2024

india elections

Getting almost a billion voters to the polls: a look inside the 2024 Indian Elections

With national elections having begun in India, this article shines a light on the complexities of organising an election for almost one billion voters, including the voting phases, access to poll booths and whether India’s electronic voting systems ensure a free and fair contest. It is co-written by a constitutional law academic from the UK and a trained lawyer from India with expertise on elections. In recent weeks, just under 50m voters in the UK have had poll cards pushed through their letterboxes, informing them of their nearest polling station for the upcoming local and mayoral elections. On 2 May 2024, they will head to the appointed place – usually a local sports club, community hall or other public building – mark a slip of paper with a pencil cross and cast it into the maw of a black plastic box. On the other side of the world, nearly 20 times this number have begun voting in the 2024 Indian parliamentary elections, the largest electoral exercise on this planet. But how in practice does a country like India get a billion voters to the polls, and how does voting take place?  The most obvious feature of the 2024 Indian elections is that – for reasons of practicality, more than anything else – they do not take place on one day: the General Election 2024 schedule published by India’s Election Commission indicates seven ‘phases’ taking place in consecutive weeks from Friday 19 April 2024 through to Saturday 1 June 2024. In 22 of India’s 28 states and 8 Union Territories, including Gujarat (26 constituencies) and Tamil Nadu (39 constituencies), there is one polling date for the entire state; in Bihar, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh, voting is spread across all seven weeks. Holding elections across multiple phases has been a consistent feature across all Indian parliamentary elections since India gained independence in 1947, and is mirrored to some extent in the primaries for the US presidential elections.   A second aspect of the logistical problem presented by the Indian parliamentary elections is ensuring access to polling booths. India’s electoral rules state that there should be a polling station for every 1500 voters, and no voter should be made to travel for more than 2km to cast their votes.  Voting in India has also long transcended the pencil and paper approach of the UK. After a series of pilot tests, Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) have replaced paper ballots throughout India since 2001, and after testing in several assembly elections, the ‘Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)’ mechanism was added to the EVM from the 2019 General Election.  What happens on polling day? After security checks at the entrance of the polling station, voters face an ID check. A permanent ink mark is put on their finger (to show they have voted), and they are directed to the ballot unit which is protected by a screen to ensure confidentiality. The ballot unit usually has 16 buttons, each representing a candidate and their political party (if more than 16 candidates are running, then multiple ballot units are installed). Voters press a button on the ballot unit to cast their vote. The VVPAT machine then prints a slip showing the serial number, candidate name and party symbol selected by the voter. This is displayed in a glass window for 7 seconds to enable voters to verify their choices, completing the voting process.  According to the Election Commission, EVM units cannot be connected to any input source or third-party machines, ensuring their independence. EVMs also have a mechanism (the Unauthorised Access Detection Mechanism) that disables the machine immediately if anyone tries to tamper with it. Before each election in which they are used, all machines are tested, and a mock poll is conducted on 5% of the machines randomly selected by representatives of recognised political parties.  Research by the Brookings Institute suggests that EVMs have successfully contributed to the health of Indian democracy in three ways. First, EVMs have reduced electoral fraud. Because they control the rate of voting (four votes per minute), political party officials cannot physically ‘capture’ booths and rig the vote by filling boxes with paper ballots, and the presiding officer can close voting if issues arise. Second, EVMs improve electoral competition by reducing the vote shares of both incumbent and winning parties, an observation corroborated in more recently published research. Third, EVMs make it easier for marginalised groups to vote, as paper ballots can be a barrier to those who are illiterate or who have received less formal education. The study also indicates benefits in relation to efficiency, a vital consideration given the size of India’s electorate.  On 26 April 2024, the Supreme Court of India dismissed a petition urging either a return to full paper balloting, or that all VVPAT slips should be counted, describing in some detail the safeguards within the system. This reinforces earlier cases in which the Court upheld the credibility of the system, including another judgment earlier in 2024, and cases in 2017, 2018 and 2019.  The behemoth that is the Indian parliamentary elections will continue to rumble on for the next six weeks, its great silver voting machines zig-zagging their way across the vast expanses of the country. It is not until 4 June 2024, when all the votes have been counted and the results are announced, that the impact of the planet’s largest electoral exercise will be revealed to the world.  Co-written by Pravar Petkar and Nitish Rai Parwani.

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The International Centre for Sustainability Launches This Month

The International Centre for Sustainability launches this month, a new global hub dedicated to fostering a deeper alliance between the UK, the West and India. Spread over two floors in the heart of the City, the Centre is an independent research and advisory organisation rooted in nine key pillars. The first of its kind, the ICfS will become a single point of access for policy makers, academics, journalists, politicians, writers, influencers and the public at large to better understand India and her diaspora. The ICfS will officially launch on Wednesday 10th April, followed by two weeks of exclusive panel discussion and roundtable events, with themes including emerging technology and its effect on democracy, disinformation and the digital threats shaping our world and whether animals should be given personhood. To see our full event calendar and register for a free ticket, please click here. To find out more about the events, email Nicole Chidgey on [email protected]

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Britain needs Stronger Intelligence Cooperation with India ICFS

Britain needs Stronger Intelligence Cooperation with India

Intelligence cooperation between the UK and India has a long history and remains a key component of the bilateral relationship. Like most intelligence relationships, there have been moments of highs and lows. However, moving ahead, the quality of this relationship can be strengthened by infusing a sense of equality into a relationship that has hitherto been viewed with a sense of power asymmetry favouring Britain.   Historical Evolution of India-UK Intelligence Relationship  The evolution of India-UK intelligence relationship can be observed in five phases. The first phase is the pre-independence period when the Indian intelligence bureaucracies were led by colonial Englishmen. The agencies focused on tackling threats from criminals, subversives, and revolutionaries, with the aim of solidifying British colonial rule in the subcontinent. Many of the tools and techniques of intelligence were learnt by India during this period.   The second phase began from the time of independence to the 1971 Indo-Pak war. During this period, the intelligence relationship strengthened over time. Since independence, even as the Indian political leadership sought to sever the umbilical cord between the Indian Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the British intelligence, interpersonal relationships between officers of the IB and the MI5 became a key driver for strengthening ties. After the 1962 India-China war, Britain became India’s key intelligence ally by sharing technical intelligence equipment, imparting analytical training to Indian intelligence personnel, and establishing some of India’s covert action agencies.  Although this period could be seen as the golden age of Indo-British intelligence relationship, the power asymmetry was palpable. British intelligence relationship with post-colonial states during this period was giving rise to a ‘commonwealth intelligence culture’. Although the post-colonial states certainly benefited from British tutelage, on balance, the relationships were just means for British influence in the regions and largely served Britain’s anti-communist agendas. London’s reserved approach towards Indian intelligence was reflective of this trend. Where skills related to anti-communism were required, such as counterespionage, British intelligence services were readily available. On other areas, however, help was less forthcoming.  The third phase emerged during the 1971 Indo-Pak war and lasted roughly till the 9/11 attacks. Geopolitical changes brought Britain closer to Pakistan and China whilst India became a key partner for the Soviet Union. Against this backdrop, Indo-British bilateral relations began plummeting. Britain even played host to several of Indian insurgent leaders causing discomfort in New Delhi. Despite this, intelligence relationship remained much stronger than between other organs of the government, driven mostly by the interpersonal relationships developed between intelligence officers over the years. Therefore, except on matters such as Kashmir and Pakistan where severe restrictions were placed by British policymakers, intelligence cooperation continued across several important matters.   The fourth stage was born after the 9/11 attacks and picked up steam after the 2005 London tube bombings. A Joint Working Group (JWG) on Terrorism was established and witnessed sharing of intelligence between the two countries. However, this relationship too was not without limitations since the key source of terrorism in India, i.e. Pakistan, was Britain’s ally. Additionally, London was restrained in its options given the large and active British Pakistani diaspora, which frustrated Indian counterterrorism efforts. Once again, Britain’s own interests dominated the Anglo-Indian intelligence relationship leaving disastrous consequences for India as seen in instances such as the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. Not only did Britain not share vital intelligence it had developed on the Lashkar-e-Taiba, but it also further insisted on India exercising restraint against Pakistan. The latter was motivated largely due to the presence of many British Pakistani citizens in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.  The Present and Future of UK-India Intelligence Cooperation  Whilst counterterrorism related intelligence cooperation continues, the present and fifth phase of the relationship is witnessing shifting priorities on both sides, particularly in Britain. Recognising the threat posed by China and emerging technologies, the UK has declared an Indo-Pacific tilt and desires leadership in artificial intelligence (AI). With respect to the Indo-Pacific, as most observers confess, Britain’s aspirations are larger than its ability to deliver. US Secretary of Defence, Lloyd Austin, also noted that Britain is ‘more helpful’ in the Euro-Atlantic space than in the Indo-Pacific. Such a scenario provides Britain with reason to strengthen relationship with India, and intelligence cooperation is one such area to foster deeper ties.  In the last few years, India has made considerable investments in naval power under the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) to develop a safe, secure, and stable maritime domain. Efforts have been taken to develop maritime domain awareness through creation of avenues such as Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) hosted by the Indian Navy. When established in 2018, France became the first country to post a liaison officer at the IFC-IOR headquarters where non-classified information is exchanged. UK followed suit two years later, in 2021. The same year, the UK’s Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 21 held maritime training with the Indian Navy. However, as noted by the Defence Committee of the House of Commons, ‘Indian Navy received less benefit from this training then from its combined training with US Navy carrier groups’. The committee, thus, suggested that ‘the UK must be a reliable partner to India’. As the CSG 25 is set to arrive at Indian shores next year, there are hopes for positive developments.  On cyber and AI, modest efforts towards cooperation are beginning to emerge, although much of the AI related cooperation is seen in non-security domains. Critical infrastructure protection, prevention and deterrence of cyber-crime are areas that hold potential for greater India-UK intelligence sharing. However, hitherto cooperation is mostly happening under the aegis of multilateral frameworks such as UN led conventions and the International Counter Ransomware Initiative. Last year, there were explorations for bilateral cooperation with the visit of Lindy Cameron, CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to India and meetings with key stakeholders, including India’s then National Cyber Security Coordinator, Lt Gen. Rajesh Pant. However, the real outcomes of these explorations are yet to be fully ascertained. There is, nevertheless, a clear indication of the availability of a talent pool

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Why Ukraine and the West must resist Putin’s fuzzy logic ICFS

Why Ukraine and the West must resist Putin’s fuzzy logic

This is part one of a three-part response to the Carlson-Putin interview.   The United Kingdom for all intents and purposes is at war with Russia.  Underlying all other points this must never be forgotten. To my mind Tucker Carlson has pulled off the interview of the year. He allowed Putin to speak, and some have claimed that this has allowed us to glimpse at the world through Putin’s weltanschauung: how he interprets the world, and Russia’s position in it. This could also be an incredibly naive position to take, as it implies that what Putin was telling us was what he believed – for which one must take a gigantic leap of blind faith over a chasm of lies and deception. Putin’s narrative had an altogether different intention. What it was remains opaque, but certainly not truthful.    No sooner had the interview been aired, western commentators began responding. The BBC: Tucker Carlson interview: Fact-checking Putin’s ‘nonsense’ history;1 Britain’s foreign policy think tank, Chatham House writes: ‘Putin’s Carlson interview shows the links between Trump talk and Russian messaging’;2 and Britain’s Guardian writes: ‘Tucker Carlson’s Putin interview wasn’t journalism. It was sycophancy’.3 Russian reactions were also loud. The Russian News Agency has articles with titles such as: ‘Putin’s interview with US journalist racks 150 mln views on X social network’;4 another wrote: ‘Criticism of Putin’s interview with Carlson designed to derail peace dialogue — German MP’;5 and ‘The Pope urges the West to listen to Putin and start negotiations with Russia without any preconditions,” Leonid Sevastyanov stressed’.6   In a liberal society, ideas and their counter ideas should be coming at us from all sides, allowing us to see the world from as many perspectives as possible. Of course, in reality it becomes almost impossible to see “the wood from the trees”. As a Director at the International Centre for Sustainability, based out of London, our very raison d’etre is to do exactly that – make sense of difficult things, from a view that is as objective as possible. Furthermore, we concern ourselves with everything that involves British (Western) and Indian interests – after all we are a centre that comments on both countries. Russia stands at a very perplexing intersection right in between Western and Indian interests. To my mind, it is worth noting the Pope’s first sentence, and maybe not his second one; namely that we ought to listen, and really listen attentively, with ample curiosity.  I have done exactly that. I have tried to listen and really understand the “Putinian worldview” with equal amounts of scepticism.     The first thing to note is that Putin presents a historical narrative. Here he rests on a vision of the historical territorial extent of Russia, using Orthodox Christianity as the binding agent, something which his regime wants to re-create.  This is essentially a state that is trying to claim legitimacy for its hostile actions from historicity. After taking us through a thousand-year history in 30 minutes, he leads us to the thrust of his argument, namely that Ukraine as a state essentially rests on a quasi, even superficial idea with shallow roots in modern history. He claims that Ukraine not so long ago denoted a people (Russian) who lived out on the frontiers – it was a geographical notion, not one of a separate identity. He also criticises Soviet leadership, especially Lenin and Stalin in creating an idea of Ukraine and Ukrainians as a separate region.  All this is particularly dangerous because Putin de-legitimises an entire nation, millions of people who may indeed have interwoven connections with Russianness but classify themselves as distinctly other.   The colonial British tried to do something similar in India. The British tried to convince themselves and everyone else, including the Indians that they were essentially a non-nation, and that they all belonged to completely distinct separate castes, tribes and clans. There was nothing that they could call India, if it were not for the British. Sir John Strachey who had spent many years in the subcontinent, and had once been the Governor General’s Council, gave a series of lectures at Cambridge University to an audience of ‘to-be’ civil servants of the raj. In this lecture he claimed that ‘India was merely a label of convenience, a name which we give to a great region including a multitude of different countries.’7  Strachey was so convinced by his own myopic experience that he said, ‘Scotland is more like Spain than Bengal is like the Punjab’.8 He wasn’t finished. He went on to say with all the hubris-induced self-conviction, ‘in India the diversities of race, language, and religion were far greater. Unlike in Europe, these countries were not nations; they did not have a distinct political or social identity… this is the first and most essential thing to learn about India – that there is not, and never was an India.’9 One wonders what Sir John Strachey would say now if he was to see modern India, unified, and steaming towards her hundred years of independence? The residue of these preposterous notions is still found in countless works of scholarship and worse still, in the attitudes of civil servants and the wider establishment in western nations. Just as the colonial British empire ultimately failed in concocting its false history, Putin too, with his dreams of a Russian Empire, is most likely to fail in de-legitimising Ukraine.   When I speak with Ukrainians, they are first to admit their close ties with Russia and the Russian people, but, they say, “we are Ukrainians, and we want to govern ourselves and protect and promote our own distinct culture and identity.” Certainly, Putin’s history, even if partially correct, does not justify his actions. If one were to follow Putinian ideas to their end, we would have perpetual war and conflict between nations. Just think for a moment if India started to think in the same way about Pakistan, or Bangladesh, or Sri Lanka. It would be nothing short of disaster for everyone concerned. India too,

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ICfS response to ‘Neither Confirm Nor Deny’ article

On 27th January 2024, the ICfS came to know that an opinion piece was written by a researcher named Ollie Ryan Tucker. Tucker accuses the ICfS of being a “pro-Modi”,  “well-funded” think tank.  The International Centre for Sustainability is an independent research organisation funded by individual donors and well-wishers, with the primary aim of fostering a deeper alliance between the UK and India in order to promote sustainability. The centre is not politically aligned with any individual nor any political ideology. We do sustainable. The centre stands for strengthening democracy, liberal institutions, the rule of law, delivering better governance, protection for all sentient beings, and our ecosystem, all underpinned by a robust ability to defend our interests.  Tucker also makes allegations against several of our fellows, which we consider to be baseless, slanderous and in bad taste. We stand behind all our staff who do a brilliant job in researching and understanding some of the most difficult challenges facing our planet. The centre writes on a wide variety of issues from trade deals to environmental justice, and on countering extremism to de-radicalisation. If you would like to know more, please get in touch with us at [email protected]

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Ram Mandir

The Ram Mandir temple at Ayodhya: Forging harmony or repeating history?

Whilst all attention turns to unrest in the Middle East, the opening of what is considered to be the equivalent of Mecca for Hindus is passing with little opposition from extreme factions in the UK. A site that has been marred with communal unrest, with thousands of lives lost, has often seen activity in Ayodhya pour over into neighbouring states and, indeed, the UK. Is this the moment for resolute peace? Gujarat 2002 saw 790 Muslim and 254 Hindu lives lost and countless families displaced, in a horrific display of retribution and revenge. The catalyst, the burning alive of Hindu families returning on a train from a pilgrimage to the soon-to-be-consecrated site of the Ram Mandir. The contest for possession of the infamous Ayodhya site has claimed thousands of lives, attention now turns to whether Monday’s consecration can be an opportunity for peace or yet another reason for communal unrest. Mass violence over possession really began in1992. The strongly held belief that the site was the birthplace of Lord Ram, making the soon to be Mandir equitable in spiritual significance to Mecca for Muslims, or Bethlehem for Christians, spilt over into violent religious extremism. The violence in India sent ripple effects across the globe including the UK where Hindu temples in Leeds, Sheffield and Derby were set ablaze and numerous Hindu businesses attacked. Since 2002 initiatives to lift people out of poverty and eradicate caste, corruption, and vigilantism have significantly reduced slum communities. Slums in India have historically acted as a society within a society, having within them their own system of judge, jury and executioner. A mixture of bigotry, fear and lack of resources has led police to leave slums to fend for themselves. Nothing was starker than the 2002 riots in demonstrating where such neglect could lead. Ram is a major deity in Hinduism. He is the seventh and one of the most popular avatars of Vishnu. In Rama-centric traditions of Hinduism, he is considered the Supreme Being. Since improvements in police recruitment and training have been made, the initially slum-based violence of 2002 has little chance of repeating. But more than that, there has been a cross-community and cross-political acceptance of the Supreme Court’s judgement, one that unanimously ruled Hindus held the possessory rights over the site and allocated land for the building of a mosque. This respect for the court’s secularly based judgement, combined with a want and will for greater communal harmony, makes the consecration more a mark of peace and reconciliation than a cause for concern. One of the primary Muslim litigants, whose house was burnt down in the 1992 unrest, said at the time of the Supreme Court verdict, “We had said that we will accept whatever the court decides even before the judgment came. We now welcome the verdict. It’s all in the past now. Let’s hope the verdict and construction of the mosque paves way for permanent peace in Ayodhya.” Anwar Hussain, a Muslim artist contributing to the festivities on Monday, expressed hope for permanent peace in Ayodhya, symbolising the potential for coexistence. His sentiment is echoed by many Muslims who see the event as an opportunity for communal harmony. Muslim artists from across the country are supporting the opening and partaking in the festivities; 40 Muslim women are preparing to present Lord Ram with a handcrafted outfit and Gulam Jilani, a Muslim tailor who specialises in making religious ‘Mahaviri’ flags in Jharkhand’s Hazaribagh district, has stitched a flag measuring 40 feet in length and 42 feet in width that will fly from the Mandir. As various communities, including Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs, and Muslims, contribute to the construction of the Ram Mandir, the narrative of inclusivity within diversity takes centre stage. Whilst the communities push for peace extreme fringes on both sides will attempt to peddle divisive narratives. There will be accusations of Hindu supremacism or articulations of a Hindu victory over Muslims. We have seen in recent years how perceptions of Hindu nationalism in India can inspire attacks on Hindus in the UK. In Leicester in 2022 Hindu homes, temples and vehicles were targeted in response to British Islamist claims that “Hindutva terrorists” were threatening Muslims. With Ayodhya’s harrowing history it is likely those intent on sowing Hindu-Muslim division will once again raise their voices, yet not a pip from the typically vociferous 5 Pillars et al. Shakeel Asfar lead a mob of masked Muslim men to protest against a Mandir in Birmingham in 2022, as it planned to host Sadhvi Rithambara, a key agitator in the illegal demolishing of the mosque in 1992. This weekend he has shared content of himself at a pro-Palestine march encouraging the crowd to shout, “from the river to the sea.” British Islamists may indeed be distracted this weekend, but one should be cautious in assuming they are finished with their campaign against British Hindus. The true challenge for both India and the UK lies in steering the narrative away from division towards a shared vision of inclusivity within diversity. As the world watches the formal opening of the most significant Hindu temple, the story that unfolds will determine whether this is a celebration of inclusivity or another chapter in a narrative steeped in violent unrest. While government and communities invest in fostering inclusivity, the answer ultimately lies in the eyes of the beholder and indeed how this chapter is told. For further consultation and media requests, please contact [email protected] To read the ICfS briefing pack on Ram Mandir, please click here.

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