracy which are currently worthy of attention. First, recent commentary by the ICfS has noted issues in the appointment process for the Election Commission of India (ECI): after the Supreme Court of India had mandated the Leader of the Opposition’s involvement in appointments, the BJP Government legislated to replace the Leader of the Opposition with a Cabinet Minister instead. The natural conclusion is that a watchdog that ought to be independent has been politicised. This has raised questions around whether the ECI’s application of the Model Code of Conduct – including a finding that PM Modi’s Rajasthan speech violated the code – was truly objective, as violation notices were issued to both the INC and BJP as parties, rather than to individual candidates. Maintaining India’s long-term democratic health requires the new NDA Government to reverse these changes and safeguard the ECI’s independence. Second, questions persist over whether India’s regulatory framework for tackling AI-generated misinformation is up to scratch. The 2024 Lok Sabha election campaign saw deepfakes of Bollywood actors criticising PM Modi , as well as fabricated videos of two deceased politicians in Tamil Nadu addressing today’s voters. Recent Government-issued advisory notes emphasise the obligations upon social media platforms and AI companies to be transparent about AI-generated content and remove anything unlawful. However, the broader regulatory scheme exposes platforms to criminal liability for unlawful speech where content is flagged by Government-approved fact-checkers as ‘false’. This raises free speech concerns that go the heart of whether Indian citizens can make decisions at the ballot box based on a wide range of perspectives. With the BJP Government having

 ‘Power’, said Marcus Aurelius, ‘is something that can only be exercised within oneself, upon ones own mind – not outside events. Realise this, and you will find strength’. [Meditations, Book VI, Ch. 8] It is a question that we seldom ask these days – what really is power; where is it found; and how can it be really exercised? Power is a multifaceted concept that extends beyond mere authority or control. It is an intricate web of influence, perception, and ability to effect change. Defining power involves understanding its sources, mechanisms, and limitations. According to political theorist Robert A. Dahl, power is the ability of one actor to make another actor do something they would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1957). To What Extent Are People in Positions of Power Actually in Power? Prime ministers, ministers of state, and CEOs of large companies are often perceived as the epitome of power. However, their ability to exercise this power is frequently constrained by various factors. For instance, political leaders like Narendra Modi, or our own Prime minister Rishi Sunak, operate within a democratic framework where their decisions are subject to parliamentary approval, party politics, and public opinion. CEOs, despite their significant influence within their corporations, must answer to boards of directors, shareholders, and regulatory bodies. The limitations on their power are numerous. In democracies, politicians must navigate a labyrinth of bureaucracy, legal constraints, and public accountability. This often results in a dilution of their power as they are forced to compromise and negotiate. Similarly, CEOs face market competition, regulatory environments, and internal company dynamics that can hinder their ability to implement changes unilaterally. The Performance of Power in Politics In democratic systems, politicians often find themselves wearing a metaphorical mask, performing an alter ego that aligns with public expectations and media portrayals. This performance of power, rather than the actual wielding of it, becomes crucial for maintaining their position. The notion that politicians must “act” power rather than be powerful is vividly illustrated in their public personas and campaign strategies. Narendra Modi, for example, has cultivated a strongman image, portraying himself as a decisive leader capable of transformative change. Rishi Sunak, with his polished public appearances and careful articulation, embodies the image of a competent and reliable leader. Even Keir Starmer presents himself as a principled and steady alternative to the current government. These public personas are meticulously crafted to resonate with voters and maintain their support. However, the performance often takes a toll on their true selves. The constant need to project power and confidence can lead to a disconnection from their authentic personalities, resulting in a deranged or altered character. This is not merely an act of deception but a necessity imposed by the nature of political life. Power in this sense can be deeply corrosive to the character of any politician, and takes a Herculean effort, and large portions of luck to maintain integrity, honesty, and vulnerability. Power and the Media: The Role of Communication Often in British democracy, to effectively wield power, politicians must often bypass traditional bureaucratic structures and communicate directly with the public. This is typically achieved through the media, which acts as a filter and amplifier of their messages. Only by engaging with the public can politicians hope to turn the cogs of power and initiate change. Liz Truss provides a poignant example of this phenomenon. Rory Stewart, a fellow politician, recounts an incident where Truss, uninterested in genuine policy development, demanded a hastily concocted seven-point plan for national parks. This plan, quickly handed to the BBC for publication, served more as a performative act of power than a substantive policy initiative (Stewart, 2023). Truss’s actions illustrate how the desire for power can eclipse the commitment to actual governance. The Realities of Power The case of Liz Truss is emblematic of a broader trend where the allure of power can overshadow its responsible exercise. The performative aspect of power is often prioritized over its substantive application. Politicians like Truss crave the appearance of decisiveness and control, even if it means neglecting the follow-through necessary for real change. In contrast, Rory Stewart himself represents a different approach to power. His dedication to detailed policy work and genuine change highlights the potential for power to be exercised responsibly and effectively. However, such an approach is increasingly rare in a political landscape dominated by media performance and public perception. Stewart, to-date, has failed as a politician in the United Kingdom precisely because he refuses to engage in the performative aspects of being a politician. So what? The nature of power is a complex interplay of influence, perception, and action. Those in positions of authority, whether in politics or business, are often constrained by external factors that limit their ability to exercise power fully. In democratic systems, the need to perform power complicates the genuine exercise of it, leading to a disconnection between public personas and true capabilities. Ultimately, the effectiveness of power hinges on the ability to engage directly with the public, leapfrogging bureaucratic inertia and leveraging media influence. As the cases of Modi, Sunak, Truss, and Stewart demonstrate, power is not just about holding a position but about the delicate dance of perception, communication, and action. This nuanced understanding of power reveals both its potential and its pitfalls, underscoring the importance of authenticity and responsibility in its exercise.